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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

FRENCH OFFICIAL DISCUSSES MIDEAST PROBLEMS

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 133, 28 Aug-3 Sep 82 pp 21-22

[Interview with Prominent French Foreign Ministry Official by Jamal al-Rawi: "Paris Discovered New Facts: Prominent French Official Tells AL-MAJALLAH, 'The PLO Cannot Be Terminated after Everything That Happened; the United States Discovered That Its View of the Organization Was Wrong; Our Relations with Israel Are Very Poor, but We Will not Break Relations; We Support Iraq and a Unified, Open and Pluralistic Lebanon;' " in Paris]

[Text] Much has changed in France's posture on the conflicts in the Middle East since Israel's invasion of Lebanon began. With the increase in French diplomatic efforts that followed the entry of Israeli troops into Lebanese territory, Paris discovered new facts and noticed the extent to which its positions were distant from those of Washington and Tel Aviv. France modified the general concept underlying its actions in the area. AL-MAJALLAH interviewed a senior official who is responsible for French foreign policy. That official, who had recently met several area leaders in the course of a broad tour he had completed in several countries of the Middle East, stipulated that he not be identified. We agreed, and we had this candid interview with this prominent French official in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the general concept underlying the French position on what was happening in the area.

[Question] What is your analysis of the situation in the area today?

[Answer] The Middle East area is going through very complicated labor pains. What is happening in Lebanon and in the Gulf represents only some of the characteristics of that difficult labor. This period is one that abounds in political, economic and religious questions about the future of the region, a future which appears to us to be very mysterious.

[Question] What is the basic principle that defines your position on the conflicts in the area?

[Answer] The French position on the crises in the Middle East stems from the principle of rejecting the use of force and the need to maintain a dialogue between all parties.

[Question] Do you believe that a non-military solution can be achieved in Beirut?

[Answer] I do not believe that any of the parties in the dispute has an interest in completing the battle of Beirut. It is not in Israel's interests to become involved in a street war because this would cost the Israeli army a large number of its men. In the battles of Wednesday, 4 August the Israeli army achieved no significant progress and yet it lost 19 men, and 84 of its men were wounded. These manpower losses are very large for the Israelis. I do not believe that they are prepared to sacrifice hundreds and perhaps thousands of their men in the army. In addition, the Israeli army is a modern army, and it costs large sums of money. Going into Beirut would greatly increase these material costs which Israel has been paying ever since its incursion into Lebanon began. The frail Israeli economy cannot endure all this. The Palestinians too have no interest in completing a battle which they are losing militarily. With their steadfastness the Palestinians achieved the most they can achieve politically, and bringing the battle of Beirut to an end is in their interests. Therefore, it is in no one's interest that this tragedy should continue. However, this does not mean that the military option has been cancelled. Inside and outside Israel there are those whose thoughts are quite extreme. On our part, we believe that what is left of Beirut must be saved from destruction and that the Israeli army must not enter West Beirut. Our interest in saving Beirut is due to our conviction that saving Beirut means saving Lebanon. Beirut is a symbol for Lebanon. If it is destroyed or occupied, this will mean the end of Lebanon as an independent entity.

Doing Away with the PLO Will not Solve the Question

[Question] You said that the PLO with its steadfastness realized significant political gains. What did you mean by that?

[Answer] Certainly. If the Israeli army had been able to occupy Beirut in the chaos of the early days of the incursion, it would have dealt a final blow to the PLO. However, the hesitation of the Israelis and the steadfastness of the Palestinians altered the given factors of the situation. After the defeat of the early days, the Palestinians were in high spirits. They reinforced their defenses and confronted the Israeli army as an equal. This showed the world that their cause existed and made the PLO realize major political gains on the international scene. These gains would not have been realized had it not been for the Israeli attack.

[Question] It is evident that the aim of Israeli and U.S. policy is to liquidate the PLO. This is based on an analysis which states that doing away with this organization will lead to a solution to the question of the Palestinian people. What do you think of that?

[Answer] Doing away with the PLO would never lead to a solution to the Palestinian question; it would rather increase the complexity of the question. It would provide the opportunity for the establishment of several Palestinian organizations, and it would increase the extremism of Palestinians in general. The PLO with its present leadership follows a moderate policy. In order for this policy to continue, we must give the organization an honorable political way out. At any rate, we believe that the PLO will survive and that it cannot be eliminated after everything that has happened. This organization has [gained] major political recognition which has increased after the Israeli incursion into Lebanon. Mr Yasir 'Arafat's political stature cannot be as easily eliminated

today as the Israelis think. A better solution to the Palestinian question would be to give the Palestinian people a state on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This is their land, and the vast majority of inhabitants there are Palestinians. There is no doubt that the interests of the Palestinian people require that there be one organization defending their rights.

[Question] What do you think of the U.S. position on the Palestinian question?

[Answer] The Americans used to believe that if the PLO were eliminated, matters would become easier. Now, they have begun to discover the error of this analysis. U.S. policy changes slowly, and Americans take a long time to adjust to new given factors. Sometimes, they even persist in their errors instead of changing their policy. There is no doubt that their analysis of the situation in the Middle East has undergone considerable change in recent months even though the early signs of that change are still undeveloped and incomplete.

[Question] What do you think of the efforts that are being made by U.S. envoy Philip Habib in Lebanon?

[Answer] Philip Habib's mission is not a serious one. How can the United States claim that it wants to reach an agreement with the disputing parties and at the same time refuse to communicate and meet with one of the parties? If Ambassador Habib were serious in his mission and intent on stopping the bloodshed, he would have to meet with Palestinians and apply greater pressure on Israel.

Relations with Israel are Very Poor

[Question] What about relations between Paris and Tel Aviv today?

[Answer] Our relations with Tel Aviv are very poor, but we still communicate with the Israeli government.

[Question] What more do you expect the Israeli government to do before you break diplomatic relations with it? Wasn't the conduct of the Israeli army and weren't the statements made against France by senior Israeli officials enough for breaking relations?

[Answer] What good would it do to recall our ambassador in Tel Aviv? If such a decision were made, it would be useless. Israel is an existing entity that is presently going through a period of transition. There is a new generation of Israelis growing, and that generation is looking at things differently. We must not break relations with Tel Aviv because this would mean breaking diplomatic relations, and that would mean that we had lost hope and discontinued the dialogue. We must wait and be deliberate. The present Israeli policy will not continue forever.

[Question] If we were to rule out breaking diplomatic relations, what can you do to deter the Israeli government from persisting in its policy, especially since your actions at the Security Council are subject to the U.S. veto?

[Answer] We do not have much leverage with Israel, but this does not keep us from expressing our position continuously. As far as the Security Council is

concerned, we have large capabilities through that body despite the fact that our position is different from that of the United States.

[Question] Do you anticipate that the European Community will impose sanctions on Israel?

[Answer] So far, we have not prodded our European allies in the direction of imposing sanctions against Israel.

Lebanon's Future Is a Mystery

[Question] How do you see the future of Lebanon?

[Answer] Lebanon will either be a pluralistic country or it won't be Lebanon. Lebanon's power and its weakness [as well] lie in its pluralism. This is the nature of this country whose existence as an independent country can only be justified if that existence is based on pluralism. We are opposed to partition; we are against small states that want to be militarily strong. Throughout its history, Lebanon has been a threshold not a stronghold. A partitioned Lebanon would not be Lebanon and cannot play the role that a united Lebanon can play. France supports the notion of an open and a pluralistic Lebanon. It is this notion that ties us to that country, and it is the one that determines all our policies toward it. Our view of the Lebanese question is a pragmatic one. We want Lebanon to be independent and united. In general the Lebanese people agree with the notion of a pluralistic Lebanon, but they reject the reality of this idea. That is, they refuse to accept equality. Each Lebanese faction claims that it wants a Lebanon for all the people, but at the same time that faction tries to control Lebanon by itself. The future of this country is a mystery that is tied to the extent to which the Lebanese people are willing to make sacrifices for a pluralistic Lebanon. Unfortunately, however, we know that there will be no solution to the tragedy of this country until a solution to the Palestinian question is found.

[Question] President Elias Sarkis's term will end in a matter of weeks. What in your opinion are the characteristics required in a new president?

[Answer] The selection of a new president for Lebanon is something that is up to the Lebanese people and their representatives. We tend to support every presidential candidate who wants a united, democratic and pluralistic Lebanon.

[Question] Does Bashir al-Jumayyil, in your opinion, fill this prescription?

[Answer] We do not have a position on Bashir al-Jumayyil or others. What matters is that the new president be capable of building a country that can fulfill the aspirations of all the factions of the Lebanese people.

We Support Iraq

[Question] The Israeli incursion into Lebanon is not the only conflict in the region at the present time. An extensive war is going on in the Gulf. Where do you stand on this war?

[Answer] It is our opinion that weakening Iraq would weaken the region. Accordingly, we support Iraq in this war. Naturally, we do not support all the policies of Baghdad. We were not convinced, for example, of the reasons the Iraqis used to justify their attack on Iran in September 1980.

[Question] Do you believe that the PLO has anything to do with the attack on the Jewish restaurant in Paris which took place on the 9th of this month and led to the death of six persons?

[Answer] So far we do not have sufficient information about the identity of those who committed this crime. However, I do not believe that the interests of the PLO would be served by committing such an act, especially under present conditions.

[Question] How do you evaluate all of your relations with the Arab countries?

[Answer] In general, French-Arab relations are good, but the Arabs do not think about us unless their relations with the Americans are not good.

[Question] How in your opinion can French-Arab relations be strengthened?

[Answer] We would like to strengthen these relations. What is important is that Arab countries have a serious desire to engage in open relations with powers other than the United States or the Soviet Union.

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CSO: 4404/661

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

ISRAELI MUSLIMS IN EGYPT—Egypt has given grants to five Muslims from Israel so they can train in the al-Azhar University. Our correspondent Bassam Ja'bar notes that the president of the state, the prime minister and Arab elements have appealed to the Egyptian authorities on several occasions requesting that Israeli Arabs be allowed to learn at al-Azhar due to a shortage of Muslim clergymen in Israel. [Text] [TA131546 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1500 GMT 13 Sep 82]

CSO: 4400/484

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

PALESTINIAN JOURNALIST DISCUSSES PALESTINIAN NATIONAL CULTURE

Kuwait AL-TALI'AH in Arabic No 757, 25 Aug 82 pp 39-41

[Interview with Yahya Khalaf, the Secretary General of the Association of Palestinian Writers and Journalists by the information delegation of the association's chapter in Kuwait: "Palestinian National Culture Has Been and Is Being Enriched by the Armed Struggle;" in Damascus]

[Text] The national awakening brings about a cultural, literary and artistic awakening. Writers and journalists must not be less courageous than the fighters who are defending Beirut.

The Nazi U.S.-Zionist invasion [of Lebanon] comes across as an action undertaken not only against military and political fighters, but rather against much more than that. This Nazi invasion comes across also as an action undertaken against literary figures, writers and journalists, particularly since a national culture cannot be established outside the national political entity of any nation. Nor can a national culture be established outside the frameworks and experiences of these people.

It is therefore inevitable that the significant role which writers and journalists play on and off the field be considered. Writers and journalists play that role with a sense of commitment and unity, and they do not separate themselves from the struggles of the masses and the fighters. Here is the text of the interview that the information delegation of the Association of Palestinian Writers and Journalists conducted with Yahya Khalaf, the secretary general of the association, who was not able to return to Beirut after the invaders surrounded the city.

[Question] One of the objectives of the vicious imperialist, Zionist attack is to destroy institutions and accomplishments and kill individuals who made and are making a contribution to the progress and development of Palestinian culture and literature. What do you expect will be the military outcome of this battle, and what will the effects of this outcome be on the progress of Palestinian culture and literature?

[Answer] The aim of the U.S.-Zionist attack is to exterminate the Palestinian people and liquidate the vanguard of the Arab national liberation movement which

is represented by the Palestinian Revolution and the Lebanese National Movement. Its aim is to destroy Beirut and what Beirut stands for today, a stronghold of Arab pride and opposition. Its aim is to exterminate the Palestinian and Lebanese people and to strike at all the cultural and humanitarian accomplishments of Beirut, the capital of Arab culture. Its aim is to strike at the cultural and political achievements of the Palestinian people.

This repugnant, barbaric and murderous attack by the Zionist imperialist military machine has been without precedent in history. It is an attempt to uproot everything: to uproot people; to uproot the spirit of resistance; and to uproot political and cultural gains.

In the past we writers and journalists proclaimed the slogan of writing for Palestine in blood. Now it is the children of Beirut who are writing for Palestine in blood. Resistance for the sake of Palestine comes from the windows and balconies of homes and from the waves of the sea.

The most serious matter we are facing in this battle is the official Arab silence about what is taking place. The most serious matter we are facing is this apathy that is without precedent in the region.

Sooner or later Arabs will know that the joint forces with their extraordinary resistance are in a forward position putting up a defense against the imperialist Zionist advance towards Arab capitals.

What do we expect militarily from this battle?

Regardless of the outcome, the PLO will survive; the Palestinian people will survive; and the idea of armed struggle will survive. The hostile force does not exist that can disarm the Palestinians or put out the fires of the armed struggle. Therefore, the struggle of the Palestinian people will continue until all its objectives are achieved.

Our generation, which joined the ranks of the revolution since its birth came to fight under the slogan, "The national war of liberation will last for a long time." We do not despair, and we do not know defeat. We assumed the responsibility after the [Arab] regimes were defeated in June 1967, and we were the popular alternative to the defeated regimes. We [illustrated] the popular birth of the Arab nation, and we were able to embark upon the most honorable and the most noble battle of the Arab nation in its struggle with the national enemy who is represented by Zionism and imperialism and the forces that are associated with them.

Now after many years of experience, we are the ones who are fighting, while the [Arab] regimes stand by and watch.

The fighting in which the joint forces and the Palestinian and Lebanese people are involved is action that is being undertaken to defend the righteousness, the purity and the integrity of Arabs. It is an addition to the accumulated struggles that were forged by the contemporary struggle of the Arab masses.

This heroic fight will create a new Arab awareness, and it will be followed by a sweeping revolutionary awakening in the entire Arab region.

I do not believe that as Palestinians we stand alone. All unassuming, poor and honorable Arabs will be among the fighters of the next phase. I believe that after this battle there will be a new phase of the Palestinian Revolution. I believe that a national awakening will be accompanied by a cultural awakening as well as a literary and artistic awakening. All forms of expression for national and democratic liberation will change for the sake of national and social liberation; for the liberation of Palestine; for the liberation of Arab countries from open and secret occupation; and for [the establishment of] a unified, democratic Arab homeland.

[Question] What is the role of the association in this battle? What is the role that Palestinian writers and journalists are expected to play during and after the battle?

[Answer] As soon as the battle broke out, the association began publishing a daily newspaper in Beirut called AL-MA'RAKAH [The Battle]. All Palestinian literary writers and journalists in Beirut took part in bringing out this paper which featured the outstanding works of these literary figures and journalists and conveyed them to the fighters and those who were resisting in Beirut at their positions and places of hiding.

Despite difficult conditions, this newspaper is still being published.

Most Palestinian writers and journalists, particularly those in Beirut and in the remaining areas of Lebanon in general have joined the ranks of the joint forces and are fighting with their guns and with their pens.

Outside Lebanon Palestinian writers and journalists have made contributions to all daily bulletins that are published and distributed to Palestinian and Arab communities. I mention here specifically, the bulletin, SADA AL-MA'RAKAH [Echo of the Battle], which is published by United Information in Damascus, and also SAWT AL-MA'RAKAH [Voice of the Battle], which is published by Palestinian popular organizations in Kuwait.

Despite the fact that most members of the general secretariat of the General Association of Palestinian Writers and Journalists are preoccupied in combat duties in Beirut, the association did play its part in the battle. It took political action in the Arab world and internationally through the relations it has with the International Association of Journalists and with the Association of Asian and African writers. It also took action through the relations it has with the associations of Arab literary writers and journalists.

We tried to prod cultural and journalistic circles into action, and we began with a march for Arab intellectuals in Damascus that took place in front of the American embassy.

In the coming months several international symposia for solidarity with the Palestinian cause will be held in several European capitals. These will implement decisions by the association of Arab journalists and the General Association of Arab Literary Writers. These decisions were based on working papers submitted by our association.

With regard to your question about what writers and journalists are expected to do during and after the battle, this is a question that is being asked of every writer and journalist throughout the Arab scene.

I will not preach to writers and journalists, and I will not tell them what role they should play. However, I ask them to demonstrate [a degree of] courage that is not less than that of the Palestinian, Lebanese and Arab fighters who are defending Beirut.

[Question] What is the role that associations of Arab writers, literary writers and journalists are expected to play? Were the contributions of these associations commensurate with the attack that was waged by the hostile force? What is the role they are expected to play in the future?

[Answer] Most Arab associations are subordinate to their regimes. Some of them took action and issued statements, whereas others remained silent. This battle has demonstrated that these official associations are impotent.

This battle has demonstrated that these associations do not represent the truth about the movement of culture or the media in their countries. On the other hand, this battle has brought to the forefront the marginal role Arab intellectuals play as a result of the repression and curtailment of freedoms in the Arab homeland.

However, it was in a relative way that the General Secretariat of the Association of Arab Journalists met at our request and issued a set of resolutions and recommendations and formed some delegations.

Also the permanent office of the General Association of Arab Literary Writers and Writers met in Tripoli in north Lebanon. The association's meetings constituted a new cultural phenomenon.

Regrettably, I must say for the record that most associations of literary writers were not present at that meeting, and a quorum was established with difficulty.

[Question] Palestinian cultural and political organizations and the political freedoms under which they operated in Beirut played a leading role in enriching Palestinian culture and literature. How can this role continue if the hostile attack were to succeed in achieving its objectives, chief among which is getting the Resistance out of Beirut?

[Answer] No matter what happens, Beirut will continue to be the capital of Arab culture. No matter what happens, the national forces fighting for the unity, the Arab character and democratic development of Lebanon will survive. Therefore, Beirut will continue to be the most splendid of cities. It will continue to be a cultural symbol.

Palestinian national culture has been enriched and continues to be enriched by the armed struggle. The experience of common struggle has given this culture its content of a democratic struggle.

Numerous cultural organizations have flourished, such as the [Palestine] Research Center, the Institute of Palestinian Studies, the Association of Palestinian Writers and Journalists, Unified Palestinian Information, AL-KARMAL Magazine, which is published by the association; and the economic magazine, SAMID, which is published by the SAMID Organization, etc. These organizations will survive, and if they are destroyed by the shelling, we will rebuild them.

Palestinian national culture has deep-seated roots and can be found wherever Palestinian intellectuals can be found: in Lebanon, in the occupied land and in other Arab countries. This national culture is part of Arab national culture. It will play a more significant role in the future.

[Question] What has this battle added to the Palestinian people's sense of self in the cultural, literary and political area?

[Answer] If the common saying about the hammer shattering glass but flattening out and strengthening iron is true, then the Palestinian people, who faced the ferocious wave [of the attack] and the destructive military machine of imperialism with extraordinary courage, have gained a new experience for which the price was blood and loss of life. The Palestinian people have gained from this experience a greater willingness to continue the armed struggle. This experience has affirmed to the people the importance of this struggle through the eagerness of imperialism and Zionism to liquidate the Palestinian Revolution.

The battle will harden the cultural, political and war experience of the Palestinian people, despite the heavy price they paid.

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CSO: 4404/653

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

FIGHTER JETS DENIED TO PLO--The Kuwaiti magazine, MIR'AH AL-UMMAH [Mirror of the Nation] has revealed in its latest issue the substance of a secret agreement between the PLO and an Arab country. The revelation is attributed to informed Palestinian sources. The agreement would allow Palestinian fighters in the forementioned country to fly 30 MIG-21 and 23 airplanes in successive sorties and to carry out suicide operations with these airplanes during which they would bomb some Israeli cities. Palestinian sources added that it was hoped that such operations would constitute a major pressure factor on the Zionist enemy and would upset military and political equations, forcing the Begin government to revise its policy completely with regard to its forces' invasion of Lebanon. Such action may have even forced the Begin government to recognize the PLO. Palestinian sources expressed strong bewilderment because the Arab country in question did not abide by this agreement and prevented the Palestinian pilots from carrying out the suicide missions for which they had undergone prolonged rigorous training to ensure success in case they carried out these missions. Palestinian leader, Yasir 'Arafat sent a letter to the president of the forementioned country reminding him of the agreement that had not been carried out. [Text] [Amman AL-UFUQ in Arabic No 19, 11-17 Aug 82 p 7] 8592

CSO: 4404/660

KARMAL SAYS UNITED STATES PREVENTING PEACE INITIATIVES

Kathmandu THE RISING NEPAL in English 31 Aug 82 p 3

[Text] New Delhi (AFP)--Afghan President Babrak Karmal has accused the United States of seeking to tie down an estimated 100,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan, the Indian News Agency (PTI) reported Sunday.

In an interview with the agency Mr Karmal said, "It is the international reaction, specially the United States," which is provoking crisis in this region and not letting the Soviet troops return to their country.

Mr Karmal added that all problems with his eastern neighbour Pakistan could be resolved through negotiations.

"What is required is a common sense approach on the part of Pakistani rulers and a readiness for direct talks (with Afghanistan)," he said.

Mr Karmal said it was the U.S. administration's "design" to undermine the Soviet Union by preventing peace initiatives and by creating problems for Moscow.

PTI reported that he said the recent talks with Pakistan conducted under the auspices of the United Nations in Geneva were "very useful" and he had struck an optimistic note on the exercise.

Talking about the Afghan refugee problem, Mr Karmal accused Pakistan, which now housed over 2.7 million refugees, of preventing them from returning home.

Official statistics however, compiled by world relief agencies and supported by diplomats, say there are about four million Afghan refugees abroad.

Mr Karmal also accused Iran of preventing the homecoming of Afghanistans.

The PTI interviewer said his meeting with the Afghan President took place in the "heavily guarded" presidential palace in Kabul.

Mr Karmal claimed the security situation and political stability of his Soviet-backed government was increasing "day by day, week by week and month by month."

He said the situation of his embattled country would return to complete normality within a couple of months if "interference from outside ceased."

He accused the 'bandits' the official name for Moslem insurgents fighting his government--of being responsible for his country's ills.

He acknowledged that a visitor to Kabul could hear "firing here and there" and he blamed it on the "bandit gangs."

"The counter revolutionary forces cannot resist the Government and the armed forces openly, that is why they come in small terrorists groups," he said, apparently conceding that Moslem insurgents were active.

CSO: 4600/757

AFGHANISTAN

KABUL BROADCASTING TO REFUGEES TO RETURN HOME

Kathmandu THE RISING NEPAL in English 31 Aug 82 p 5

[Text] New Delhi, (AFP)--The Soviet-backed Afghan Government has begun a two-hour daily broadcast over the state controlled radio to try to coax back an estimated four million Afghan refugees who fled the country after Moscow's armed intervention in December 1979.

The broadcast, which began Friday with the Moslem holy prayers, is specially aimed at Afghanistan's eastern neighbour, Pakistan, which has given shelter to more than 2.7 million refugees, said Indian broadcasters who monitor Kabul radio.

The broadcast can also be heard clearly in Iran, which has a large number of Afghan refugees, and India.

"The broadcasts for Afghans abroad will explain the lofty aim of the sour (April 1978) revolution and disclose the atrocities of the agents of imperialism and plots concocted by them at the instance of their masters," Kabul radio said Saturday night in formally announcing the broadcast.

The broadcast is seen by diplomatic analysts here as part of a Moscow-engineered campaign to win back the refugees who have drawn international attention and have been aiding Moslem insurgents fighting the government of President Babrak Karmal.

The broadcast followed an appeal by Mr Karmal Tuesday asking his countrymen to return to their homeland. Mr Karmal said returning refugees will be pardoned under a general amnesty announced twice by his government, but largely ignored.

The appeal, rejected outright by insurgent leaders in Pakistan, called upon Afghans to return home immediately. Mr Karmal said the refugees should not continue to live "poverty and dismal conditions while their leaders were rolling in luxury and busy enjoying a life of pleasure."

Insurgent leaders questioned Mr Karmal's sincerity but the campaign follows reports that many Afghans who fled the country were finding it increasingly difficult to stay abroad because of local government and financial problems.

Over 800 Afghans have left India for Kabul during last three months, a refugee leader here said.

The campaign also follows daily reports in the state-owned newspapers said diplomats, on refugees returning home. To judge by the reports, more than 25,000 refugees should have returned to Afghanistan during the last six months, said diplomats who monitor developments in the embattled country.

CSO: 4600/757

SOVIETS USING ASCETIC LEADER TO INFLUENCE MUJAHEDIN

Karachi DAWN in English 31 Aug 82 p 3

[Text]

LONDON, Aug 30: The Soviet Union is now employing, in typical colonialist style, professional 'Fa-qirs' and 'Malangs' with some following in Afghanistan to dissuade the Mujahideen from Jihad and pave the way for acceptance of the Soviet-backed administration.

One such known malang, Bahauddin Jan Agha, these days has been active in Qandahar Province. Some of the Mujahideen fighting on Qandahar fronts are reported to be his disciples. Within Qandahar city all the beggars and malangs are stated to be within his discipline and he also commands some influence among the commoners. The Soviets have been utilising the services of this ascetic who has seemingly forsaken worldly comforts.

Bahauddin Agha joined a newly created organization 'Jibha-i-Milli Pider Watan' (National Fatherland Front) and was projected by the Kabul government with a scheme. It is reported that Agha's performance was appreciated at a recent meeting of the Defence Ministry. He is a welcome guest everywhere

in the province and has been issued an identity card with the Governor's signatures.

Bahauddin Agha visited the Mujahideen's fronts in the month of Ramazan and asked them if they stopped disrupting power installations within the cities he would secure release of their companions from jails. But he never fulfilled his promise whenever the occasion arose. The 'Malang' in his Eidul Fitr address had said that he was displeased with the armed resistance of the mujahideen. He argued that in this fighting the people have suffered a lot.

Meanwhile, bombing by MiG fighters and helicopter gunships in the rural area close to Qandahar have resulted in the killing of two Afghan women and injuries to several children.

According to reports reaching here on Aug 20, MiGs and helicopter gunships bombed and strafed the villages of Qalcha and Nakhooni near Qandahar city and fired rockets as a result of which two women were killed and a number of houses were destroyed. A woman and five children were injured.

KHOMAYNI SEEN SURVIVING INTERNAL, EXTERNAL CRISES

Zurich DIE WELTWOCHTE in German No 31, 4 Aug 92 pp 4-5

[Article by Andreas Kohlshuetter: "Why Iran has Gained in Strength both Internally and in the War with Iraq--Longwinded Revolution"]

[Text] Since the beginnings of the Islamic Republic, Khomeyni's rule has been repeatedly declared dead--but today the power of the ayatollahs is stronger than ever before. Young Iranians are sacrificing themselves by the thousands for their religious ideals. It is, however, still unclear whether a struggle for power may not be getting under way at the highest levels of the regime.

With the battle cry, "The way to Jerusalem leads through Baghdad," Ayatollah Khomeyni drove 100,000 Iranians into the "holy war" invasion against the Iraq of Saddam Hussein. As a sendoff for Operation Ramadan on 13 July the old ayatollah raged against the "blasphemous regime" in Baghdad and declared that the goal was to overthrow the regime and replace it with an "Islamic government." He said: "Our Iranian brothers were forced to invade Iraq in order to deliver the suppressed people and to send the regime of suppressors to hell."

Of course, things have not yet progressed that far. And the invasion calculation of the Teheran mullahs has not yet proven to be correct. The Iraqi nationalist resistance spirit is now being aroused against the theoretic arrogance of Khomeyni. The Iraqis are obviously fighting better on their own territory than they did before on Iranian soil. The more so as the Shatt-al-Arab terrain with its water obstacles favors the defenders and forces the Iranian attackers to technical tours de force of which they are possibly not capable, their revolutionary elan notwithstanding.

Under the invasion pressure of the Iranian religious fanatics, the readiness of lay-Shiite, Kurdish, communist, and possibly military opposition circles within Iraq to stab Hussein in the back is sinking.

Teheran invasion propaganda has also finally been adjusted to circumstances. Talk about the great ultimate goals such as the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, the occupation of the holy Shiite pilgrim city of Kerbala and the "liberation of Palestine" via Baghdad has grown quieter. On the other hand, immediately

achievable military goals are being accentuated. These include the erection of a "security belt" for the protection of the Iranian border region against enemy artillery fire and, most importantly, also for the reconstruction of the exposed economic centers of Isfahan and Khorramshahr.

Claims to Power in the Entire Region

The immediate goals also include the intention to block the vital reinforcement route from Kuwait to Basra along which fuel, food and weapons have been rolling toward Iraq since the beginning of the war.

Such swinging back and forth of the pendulum between rhetorical and real invasion goals does not alter the fact that the invasion of Iraq as well as the aggressive Teheran policy of harassing Saudi Arabia and the oil sheiks, underline hard claims to hegemony which are permeating the entire region. At the same time, they represent a ponderous challenge to the interests of the West. Filled with expansive confidence and conviction, as early as the end of May after the recapture of the port city of Khorramshahr, which was of decisive importance in the war, Khomeyni urged the Arabian Gulf states to show more respect for the new power relationship: "Now you know that our victorious government and nation speak from a position of power."

It is a fact that one gets this impression in the gulf. Against this background, Kuwait refuses any consultations about security policy with America whatsoever. The U.S. offer of joint military maneuvers remains unanswered everywhere. The gulf states feel threatened by the new dominance of the revolutionary Islamic Iran, but they shy away from intensified ties with America or even with Egypt which could enrage Khomeyni against the neighboring "U.S. lackeys." The conservative ruling families on the Arabian peninsula are more inclined to adapt to a life with Khomeyni of long duration. Even the death of the monumental leader of the revolution, as people are now saying more and more frequently, will in no way cause the sudden collapse of the rule of the Teheran clerics.

All of this is based on the assumption of a solidified and consolidated power structure within Iran. Eyewitnesses confirm that victory in the gulf war and the expulsion of the Iraqis have brought the mullah regime a clear increase in popularity. The call to resistance by the leader of the leftist Islamic Mujahedin guerillas, Massud Rajavi, faded away in any case without an echo. After the decisive battle at Khorramshahr he appealed from his exile in Paris to the Iranian army, police and gendarmerie, to "continue the true war" and to "take aim at the Khomeyni regime with all weapons."

The War Cost more than 60,000 Dead

In the view of observers on the spot, however, the mood in both Teheran and the countryside is stamped with weariness of war and terror. The dead in the gulf war up to now are estimated at between 60,000 and 80,000. The victims of the civil warlike disturbances within the country--Kurdish uprising, guerilla warfare in the cities between the Mujahedin and the

revolutionary guards, and the Islamic revolutionary terroristic executions--are numbered at about 25,000. No wonder the spectacular bomb placements and assassination campaign of the Mujahedin, the one active and unscrupulous resistance movement which is ready to kill, found no support among the people. After some 10,000 arrests (Khomeyni's secret police has been significantly improved), massacres and executions of members and sympathizers, the hard-pressed Mujahedin leadership finally had to spread the word that "the phase of self-preservation has begun, limit your movements and meetings to a minimum." The ebb of violence was greeted far and wide with a sign of relief.

The Iranians are in no mood for a great uprising against Khomeyni. A Dubai businessman with Iranian relatives describes this aspect of the national psyche: "passive, apathetic, mistrustful toward all official and opposition promises, convinced that everything would only get still worse with open resistance." Many, very many, especially the lower classes and the gigantic south Teheran city proletariat, are continuing to commit themselves meanwhile with Iranian-Shiite passion to "Khomeynism," which is defined by a diplomat in Teheran with many years of experience as an Iranian specialist, as "the new attempt of an Islamic country to go its own way, a way which in this specific religious alignment--because it is too anachronistic--is presumably doomed to collapse, but which is filling the masses in Iran, even a newly developing elite, with great enthusiasm."

The capacity of the Islamic regime to hold out and recover economically plays an important role in this connection. Hidden to a large extent behind the scenes of the gulf war and contrary to all Cassandran prophesies and mullahs have brought about a consolidation of their sagging economy, but without removing the basic evils: mass unemployment and galloping inflation, serious gaps in supplies, rationing, black market, and queuing up for meat, eggs, rice, sugar, cheese, milk, coffee and cooking oil, all of which are characteristic of everyday life. Still, the will to overcome crises and to reconstruct rationally is there. The signs are growing of a tendency to get things cranked up again with more pragmatism and less fanaticism:

--With a current daily output of 2.5 million barrels, oil production has taken a surprising leap forward. Exports have grown from 400,000 barrels a day at the beginning of 1982 to about 2 million today, for the most part, to be sure, at spot-market prices not fixed by contract which are as much as 20 percent below the OPEC level.

The Financial Situation Has Improved

--The Iranian financial situation has improved as a result of the "little oil boom." The ominous pressure on rapidly shrinking foreign-exchange reserves has diminished considerably. Thus, among other things, vital food imports and the payment of government salaries which the majority of the working population depend upon, could again be assured.

--Foreign experts, formerly avoided and expelled, are once again welcome in revolutionary Iran which has recovered its economic senses (West Germans: power plants, perhaps also oil installations; Italians: harbor works and pipe lines; Russians: steel sector; Yugoslavs and East Germans: mining and machine industry).

--Great investment projects which were rejected and suspended after the fall of the shah are being energetically revived, such as, for example, the deep sea harbor complex at Bandar Abbas, the Bandar Khomeyni petrochemical complex, the copper extraction installation at Sarchesmeh, the nuclear power plant at Bushehr, the infrastructure for a domestic nuclear industry, and the automobile assembly plant for Talbot cars.

--The budget adopted in March in the amount of \$39 billion (heavily emphasizing agriculture and non-petroleum industry) heralds a period of growing general and new investment. Business with Japan and Europe is especially flourishing. Contracts with the Krupp concern (steel works expansion, sugar refining, cement factories) soared from \$37 million in 1981 to \$100 million in 1982.

--Behind the smokescreen of religious agitation, the goal-oriented soberly calculating political clergy makes economic deals with the "little Satan" (USSR) and even with the "giant Satan (United States). In 1980-81, trade with Russia more than doubled (to \$1.2 billion), imports from the United States rose from \$20 to \$300 million. Since the beginning of 1982, Iranian oil is again flowing across the Atlantic, even into the strategic reserve of the U.S. Government.

--Khomeyni's theocracy again enjoys credit with its big businessmen, without which it cannot be governed. The anger of the bazaars with the economic stagnation, anarchy and nationalization plans has grown silent. Their flirtation with ex-president Bani Sadr and the national mujahedin is apparently over.

Now the Clergy Must Demonstrate Ability

The masses of the "mostazafin," the "disinherited and the underprivileged," on which the radical Islamic regime depends, are no worse off than they were before the revolution, in the view of Western and Arab experts on Iran. As an analysis has confirmed, Khomeyni's Islamic populism, with its "stress on readiness to suffer and the feelings of self-worth of the lower classes," is still able to bridge "the discrepancy between the expectations awakened by the revolution and actual miserable conditions, and will continue to be able to do so."

The Islamic Republic has understood how to avoid the torturous choice between guns and butter. That is no small achievement. Bread has never run out for the people and munitions have never run out for the troops fighting the Iraqis. And the invader has been defeated, the gulf war practically won. Thereby, of course, the much used lightning rod for all critical grumbling within the country against the Khomeyni regime, was dismantled. Internal

politics is gradually regaining its prewar primacy. The political clergy with their hands on the levers of power must demonstrate their leadership ability and their capacity to govern. The excuse of the external crisis is less and less convincing.

By drawing out the definitive end of the gulf war, especially by holding fast to the improbable demand for an unconditional surrender by Saddam Hussen in Baghdad, Khomeyni may be able to postpone the hour of truth. With acts of military violence such as Operation Ramadan, he can tie up his armed forces for a good while on remote borders far from Teheran and thus neutralize and rein in all their desires for a say on how things are run, desires which have certainly grown in the aftermath of their military triumph. But the ayatollah will not escape domestic political postwar stress. Postwar turbulence is evident in two areas of tension which could destabilize the revolutionary regime and transform the gulf war victory into a domestic defeat: the armed forces and the Shiite priesthood.

The Iranian Bonaparte or Cromwell who might be borne up on the waves of war and chaos from being leader of the troops to being a dictator, feared by the ruling clergy, is nowhere to be seen. The 34-year-old commander in chief of the land forces, Col Ali Sayyed Shirazi, who is considered the victor in the decisive gulf war battles at Dezful/Sush (late March) and Khorramshahr (late May), is considered by informed circles to be a model of loyalty: "dedicated to the regime with body and soul, an enthusiastic and obedient child of the Khomeyni revolution."

The rise of Shirazi and the barely 30-year-old brigade commanders around him coincides with a palpable relaxation of the once explosively tense relationship between the regular career army rooted in the regime of the shah and the Islamic Revolutionary guard or Pasdaran. In an early phase of the gulf war, these tensions had weakened the Iranian resistance forces enormously and made coordinated actions difficult. Today the feud seems to be set aside, the army completely brought into line--by persuasion, circumstances and force.

For the time being, this army is no longer a viable instrument for a military putsch even though one should not exclude the possibility of a new outbreak of the old malaise in the event of a senseless, militarily unjustified prolongation of the gulf war operations on Iraqi territory. The more so as the Pasdaran see themselves as the pace setters of those fanatical, Islamic revolutionary forces which would like to go on shooting and advancing right up to Kerbala and Baghdad, even "into Saddam's palace itself."

Competition of Islamic Groups

People who know the country say, however, that the "purified and bleached" Iranian army, even if it grumbles, no longer represents a real danger in the coming years for the mullah government. Moreover, the governing clerics, who do not wish to see their political circles disturbed, are putting reins on the wild-running radicalism of the revolutionary guards.

As a politician and a statesman, Khomeyni is trying to dampen the impetuosity of the Pasdaran. As the original revolutionary, he cannot and does not want to throttle this source of power, but he is trying at the same time to keep the inner development of the Pasdaran under control.

Khomeyni has already mentioned the competition of "various Islamic groups" who are struggling for influence in the Pasdaran associations. In doing so, the ayatollah was addressing the struggle for power going on, still largely behind the scenes, which has broken out behind the facade of unity of the Islamic revolution in the ranks of the Shiite priesthood. Soviet press and radio complaints are running in the same direction with regard to the absence of ideological and political homogeneity in the Iranian clergy which are, in the Soviet view, permeated with reactionary, counter-revolutionary, unrealistic and anti-Soviet forces. And in connection with the dubious affair regarding a plot involving the moderate Ayatollah Shariat Madari, the newspaper KEYHAN commented, "Has the moment not come to sanitize the clergy? Apparently the majority of the priests at the school of theology in Qom are lacking in revolutionary conviction."

In recent months, three clerical trends have become more strongly recognizable than before, though without genuine party alliances with fixed programs and clearly defined circles of followers.

There is One Opposition

On one wing there is the political clergy educated by scribes of the second and third rank under the leadership of Khomeyni which stands as a relatively close-ranked social-revolutionary community sharing the same fate. Flexible positions in the middle is occupied by high-ranking clergy including some of the highest who are religiously conservative and who remain aloof as much as possible from government operations. Among these are five of the six--with Khomeyni--"great ayatollahs" (Marja-e-Takhlid). On the other wing, there is the extremist, militant messiah movement, the Mahdaviye-e-Hodjatiye, which will not commit itself politically or in a social-revolutionary sense but is all the more rabid in persecuting "heretics" (Bahai) and "atheists" (communists) and is acting today as a loose religious community of interest. Even so several ministers and about one-third of the parliamentary delegates are classed with this wing.

At the center of the Islamic opposition to Khomeyni stands his claim to the immediate exercise of political power by the clergy which is confirmed constitutionally in the institution of the "religious leader" (Velayat-e-Faqih).

The Political Vacuum Is Still Effective

Such worldly militance and dominance by the Iranian Shia is of relatively recent date in history. It contradicts the long, quietist tradition of renunciation of power, of adaptation to those in power at the moment and self-limitation to the purely religious area. The conservative clergy opposes or is at least uneasy, about Khomeyni's political Sturm and Drang. They

fear for the purity and existence of the doctrine because the erection of God's kingdom on earth is a matter for the returning Messiah and hidden 12th Imam. The Hodjatiye zealots argue that Khomeyni's Islamic Republic is a definite hindrance to the deeply longed for return of the savior who will only appear when the world sinks into paganism, depravity and turmoil. The conservative opponents have nevertheless succeeded in blocking Khomeyni's social-revolutionary program especially the regulation of the succession of the old ayatollah.

During a Friday prayer in Teheran, a clash developed between those who wanted Khomeyni to live long and exalted and others who with an anti-Khomeyni slogan called out for immediate help from the Messiah: "Mahdi, come! Mahdi, come!" Still such dramatizations of the differences of opinion in the camp of the Shiite clergy are exception.

For one thing Khomeyni maneuvers cleverly through the clerical fronts. He seeks to isolate unshakeable opponents like Ayatollah Shariat Madari, to assuage and to integrate compromise-ready theologians. He does this by means of demonstrative persecution of the Bahai and the application of thumbscrews to the communists, which satisfies the Hodjatiye. He does it by means of apologetic discourses in which he recalls that the mullahs had already broken through the barriers of political noninvolvement at the time of the Prophet and that clerics had only been forced by need to take power in revolutionary Iran and only temporarily--until the nonclergy were in a position to govern the Islamic Republic as "ordered by God."

Secondly, for the foreseeable future there is no worldly and lay alternative. The prevailing political vacuum created by the shah and continued by Khomeyni after a very short democratic pause makes clerical rule irreplaceable for a long time.

Thirdly, Khomeyni can rely on a basic consensus which surmounts all differences and cements the clergy and also on the fact that these homemade opposition theologians will remain loyal, that no one is willing to risk an open break with the Islamic regime and the "line of the imam" Khomeyni.

9827

CSO: 4620/60

DEVELOPMENTS IN WEST AZARBAIJAN DISCUSSED BY PRESIDENT

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 23 Aug 82 p 10

[Text] Yesterday at noon, Mr Ghafari, representative of Salmas's people in the Majlis, accompanied by a group of officials from that city, met with Seyyed 'Ali Khamene'i, the president. At the beginning of the meeting Ghafari presented a report on the city's political and social situation to the president. Then Khamene'i, pointing to the tricks of the past regime's masters, and their effort to create disagreements among the various peoples during and after the victory of the Islamic revolution, said: By raising the banner of the Party of God and the banner of following the nation's imam, the people of West Azarbaijan have made all those who eyed Azarbaijan with illegitimate aims despair, despite all the obstructionism and sedition in that very far-flung point. He said furthermore: This region's people have dealt with and resisted those groups opposing the Islamic republic and those elements who saw their survival in the destruction of the Islamic republic in such a way that the shameful, cowardly scheme of the revolution's enemies has come to nothing.

The president, pointing to the losses inflicted by the enemies of the Islamic revolution in the Kurdish and Turkish regions, including the takeover of the Mahabad Base by elements of the counterrevolution and the martyring of a number of dear brothers in that base, emphasized the adherence of these region's people to the Islamic republican government, and said: Without a doubt, if the people of these regions, whether Turk, Kurd, Shiite or Sunni, had not adhered to the Islamic republic, certainly not only the Islamic republic but any power would have faced problems in confronting all the sedition that was being strengthened by the enemy. He said: The only thing that brought about the despair and defeat of the counterrevolution in those regions, and caused the revolution and the Islamic republic to remain standing with all its power was the agreement, adherence and attachment of the people to the officials of the revolution and the Islamic republic. This is a great honor for all the people living in those regions. Pointing to the turmoil in Kordestan, the president then said: Our foreign enemy is not looking for any special persons. It will use any person that it can put into service, just as in your region it took control of Turkish, Kurdish, Shiite and Sunni elements. He added: Those persons who fought against our dear Revolution Guard brothers in the trenches of Kordestan and West Azarbaijan, most of whom were annihilated, were mainly neither Turk nor Kurd. Rather, they were counterrevolutionaries that had gathered in these regions from various points in the country in order to strike a blow against the Islamic revolution. The tyrannical, cowardly Iraqi

regime had also sent them weapons from across the borders and had assisted them so that they would fight against the Islamic republic. He added: It is not proper for a person to say that elements opposed to the Islamic revolution are Kurdish elements. It is not proper for a person to create discord between Shiite and Sunni brothers with these pretexts. All those persons whose interests were endangered by the Islamic republic, who fell victim to the temptations of foreigners, whose hearts were not illuminated by faith, and who have not accepted Islamic education, they have become opponents.

Emphasizing the preservation of unity between all strata of the nation, the president said: The enemy is looking to create discord in the Azarbaijan region, and you must make him despair. He said: The people of West Azarbaijan, whether Turk, Kurd, Shiite or Sunni, and all the other peoples must crush God's enemies in the region by maintaining unity of speech and taking refuge in God's love. Fortunately, the evidence of the enemy's defeat can be witnessed in the region. Pointing to the victories of Islam's warriors on the warfronts and in the struggle with the counterrevolution, Khamene'i said: Because the enemy sees that our people have been able to acquit themselves in the war arena and in military confrontations, it has engaged in sedition in the political arena. The president stressed: Anyone who raises a tune in which there is discord or a gap between the Islamic nation and the Iranian Muslim people is a traitor to the revolution, the people and the Islamic republic. He said: Those persons who raise the banner of discord and doubt and divide Muslims on the pretext of protecting this or that people or this or that sect are wicked people. Be sure that the people and the Islamic republican government will cleanse all the region from the filthy deceived stooges of the great satan and the little satans. In conclusion the president stated: Just as the nation, through the power of faith and zeal, was able to persuade the basic counterrevolution to flee the country, it can now put in their places all those stooges in the region which are trying to create insecurity and discord and which are under the influence of foreign powers.

9597

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IRAN

FOREIGN, DOMESTIC ISSUES DISCUSSED BY PREMIER MUSAVI

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 29 Aug 82

[Interview with Prime Minister Musavi]

[Text] ETTELA'AT Political Service-Mir Hoseyn Musavi, the Prime Minister of our country, answered questions from ETTELA'AT's political correspondent in an exclusive interview yesterday pertaining to recent developments in the country and international policies. The Prime Minister discussed his views pertaining to the conference of leaders and foreign ministers of nonaligned countries, Iran's relations with India and the countries of the steadfastness front, the matter of the opportunism and hoarding of some capitalists, and matters related to the shortage of goods and the problems of production.

Our political correspondent asked the Prime Minister: Please tell us what caused Iran to maintain a special continuation in its political and economic relations with India, and please tell us what kinds of relations Iran will be mainly seeking with India in the future.

The Prime Minister answered: We have many things in common with India, whether they be historical, cultural, or political. Some of the factors which allow us to deal easily with India have their roots in history, and naturally, the rich culture that India has, the historical contacts we have had with them, and the presence of 120 million Muslims in that country all justify our having a special relationship with this country. Some of the issues are to be found in the present, especially if we look at them from the political standpoint. Among the nonaligned countries, India is more firmly committed to the principles of the nonaligned movement, and its policies and positions with regard to non-intervention by the superpowers in the Indian Ocean, the Gulf of Oman, and the Persian Gulf are similar to our own. On the one hand, India is a country that has tried to stand on its own feet from the beginning, to attain self-sufficiency with its own resources, and to move in that direction. Naturally it has been able to do a good job of creating appropriate technology for the aforesaid position within its own country. Again, if we want to study India from the standpoint of other perspectives, it must be said that India is a country with a population of 700 million which naturally attracts our attention as a good market for exports. In view of these features which have been mentioned, it is natural that we are seeking to expand our relations with India. This issue has both geophysical and economic aspects.

Prime Minister's analysis of the Nonaligned Movement

The question was asked: What is your overall analysis of the nonaligned movement? Will Iran participate if the conference of nonaligned leaders is held in a country other than Iraq? In the event of our participation, what issues will we raise? And on the other hand, despite the fact that the conference is to be held in a country other than Iraq, what need is there for a preliminary conference (the conference of nonaligned foreign ministers) to be held in Baghdad?

The Prime Minister answered: In general the Islamic Republic of Iran's position with respect to international organizations rests on the principle that these organizations are to be evaluated and studied to determine to what extent they are independent and to what extent they lean to the superpowers. In view of the internal structure of the nonaligned movement we see that groupings exist there, some of which lean to the West and some of which lean to the East.

There are also groups which try to stand on their own feet as much as they can and have come out polarized trying to find a place for themselves in a confused world.

In comparison with other international organizations, the principles which the nonaligned movement has declared are principles which are attractive to us from the standpoint of foreign policy. It is for this reason that from the beginning since the triumph of the revolution there has been a special tendency in the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran on the basis of which Iran's relations with the movement have been preserved. Of course, taking into consideration those principles which we independently believe in, such as 'neither East nor West' and the issue of protecting the world's oppressed people and so forth, it is natural that we have found it more useful to participate in this organization than in the other international organizations, although we have not compromised our ideas in any way in the process. We have not attached so much hope to this movement that we think it will solve all the world's problems, because we believe that only the activity and vigilance of nations moving in the direction of their own clarity will it be possible to put an end to the chaos in the world today. Naturally, one must realize to what extent the nonaligned movements are capable of working towards this.

The Prime Minister added: With participation in the nonaligned movements, just as in the past, we have tried to declare our own clear positions on the world's problems and to use the movement's tribune to spread Iran's revolutionary message to the nations of the world. If Iran's conditions, which are indeed that the conference be held in some country other than Iraq, are truly accepted, we will participate in the conference and will appear on the same principles and positions as before, and we will expose the plots of international imperialism and Zionism.

America's Plot and the Problem of Palestine and Lebanon

The Prime Minister said: At the next conference we will expose the plans which have been put forward by America for destroying the Islamic revolution of Iran, and we will also discuss the issue of Palestine and Lebanon, which has a special prominence. We will try to cut the hand of the superpowers out of the countries they are tormenting. The foregoing have been the pivotal issues, but other issues will be propounded from day to day at the appropriate times and as needed, because unlike before, our foreign policy is now very active, and position-taking on the aforesaid issues can have a special effect in our encounter with the nonaligned movement.

The Nonaligned Conference and Baghdad

With regard to Iraq and its relationship with the conference, the Prime Minister said: With regard to the question of why Baghdad is trying to assemble the foreign ministers of the nonaligned countries for a preliminary conference in Baghdad in view of the fact that the principal conference site has been moved from Baghdad to another location, the answer is very simple: Iraq is trying to recover some of its lost prestige, because it has nothing to say to its population, and it has also suffered an especially severe defeat among the nations of the world and the various countries and in the international organizations. The leaders of Iraq think that if they can assemble the foreign ministers of the nonaligned nations in Baghdad, they might be able to compensate somewhat for their defeat, but I think that Iraq is putting domestic problems ahead of problems abroad. It is thinking that by filling and emptying the big auditorium it had designated for the conference with representatives of the movement countries this will be a means of justifying in some fashion its two years of criminal activity in Iran to the Iraqi nation. The truth is, however, that matters have gone beyond that stage and Saddam's regime is on the way out.

The Prime Minister continued: In any case, the conference of nonaligned nations has an important role to play in relation to Baghdad's efforts. It must stipulate whether it wants to continue in the future and be a guiding light among the international organizations or not. Holding the conference in Baghdad would mean unlimited destruction and weakness for the nonaligned movement and weakening the movement's role throughout the world in the long run.

The issue that is before the nonaligned movement is not merely the issue of security. The matter of its loyalties has also been raised for discussion. The movement must therefore carefully evaluate this historical point in time, because the superpowers as well are not within the desire to see the conference take place in Baghdad in order to preserve Saddam so that they can create a place of refuge for him.

Iran and the Steadfastness Front

Our correspondent asked the Prime Minister: Why has the Islamic Republic of Iran been more attracted to the countries of the steadfastness front, taking

significant steps towards bringing about economic and political relations with countries in the steadfastness front even though there are Muslim and progressive countries in other parts of the world such as Africa, the Far East, and elsewhere?

The Prime Minister answered: At the present time we have begun moving rapidly in our foreign policy towards coming closer to all the countries of Africa and Asia. If you had noticed, we have sent delegations recently for this very purpose to those countries. Among them was the delegation headed by the respected Minister of Petroleum brother Gharazi which went to the African countries and strengthened relations while visiting these countries. We have also recently appointed several new ambassadors to the African countries and we are in the process of expanding our diplomatic relations with these countries, because we attach a special importance to the Muslim countries of Africa. I must explain, however, that what gives prominence to our relations with the countries in the steadfastness front is the direct and strong position that this front has taken against America and Zionism in the Middle East. If we go back and look at the issue of Israel's aggression, the only Islamic countries that took and are taking a clear and manifest position against Zionist and imperialist aggression are these very members of the steadfastness front. This is why we have established special relations with these countries. The position of these countries on Iraq's imposed war against us was also clear and the other countries did not have such a position. This is naturally a good reason for us to have expanding relations with these countries in a special way.

The Matter of Hoarding and Hoarders

Our correspondent said: In view of the stress that Hojjat ol-Eslam va ol-Moslemin Hashemi Rafsanjani has laid on abstinence from hoarding and profiteering at recent Friday prayers, what, in your view, are the practical ways to fight hoarding and hoarders?

The Prime Minister answered: Some of the fight against hoarding and profiteering concerns the government, and another part of it, which is more important, concerns the people. Hoarding must be viewed as counterproductive in our society, just like theft, which all the people consider counterproductive and sinful and which has become recognized as a filthy act. Hoarding must also be seen as this same kind of calamity in the public mind, and hoarders must be recognized in society as extortionists and thieves. Naturally, there is no comparison between pressure that is brought to bear on hoarders in this way and legal pressure. Apart from this, reform of the distribution system can have a pronounced effect on hoarding. We do not have an orderly distribution system. The people, of course, on their own initiative and also with support from the economic mobilization staff, have brought about innovations, such as creating cooperatives and distribution companies. The economic mobilization staff has played a very important role in the distribution of strategic goods, which has had decisive and controlling effects on the rate of inflation, to the point that during the first three months of the year 1361 [21 Mar-21 June 1982] the rate of inflation reached 15.2 percent. I had previously considered this a miraculous figure, and I still do, because in

view of the wartime circumstances and the extensive attacks we launched on Iraq and so forth, huge expenditures were necessary and it could have had striking inflationary effects. Fortunately, however, the government was able to keep it under control, and all our ministries were active in this matter. Their work was worth discussing, but the distribution effort by the mobilization staff was able to encompass all goods and the people were under great pressure because in the shops the price of merchandise was at black market levels being sold for several times the price.

Of course this has deep roots, and must ultimately be treated at a profound level, but it can also be confronted in the short run. The deep roots go back to the loose capital in the hands of the people, which is sometimes estimated at 500 billion tumans. Naturally, due to a shortage of imports and stagnation in the market, this capital remains uncommitted until a way is found to use it. In reality the easiest way for capital to be used and to show a profit is to put it into distribution. So this is when the pressure of this capital in the hands of a few will at least put us up against black markets and abnormal inflation with respect to some goods. If we can funnel this capital into production--where we also have worries--this matter will undoubtedly be resolved in the long run. One or two or three of these worries that we have consist of a shortage of currency available for importing machine goods, automobiles, and technology. Another problem is the lack of knowledge of individuals concerning production. Another is the lack of a comprehensive plan for those who wish to produce and want to see their level of production on the basis of that plan, need to have credit given to them and have other resources made available. Overall, the solution to this problem is a huge task that can funnel capital into production.

These movements are taking shape of their own accord, however, and their success will be multiplied a hundredfold with the government's help. In view of the statistics of the companies which have been registered as well as the permits which have been issued by the Ministry of Industries, the indications are that an extensive movement to funnel this capital into production has begun. We consider this a beginning, and it will expand better in the future.

9310

CSO: 4640/469

PLO DEPARTURE FROM LEBANON ANALYZED BY PLO ENVOY IN TEHRAN

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 24 Aug 82 p 8

[Text] In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate.

After "77" days of hard, relentless war throughout Lebanon, a war which now continues in the territories occupied in 1967 and 1948 and behind the lines of the Zionist enemy, the first group of strugglers from the Palestinian nation left the heroic city of Beirut. In light of the goals of this aggression, and while we utterly doubt that the enemy and the U.S. engineer of the aggression intend to permit these heroes to leave safely, we say: If the exit actually is carried out, there will be a return as a result of international pressure greater than the enemy's intent and will. With utter doubt with regard to this matter, we say that the Iranian Muslim masses have a right to a basic look at this problem, and furthermore our brothers leading this brother republic have that right from us.

1 - We completely understand that the volume of this U.S.-Zionist aggression exceeded and exceeds the ability of the PLO, the combat forces, and the PLO's allies on the Lebanese scene, although our heroic forces resisted this army which was American from the standpoint of planning, weaponry, training and organized preparations. Furthermore they were confronting an ominous alliance with the enemy on the Lebanese scene from the standpoint of land, ethnicity and trained forces. At the same time many basic, automatic conditions had created separations on the Lebanese scene among the resistance fronts and many of the PLO's allies. As a result of dishonest actions, gaps had come into being here and there among its allies...

2 - The Palestinian and Lebanese forces were utterly alone in the confrontation with this widespread U.S. assault on all axes and in all fields. They created immortal heroisms which will remain in this region's historical memory, and which will be models for all those seeking freedom and dignity for their communities and nations. According to the latest reports, the Zionist enemy (16,500 soldiers and officers) lost a number of fighter planes, helicopters, hundreds of tanks and armored vehicles, and several generals and high-ranking officers. For the first time Begin and the Zionist leaders witnessed the phenomenon of their soldiers fleeing in face of our heroic revolutionaries, the phenomenon of unrest and en masse resignations from the Zionist army, the demonstrations of hundreds of thousands of Jews in Tel Aviv

itself against the Zionist war in Lebanon, and the phenomenon of suicide that high-ranking officers resorted to as a protest against this imperialist war. The armed operations of Palestinian revolutionaries behind the lines of the Zionist enemy also persuaded Sharon, the enemy's minister of defense, to call these operations violations of the ceasefire and a war of attrition which his forces could not tolerate.

Iran's Advance Guard Position

3 - Iran's position in dispatching a number of heroic crusaders to take part in the ongoing battle in the Lebanese arena was an advance guard position. It was hoped that this initiative would be a stimulus for a movement of thousands of Arab and Muslim combatants to the scene of battle, but Arab and Muslim resources, contrary to what was expected, did not mobilize and congregate around this initiative. Iran's evaluation of the Lebanese battle was that the best path to aiding the battle and liberating Palestine was to pass through Karbala.

Actual participation by Arab countries member in the Steadfastness Front, save Syria's battling with the enemy's forces in the Beqa' region, did not occur for various reasons. These reasons can be examined at a later stage during a conference of the Front.

However, the position of other Arab countries was exhausted more or less in permitting some Palestinian volunteers (trained and untrained) to go to the front and take part in the battle. That or they suffered by sending medicine and food. Some others exerted pressure on the United States in order to establish a ceasefire and the safe exit of the Palestinian forces from Beirut, and to provide support for the children of the two nations of Palestine and Lebanon remaining in Lebanon, and they suffered with that.

4 - The Arab regimes were not able to organize a meeting to adopt a decision to help the resistance of the combatants in the Lebanese arena or to stop this U.S.-Zionist aggression.

Only Arab foreign ministers were able to meet in Tunis and form a six-member committee.

After the committee's delegations met and conversed with the permanent members of the Security Council, the committee unanimously approved the exit of the Palestinian nation's combatants from Beirut, while the Palestinian delegation had made a proposal to the Conference of Arab Foreign Ministers and the six-member committee to boycott oil sales to the United States (the engineer and guide of the aggression), to remove Arab deposits from U.S. banks, and to boycott U.S. companies and goods throughout the Arab world and the world of Islam.

Arab Silence

5 - Arab and Islamic silence was an inseparable part of the U.S.-Zionist plan for aggression. The explosion of wars and regional problems were not separate

from this plan. It was a plan whose times were drawn, one by one, on piece by piece of the Arab, Muslim countries. It had dimensions on the Lebanese, Arab and Islamic scenes.

The military and popular accomplishments of the Palestinian revolution inside and outside occupied Palestine, the military growth and development of the Palestinian revolution within and without occupied Palestine, the military growth and development of the revolution in the Lebanese arena, the anti-American, anti-Zionist attitude of the people, the accomplishments of the Palestinian revolution on the international scene in exposing the United States and Zionism and imposing a suffocating isolation on them, the condemnation of their actions in the Palestinian arena and the world, all of these had a great effect on the explosion of their hatred which became manifest in the form of this U.S.-Zionist aggression.

Now, if we add that the Palestinian revolution came into existence in an environment possessing U.S. interests, ties and objectives, a revolution that was supported by oppressed, afflicted masses in opposition to their rulers, and if these masses gain a better chance for action and become organized within the framework of a firmer organization, they will completely destroy all of that which U.S. imperialism has built up during its long history... such as institutions, companies, forces affiliated with it, and the Zionist entity (a U.S. strategic base and the number-one partner in this alliance).

Black September Slaughter

6 - The Palestinian presence in Lebanon was the result of the September 1975 slaughter perpetrated by the Jordanian regime against their presence [in Jordan]. The front in Lebanon, despite all the sufferings and killing which the Palestinian revolution had suffered during 1973, 1976 and the years after that in Lebanon, was the arena for the determinative confrontation with the regime. At the same time the revolution was aiming its rifles at the Zionist enemy; it was compelled to resist Zionism's powerful mercenaries on the Lebanese scene in order to protect its rear, its own masses and the Lebanese nation's oppressed masses. The Palestinian revolution has never said that it wants Lebanon as a substitute homeland for Palestine. Instead it has continuously responded and is responding to those claiming and proclaiming the selection of Lebanon as a homeland that if the Palestinian nation had accepted such plans, it could have lived in all the Arab countries without giving up hundreds of thousands of martyrs and without suffering all these pains and sacrifices. Thus, if this were the goal, it could attain it. The words of Palestine in this area have been and are clear and obvious. We have said and are saying that "Lebanon is a place to rest, not a place to stay." The presence of Palestinians there is temporary, just like the presence of Algerians during the Algerian revolution in Tunis, Morocco and the Libyan Jamahiriyyah was temporary, ending with the victory of that heroic revolution.

Consequences of Continued War in Lebanon

7 - The resistance of the Palestinian and Lebanese warriors in Beirut is a model that can be followed. Despite the thousands of tons of bombs that

were dropped on the residential areas of West Beirut and the positions of the Palestinian and Lebanese forces (their effect and destructive power were greater than that of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombs), and despite the Zionist enemy's abortive attempts to advance along all axes of the battle in West Beirut (the enemy suffered hundreds and dead and wounded in these attempts), despite all of this, the resolve of the Palestinians and Lebanese to repel and suppress the aggression and to accept the consequences of the confrontation all the way to martyrdom was decisive and immovable. Finally, there is a basic reality which one cannot be permitted to ignore, which is that the consequences of continuing the war in this arena will be suffered by not only the combatants and lovers of martyrdom, but also by half a million Lebanese civilian and 700 thousand Palestinian civilians who are exposed to attack within a confined area not exceeding 15 kilometers square. If resistance continues, the enemy can (in air battles like the attacks on 12 August 1982 with 65 planes that lasted 12 hours) make rubble of all West Beirut; people and buildings, such that one will have to use the past tense when speaking about the city. Supposing that the Palestinian and Lebanese warriors in the joint forces who have chosen the path of martyrdom pay no attention to such a consequence, it is still not right for them to drag their allies, who have not hesitated to give their all-out assistance, into destruction. In addition, these warriors are not in a face-to-face battle with their enemy. Instead, it is a one-sided war in which the enemy is using all sorts of destructive weapons, particularly airplanes and bombs (phosphorous, cluster and vacuum bombs and terrible weapons that are being put to the test in the Lebanese arena). Therefore this goal would involve the complete destruction of the combat forces in West Beirut, and the complete destruction of the sea of Palestinian and Lebanese civilians. Such a result would destroy an Islamic future in the Lebanese arena, perhaps forever.

This destruction is taking place under circumstances in which the elements of resistance (the cut-off of water, electricity, medicine, food and ammunition, the destruction of hospitals and clinics) were on the decline. From another angle, the Western and Islamic world were the depressing spectators of this slaughter and had sat down in impatient expectation (of the surrender of the combatants, the destruction of West Beirut on the heads of its residents, lowering the curtain on this stage of scattering the Palestinian revolution across the false, illusory calm of these weak, despicable regimes, and the final collection of the banners of the armed revolution). This speech is not to justify an action, but to present a true picture of the situation. I say this from Tehran, not from the heart of Beirut. Furthermore, I say openly that the departure from Beirut and all its dimensions (which was a joint Palestinian-Lebanese decision and adopted by the legendary resistance fighters in Beirut, without the existence of one opinion taking exception or one person objecting to it, whether within the framework of the PLO or outside it, whether within the Lebanese National Movement or the Amal Movement or outside them) must be examined and completely evaluated within a legal Palestinian framework. Each official must be confronted with his responsibility such that each person who carried out his responsibility in a good way shall be treated well, and any person having made a mistake will be reprimanded on the basis of that mistake. This is because no plot, no matter how great or terrible, has been able or is able to stop the Palestinian nation's

continuous movement in the arena of struggles which has continued from 70 years ago to the present moment. It is true that fresh difficulties will be added to the existing ones, but the march of the masses has always proved that they have been and are capable of dealing with the most difficult problems because their path is the path of truth, the path of the sincere believers.

Fresh Accomplishments

8 - Beirut's combatants are reckoned as an important part of the Palestinian revolution's combatants, but they are not all of the combatants from the two nations of Palestine and Lebanon,...and not all the Arab and Muslim combatants.

Similarly, their exit from Beirut in no way means the fall of the Palestinian revolution and the end of the Palestinian nation's struggles. No doubt their dispersion in several countries is an injury inflicted on the Palestinian nation's struggles in its basic arena, but at the same time it is reckoned as an accomplishment it will attain in other arenas--the relocation points. This is because their presence in those arenas will confront the masses of the aforementioned countries with fresh realities which must be borne, the responsibility for which they must assume. Furthermore, it will be hard for the host regimes to obstruct the reorganization of these heroes and the restart of the long, hard battle with the Zionist-U.S. entity in the region.

9 - The U.S. enemy and its Zionist tool has not yet attained all its goals in this aggression. It further plans to settle the situation on the Lebanese scene such that the Lebanese Muslim forces are totally destroyed by the imposition of "Beautiful Bashir" as the president...Imposing this mercenary will mean a great many things. One of them is the establishment of a Maronite Christian country in the territory of Lebanon which will destroy all other ethnic groups forever. It will conclude a peace agreement with the Zionist enemy, and will place the resisting section of south Lebanon under Zionist authority so that they can construct their settlements there and divert the flow of the Litani River to the occupied territories of Palestine. In the second stage of the aggression the enemy will endeavor to realize the aforementioned goals, just as most of the Zionist and U.S. enemy leaders have announced. In the second stage, they plan attacks on the Palestinian and Syrian presence in the Beqa' region, and plan to get a regime that is ready to sign a peace agreement with the Zionist enemy and to establish good neighborly relations with it. In this way the closed escape route from the Camp David plot will open, the Palestinian problem will come to a so-called end and its file will be closed forever (for the reason that it is the heart of the revolution attracting all the Arab and Islamic world and all the world's freedom-fighters).

Role of Arab Leaders Conference

10 - The enemy's schemes are not so big that we should submit to them, and it is not fated that we accept them. What there is is the tradition of the struggle between good and evil....right and futility. We are on the side of right and good, and for this reason, God willing, victory will be ours.

Here the role of the Conference of Arab Leaders emerges...It is a conference that they want to convene on the corpse of the Palestinian nation and our issue...Through conspiracy and plotting in the conference they want to achieve for the United States and Zionism what they did not obtain on the battlefield. What they want is the official recognition of the Zionist entity, the acceptance of its tyrannical existence, a collective Arab recognition of it, and at no charge. While on the other hand they want to give more tents, charity, food and medicine to 1.5 million Lebanese and Palestinian refugees, accompanied by mournful elegies...If Beirut's resistance had continued 6 months longer, this conference would not have been held because then justifications for it would not have been available.

11 - It has now become clear that the conflict in the region was a history-making one, and was not connected solely with a specific country or a definite territory. (The Zionist entity is the only existing thing in the world whose borders have not been specified in the United Nations. The world has become accustomed to the fact that its borders are wherever its soldiers are.) The United States is governing this conflict, and it has formed the Zionist entity into a base and center for the administration of the conflict. It uses other allied regimes as temporary places of support. When these regimes have completed their missions, they fall and their leaders change and are replaced according to design. The perpetual goal of this conflict is the preservation of long-term U.S. interests and keeping them away from any threat or impetus to a threat. We are not even considering the motivations and justifications that these regions propound to justify their own minor conflicts.

Therefore these movements of nations in the region remain, just as the primary aim of U.S. aggression by any means possible remains. The U.S.-Zionist entity explodes the contradictions in the body of the Arab and Islamic masses within the desired, planned framework, and fans the fires of territorial, border, sectarian and tribal problems so that the movement of the masses is diverted (towards Arabicizing or Islamifying the conflict). Thus the eyes of the masses are focused somewhere else rather than on the fundamental danger which threatens their future and the future of future generations. The mercenary regimes perform this filthy role as deputies for U.S. imperialism and Zionism. Therefore the redetermination of the conflict's priorities by all those sincerely concerned is an issue that must be given attention to the post-Beirut phase. (This is a stage in which the regimes will intensify their suppression of mass movements, old faces will be pushed aside and other faces will appear, regimes will fall so that regimes more loyal to the U.S.-Zionist enemy can come to power...regimes which will close all doors and borders in the faces of Palestinian people and persecute them all over the globe.)

Therefore the slogans of the future phase must be: "Overthrow the U.S. regimes by any means possible," "Help the armed movements of the combative masses," "Open all doors to the warriors," "Every help possible to the forces of confrontation and resistance," "Destruction of the Zionist entity, this U.S. base and place of support," "Aim all rifles towards the U.S.-Zionist entity," and "All efforts and resources at the revolution's disposal."

12 - Critical reviews of our actions before Beirut in all the regimes, organizations, and popular institutions must be carried out. We must open up the most extensive conversations and seminars in order to shape position-taking and the adoption of revolutionary, struggling decisions. We should not suffice with open and hidden criticism of this and that, and fixing responsibility on this or that organ...This is because extending the circle of conflict and widening it, and mercilessly cutting off all the feet of the octopus is more useful without lying controversies and demagogy...

The future should be for revolutionary, struggling men of action. There should be no quarreling because time is lost when the matters and means of the struggle and its continuous movement on the regional and world arenas are halted. All efforts should be towards strengthening revolutionary institutions, and their building should be centralized. Thus for the first time these masses will take on their role across the length and breadth of the Arab and Islamic world. The slogans should be: "All efforts in the service of the battle of destiny...the battle of liberation," "Long live all believing crusaders, all those seekers of paradise, all those eager to meet God, all those asking for eternity."

"Do not consider those killed in the path of God dead, but rather blessed with life near their Lord"--believe in great God.

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CSO: 4540/463

IRAN

RAFSANJANI COMMENTS ON PLO EXPULSION, ROLE OF ARAB STATES

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 25 Aug 82 p 12

[Text] Yesterday morning a group of brother and sister members of the Union of European Islamic Student Societies and a group of sisters belonging to Kashmir Literacy Movement met with Hojjat ol-Eslam va al-Moslemin Hashemi Rafsanjani in the Majlis.

According to IRNA's correspondent's report, Mr Hashemi made a speech during the meeting and explained the current situation in the Middle East, particularly the slaughter of Palestinian and Lebanese Muslims by the Zionist regime and the cowardly expulsion of the Palestinian strugglers. He said: The situation that has now been created in Lebanon shows the importance of the Iranian Islamic revolution. The sensitivity and heaviness of our duty strikes us hard. In the view of the superpowers, particularly the United States, they have consolidated their position. Thus they are mercilessly utilizing all their resources to suppress any development which restricts their future and aggression. We are witnesses of the climax of the cruelty of the so-called civilized world in Lebanon. They displayed their mercilessness and rapacity to a high degree in the expulsion of the Palestinians from Lebanon. They encouraged tyrant Israel to carry out this criminal action. Each time a motion condemning Israel was raised in the U.N., the United States vetoed it with total impudence. All this impudence is very repulsive. The United States no longer considers itself bound to any principle. In this regard the region's reactionary countries displayed their total lack of character. Hashemi added: Considering Lebanon's current state, there is no justification for the Islamic countries not utilizing their great petroleum areas in order to lessen tyrant Israel's influence in Lebanon. During the past two months we have observed how the Islamic countries tolerated this very bitter misfortune with indifference, and even welcomed it and participated in the plot. They made up with those who were holding a grudge, and let Saddam and Hosni Mobarak and the region's masters take part in the plot. Thus they committed the great crime that led to tyrant Israel's temporary victory and the disbursement of the Palestinians to North Yemen, Iraq, Jordan and other countries like the meat of a sacrificial lamb.

The Majlis speaker said: Now the Palestinian combatants have been sent to their places of exile so that they can no longer gain freedom. As the Majlis speaker continued his speech, he added: The United States and the Zionist regime,

with the cooperation of the reactionary Arab regimes, immediately appointed Bashir al-Jumayyil as the president although his Zionist nature is recognized in Lebanon, and despite the boycotting of the elections by Muslims. Bashir al-Jumayyil, who had gone to welcome the Israeli aggressors, explicitly proclaims himself a protector of U.S. interests.

Hashemi then pointed to the eastern superpower's so-called response to the U.S. and Zionist crimes in Lebanon, and said: PRAVDA, belonging to one of the world's great powers, condemns these crimes in only one article and suffices with that.

As Hashemi continued his speech, he spoke about the enmity of the eastern and western world-devourers to the Islamic revolution, and said: In a calculation, is the Persian Gulf more important, or is Lebanon; is the great Islamic republic more important, or several thousand Palestinians; is this great petroleum power more important, or is Lebanon? It is apparent that this place here is important to them. They have not hesitated to use any movement to suppress the Islamic republic. They have equipped themselves with all their military, political, espionage and economic resources in order to confront the Islamic revolution which has rippled across the world.

The Majlis president added: From this angle the Islamic revolution is important to world arrogance. Reciprocally, our duty is also heavy. We must stand up against their hidden political scheming, and not permit them to interfere in the region. We and you and all the combative forces ready across Iran are responsible for performing this heavy duty. You should know that God is your support.

In conclusion the Majlis president said: Our accomplishment in the world has nearly been a miracle, and with the promise of the noble Koran we are hopeful for the future in comparison with the past.

IRNA's report indicates that then Fazel Harandi, Majlis representative, came to the sisters present in the Majlis and gave a short speech, during which he noted the heavy responsibility of the visitors. He said: You must try to achieve expertise with commitment. The hopeful eyes of all are fixed on you. Upon your return use your efforts to obtain knowledge, so that in the future, God willing, we will make a model nation.

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IRAN

MARINE INDUSTRIES TO BE EXPANDED 'WITHOUT FOREIGN SPECIALISTS'

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 25 Aug 82 p 9

[Text] Bushehr - JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI correspondent: In an exclusive interview the managing director of the Iran Marine Industries Company gave a short history of the company's foundation and explained its function.

He was asked: When was the company founded, who supervises its administration, how has it been administered after the victory of the Islamic revolution, and what was the fundamental goal in forming the company?

The managing director of the marine industries company said: This company was formed in June 1970 under the name of Iran Marine Industries Company, Ltd., (IMICO) in Bushehr with joint capital from Iranian Idolatrists and Americans. They acted to form the company in order to meet needs, repair marine equipment and do excavation. However, after the glorious Islamic revolution of Iran and the flight of more than 70 managers, employees and workers (Korean, Filipino and American), the company was nationalized on the basis of the law protecting the expansion of Iranian industries. Directors chosen by the Iran National Industries Organization took over responsibility for its administration. On 5 October 1981 it was placed under the supervision of the Iranian Industries Renovation Organization. At the present time the company's work is the construction and repair of floating marine units up to 800 tons net dry weight, the repair of oil platforms, drilling rigs and pipes in the sea, excavation and jetty-building. He was then asked: After the company was taken over by the government of the Islamic republic, what steps has it made towards industrial and economic self-sufficiency, and how does its functioning differ from that during the Idol's era?

He said: Just as I have said, after the foreigners fled from the company, the Muslim committed brothers became confident there was no gentleman above them to afflict them, and they took control of the company's vast wheels, and thus prevented the closing down of this industry which was nearly unique in Iran. Using their natural potential talents, they began work in three areas. That is to say they have had fruitful activities in building and repairing of floating units, jetty-building and marine pile-driving. Our brothers were very energetic during the March 1981-March 1982 year in the area of building and repairing floating units and tug boats. By utilizing the company's resources they were able to repair 151 heavy vessels of military, commercial and other

types. This figure is without rival in the company's history. Even the foreigners at the peak of their activity working two shifts repaired only 113 vessels which had smaller dimensions. I must mention here that we were involved in the imposed war and we could not work two shifts. Of course our brother workers worked with such devotion that I cannot mention all their activities here. However, I will mention one of their most important activities. During the Idol's period, two ships called Iran Qadr and Iran Kusar were repaired abroad. The brothers put them in dry-dock and repaired them. Furthermore the capable hands of the brothers were able to repair 57 Iranian vessels which had been formerly repaired abroad. They repaired them on this base and delivered them. Other activities of the brothers included the repair of ships from Bushehr and Khuzestan ports, several instances of jetty-building, and the repair of ship generators, pipes, anchor winches and cranes. In the area of ship and tug boat construction, through our company's engineer brothers we were able to plan and build a 1,800-horsepower tug boat which had been 95 percent completed. Two tug boats with 12 thousand horsepower are planned for the future.

As to industrial self-sufficiency, I must say that we have been self-sufficient in the area of construction and repair. Our self-sufficiency depends on the country's independence, and we have no need of foreign experts. At the present time our worker brothers make in this company some of the materials we consume, and a portion are supplied by domestic factories such as the Arak Machining Factory. Materials we consume include marine paint which is supplied from Iran. Sand was formerly imported by the Americans while sand is to be had from Tehran's Firuzkuh Mines. Similarly bearings, ship propellers, ship anchor winches and chain gear boxes are now supplied in the same way. We are striving for further self-sufficiency, and God willing, we will succeed.

In the economic (financial) area, I must add when the government-chosen directors came to the company, it possessed a very bad financial state, such that wages had not been paid to workers and employees for several months. Therefore we were compelled to get a 40 million rial loan from the Bushehr Governor-General's Office. The company's storehouses were empty of necessary items, and there was noticeable stagnation in the area of repairs and other matters. The government directors diligently engaged in organizing the company, and eliminated excess costs. They were able to overcome the company's problems such that the wages of employees and workers were paid and many of the company's debts were paid. With the improved financial situation, we were able to bring the needed reserves up to standard and to purchase 40 million rials of capital goods.

The managing director of Iran Marine Industries was asked: What is the company's personnel situation at the present time, and how does it differ from that in the past? He answered: During the Idol's time, the company possessed 256 white-collar and blue-collar workers. When the activities in the three areas mentioned above intensified after the revolution, this figure reached 477 persons in March 1981. This indicates the new movement in the area of activating potential talents. Here it is necessary to note that the number of the company's employees and workers is only 5 percent of its capacity. With the hiring of committed, expert engineers and the training of workers in specialized jobs, we are planning to take on responsibility for the building and repair of heavy ships and freighters of the Islamic Republic of Iran's shipping. This job is under study.

TRAINING AT IRGC, MOBILIZATION OF OPPRESSED CAMPS REVIEWED

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 26 Aug 82 p 17

[Interview with camp officials]

[Text] As you know, the Mobilization of the Oppressed of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is one of the strong arms of our dear combatants at the battlefield of truth against Saddam's infidel armies.

The Mobilization of the Oppressed of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has been able, in the course of its just and proud two-year defense, in addition to playing an effective and clear role in confronting the American and Zionist aggressors of the anti-people's regime ruling Iraq, to present itself consistently, constructively, and according to plan as an important and noteworthy institution which has poured forth and arisen from the belly of the revolution. It is very unfortunate that so far, with two years gone by since the establishment and formation of such a process, the necessary and creditable steps have not been taken to understand and publicize this organization arisen from the millions of the masses of the revolutionary nation of Iran.

In this connection, in order to present and become better acquainted with the Mobilization of the Oppressed of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, we have interviewed the brother officials from the six country-wide regions, and present the results for you here.

First we have an interview with brother Mahmud Ashja', Revolutionary Guard Commander of country-wide region six, in connection with the formation of the mobilization camps in this region. In answer to a question on his opinion about the possibility of establishing mobilization camps throughout the country such as the one in region six, he said: In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate. We petition Him for aid. May God grant us endurance, and guide our footsteps, and give us victory over the infidels. [Koranic verse]. After the triumph of the revolution, it is very natural that capital should be invested to advance and promote students and youth in the matter of the Islamic revolution in order to perpetuate the revolution. In this country, in view of the situation of region six (Hormozegan Province, Sistan va Baluchestan Province, and Kerman Province) which is a region where some points are somewhat removed from the atmosphere of the revolution, and where

at some points the revolution has not taken root at all, or been put into practice and made to bear fruit as it has in the big cities, it is very natural that it has not had the effect it has had in the big cities on the masses and the students. It was thus that we decided to have camps every year from the summer of 1980 on. This has continued for three consecutive years. This year is the third year for the training camps. Since we realized that it would be better if these camps had an emigrative quality and the trainees traveled from their own regions to other regions to become familiar with manifestations of the revolution, we therefore brought them to Esfahan and centralized them. After having audio-visual and field training in various areas relating to society and revolutionary people and having participated in ceremonies such as the kamil prayer, visits to Behesht-e Zahra, and participating in the Friday prayer, these people will have had encounters with Muslim people. In addition we have a program for participating brothers to travel to the cities of Qom, Tehran, and also a pilgrimage to holy Mashhad this year and visits to the country's northern cities, so the brothers can see various cities and meet various people and that circumscribed viewpoint that surrounded them in their own region due to lack of contact with other places will be eliminated and that emigrative quality will make them capable of confronting issues a somewhat more openly and will cause their thinking to broaden. God willing, with a more open and wider point of view they will be able to confront issues.

Question: What does the balance sheet look like for these camps which have been held every year since 1980 in the provinces under the mantle of the revolutionary guards of country-wide region six?

Answer: In general, to the extent that we have been able to gather together the high school graduate brothers from these various areas, we have been successful. We have a place in the Province of Sistan va Baluchestan where actually the only thing the boys had heard of this revolution was slogans. We have been able to shake them out of their complacency and make them realize that the revolution pertains to them. Praise God that we were successful in this Islamic matter. We had cases where last year the same brothers who received training in the Mobilization camps were active as messengers for the Islamic revolution in their own regions. At the same time we must keep in mind that this issue must be met qualitatively rather than quantitatively. If only ten percent of all of these brothers who have come here were converted each one of them could be a messenger for the revolution in his own region. Just as was said, we have many examples. In areas such as Baluchestan va Sistan, Hormozegan, and the Kerman region many examples of our successes have been seen. The contacts and letters which have later come to camp officials from these brothers and that interest indicative of concern which they continually encounter shows that these people have been effective and that their effect has been useful. In addition to this program, we have a program for trainee travel to revolutionary areas such as Esfahan, Tehran, and other cities. We hope that after going to these regions and taking part in these camps these brothers will be agents for propagating Islam and true missionaries for the Islamic revolution.

Question: What is the training like for the brothers taking part in these camps? What percentage of the training in these camps is ideological?

Answer: Of course we have already said that our primary aim is to acquaint the brothers with manifestations of the Islamic revolution. It is very natural that these brothers who have been in those regions have seen less of the manifestations of the Islamic revolution. We have thus laid more stress on giving them audio-visual training. Of course they have also had instruction with books and in the classroom. We have mostly had it in mind that we would be able to run the camps in three phases. The first phase is the public phase, where we mostly rely on audio-visual materials. In the second phase the brothers who have gone somewhat beyond the first phase and have more capability take part in our ideological-ethical program. In the third place are those who can be of practical service to the Mobilization of the revolutionary guards and the revolutionary guard itself. Their program is like that in revolutionary guard training centers and in those of the Mobilization of the Revolutionary Guard Corps. Of course brothers who enter into the third phase will have a continuing relationship with the revolutionary guard and the Mobilization of the Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Question: In conclusion, what message do you have for Revolutionary Guard Mobilization officials and member brothers of the mobilization throughout the country?

Answer: With regard to the necessity for mobilizing the people, if we want to imagine the revolution without the mobilization or the revolutionary guard without the Mobilization of the Oppressed unit, the revolution and the revolutionary guard would be something less. Planning by the revolutionary guard and its officials must be linked with strengthening the mobilization. In addition to the fact that intellectual forces are linked with the mobilization, these people are the future of this nation. They are the active intellectual and practical forces of the Mobilization of the Revolutionary Guard, and more must be invested in these camps, in the form of intellectual investment, planning, and also in the way of audio-visual resources, so that God willing and with the grace of God and with the help of all officials and also the forces of these brothers we will have greater success in the preservation and perpetuation of the revolution and its attainments.

An interview with Hojjatollah Mostafa Qorbani, a camp training official of the Mobilization of the Revolutionary Guards of country-wide region six.

Question: Brother, explain the nature of the ideological training of the Mobilization of the Revolutionary Guard.

Answer: In the name of God the Merciful, the Compassionate, we petition Him for aid. As you know, the revolutionary guard of country-wide region six, which is a remote area of oppressed people, since there have been no religious activities in that area of the type that have been in the rest of the country, has established camps for the purpose of acquainting the younger generation, and especially students, with Islam and the Islamic revolution, and of course the issues of the revolution are the same as the

issues of Islam. Furthermore, the mobilization camps which have been formed and the brothers, after registration and organization, are sent to the province of Esfahan. The Islamic propaganda office of Qom was asked to send a missionary, and it sent seminary students there. The orientation of the brothers participating in the mobilization camps pertains mostly to Islamic, military, and social matters. The primary goal, however, is to acquaint them with Islam and the Islamic revolution, and this is in itself very important.

When we see a young 13-year-old, for example, with grenade in hand who is ready to sacrifice himself in order to destroy the enemy, it is because he has understood Islam. When he has understood Islam the meaning of the term martyrdom is resolved for him and he has also perceived the Islamic revolution.

In pursuit of the necessity of this matter there are scholarly seminary students in these camps who have been sent from the Imam's propaganda office, and praise God they have been observed by the participating brothers and have produced a good result.

Question: In conclusion, do you have any remarks for mobilization officials or other member brothers of the Mobilization of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards throughout the country?

Answer: As a Muslim with a sense of responsibility I must say that these programs must be well extended throughout the remote areas where religious activities have not taken place. We see that when religious activities have been extensive in Esfahan the results have consequently been greater. We see that among the dear brothers at the battlefronts, there are many Esfahani brothers to be found. This is because religious activities took place there. Therefore, if there is a shortcoming or a problem in some part of the country, it is because there have been no religious activities there. We hope that the brothers will come to these camps which are being formed. We also appreciate the efforts of the revolutionary guard officials who work hard and assemble the brothers. We hope God will bless them so they can continue their activities. If there are shortcomings and problems, with reliance on God and divine grace these will be eliminated. We hope that these camps will continue next year and in the coming years and that students and the younger generation will likewise welcome these camps.

A Talk with Brother Malaki, Internal Director of the Camps

As you introduce yourself, what is your responsibility in relation to these camps?

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate, we petition Him for aid. I am Morteza Malaki, internal director of the camps of the Mobilization of the Revolutionary Guards of region six.

Question: How were this year's camps, and what was the level of their output?

Answer: In my view, and that of most of the brothers, the output of the region's camps was very very good. Perhaps all the brothers who were sent will be sent to the fronts. For the most part they had a very good situation in view of the fact that there were shortages but there was a relatively good encounter and as a result there was a high output.

Question: Could you tell us about the problems of directing the camps?

Answer: The brothers of the region are chosen and sent by the mobilization. For example, the Esfahan region is divided into several camps. Within each camp there is an official who divides the brothers into groups of 50. Each group has a brother who is their trainer and this brother is with the brothers 24 hours a day. He studies, pursues, and solves all their problems.

Question: Could you explain the mobilization's recruitment procedure and their participation in these camps?

Answer: Brothers who want to come to the camps of the Mobilization of the Revolutionary Guard of region six and participate, are referred to the area after registering with the municipal mobilizations.

Question: In conclusion, what message do you have for the country's mobilization officials and what message do you have for mobilization member brothers throughout the country?

Answer: As one individual, my message is that more steps must be taken to form these camps and solidify them, especially in the deprived regions of our country (such as Sistan va Baluchestan). The work of our brothers in the revolutionary guard of region six has been very positive and striking. Our brothers in the mobilization centers have tried to observe Islamic ethics and to sacrifice themselves to the Islamic revolution as much as possible and to treat the participating brothers of the mobilization in the camps in a very fatherly and brotherly way.

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DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER BEN-ME'IR DISCUSSES LEBANON, AUTONOMY

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 13 Aug 82 p 13

[Interview with Yehudah Ben-Me'ir, deputy foreign minister, by Dov Goldstein in Jerusalem, 11 Aug 82]

[Text] On Wednesday evening, at the height of the negotiations for the evacuation of the terrorists from Beirut, while the atmosphere in Jerusalem is optimistic as everyone is ready to reap the fruits of the long struggle, I "catch" Dr Yehudah Ben-Me'ir, the deputy foreign minister, and I talk to him about some of the problems caused by the Peace for Galilee campaign.

We both know that the negotiations are unreliable and even now, on the eve of their successful conclusion, Israel may be walking into a political trap that may cancel out its military gains. The deputy foreign minister wants to convince me (and I get the feeling he is also trying to convince himself) that Israel is extremely careful not to fail at the last minute.

Ben-Me'ir an experienced persuader. His diction is impeccable. He does not lose his train of thought even when the sentence is rather long.

[Question How does Israel make sure it is not led on? How can you be sure the terrorists won't refuse to leave Beirut after the international force arrives there and Israel's hands will be tied militarily?

The Force's Mandate Will End Immediately

[Answer] This is one of the main issues that have been discussed and are still being discussed with Mr Philip Habib. We are aware of the danger and there is reason for concern. We have American guarantees and, besides, the moment the evacuation specified in the timetable is delayed for any reason, the force's mandate will end immediately. The multi-national force will be ordered to leave Beirut and Israel will be free to act in its own way to get rid of the terrorists. This is why Israel wants the force to enter Beirut only after most of the terrorists have left, in keeping with the original proposal of Mr Habib. This is one of the main points of the negotiations.

It is clear in any case that there are risks involved in Habib's plan, as in any other political plan. However, the military option presents greater risks, first and foremost in terms of risking the lives of our soldiers. There are other risks in Habib's plan. For example, terrorists may pretend to be civilians and not leave Beirut. There are doubts about ensuring the exit of all the terrorists. Nothing is safer than the IDF ascertaining the departure of all the terrorists. But this means having to pay a high price and we prefer not to pay such a price.

[Question] France has appeared in recent months to be clearly pro-PLO and has not spared any efforts to save the PLO in Lebanon. Why didn't Israel object to the French participation in the multi-national force?

[Answer] We feel deep friendship toward the French and there are strong ties between the two nations. The position of the French government since we started fighting the terrorists has been negative from our standpoint. It was hostile toward Israel and has hampered us. It is difficult to understand why France who has advocated freedom and equality was choosing to pursue the goal of saving a band of criminals and murderers, the worst the world has ever known. Only God and Mitterrand know the answer. The French vote in the Security Council in favor of the Soviet proposal to impose an arms embargo on Israel will remain a stain France will never be able to erase.

Two Stages for Ending the War

Israel, then, has had perfectly good reasons to refuse to include French soldiers in the multi-national force. But our strong determination to find a political solution prompted us to listen to the United States. President Reagan has made a brave and daring decision sending American soldiers to Beirut. This decision is not popular in the U.S. The president predicated his decision on the inclusion of other nations in the Multi-national force.

[Question] Israel has kept insisting that all the terrorists be removed from all of Lebanon. How will the terrorists leave the eastern part of Lebanon and Tripoli? Will Israel pull them out by force or is the evacuation of the terrorists from Beirut the end of the war?

[Answer] One should distinguish between two stages. The first stage is bringing the war to a speedy conclusion. This stage will be achieved by the evacuation of Beirut. As long as the terrorists are in Beirut surrounded by the IDF the war goes on. The suffering of the civilian population in Beirut continues and the military option is in effect. We have no interest in continuing this state of affairs. This is why we are making every effort to resolve the Beirut problem, that is, to pull out the terrorists and the Syrians and to enable the Lebanese army to return to its capital city, to unify the two parts of the city and to establish the sovereignty of Lebanon in its own capital city. When this stage is ended the war will have come to an end.

The second stage is the resolution of the Lebanese problem in its entirety. This stage is no less important than the first one, for Israel, for Lebanon and for the United States. But the second stage is political. Israel demands, and so do Lebanon and the U.S., the removal of all foreign forces from Lebanon. That is, the removal of the terrorists from eastern Lebanon and from Tripoli and the removal of the Syrians. Israel will then leave Lebanon. The Syrians are still controlling half of Lebanon. But this goal, the withdrawal of foreign forces can only be achieved through political means. Unlike in Beirut, where we have made it clear we would remove the terrorist one way or another, and we have not ruled out the possibility that if the political talks fail we would use other means, here Israel has made it clear that it would not use military force in order to remove the Syrians from Lebanon and has no intention of going to war in order to force the Syrians out of Lebanon.

[Question] And if the Syrians refuse to leave, precisely because, as you have said, Israel will not use force to make them leave?

[Answer] We will not leave Lebanon as long as the Syrians are there. Syria may come under Arab, American and international pressure to pull out its forces. It will not be easy for Syria to accept the presence of the IDF in Lebanon and to withstand the pressures I have mentioned.

There is a Chance for Negotiations with the Syrians

Still, one should examine the possibility of a political settlement with the Syrians regarding Lebanon, and I believe that it has a good chance, since it coincides with the interests of the two countries. Both countries are interested in the character of Lebanon. Such settlement should take into account the vital interests of both. I would like to say that there have been those who did not believe the negotiations for pulling the terrorists out of Lebanon had a chance to succeed. I hope that the agreement will be reached and those people will be proven wrong. One should also have faith in the negotiations with the Syrians.

[Question] What about the terrorists in other parts of Lebanon? Will Israel try to pull them out only through political means?

[Answer] The terrorists in those areas are under Syrian protection. If the Syrians leave they are not about to stay. Israel, in any case, insists on the departure of all the terrorists from Lebanon. I would not advise the terrorists, for their own good, to remain in Lebanon after the Syrians have left. If they stay, we will have to make them leave one way or another. No need to go into details.

[Question] The Syrians have surprised us. After refusing to do so for quite some time, they have announced they are willing to take in thousands of terrorists. Is there a danger the Americans may try to compensate the Syrians by agreeing to let them stay in Lebanon?

[Answer] The President of the United States has publicly stated that the American position is unequivocal on the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon. The order the President has specified is the PLO, the Syrians and the Israelis. It is hard to believe the United States will change its position by 180 degrees. The withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon will be a great American achievement and will bring about the unification of Lebanon and the establishment of an independent government. But in any case the IDF is in Lebanon and it is not possible to make any deals behind our backs. The IDF will not leave Lebanon until all other foreign forces leave.

[Question] Why does the IDF continue to attack in Beirut, using air strikes as well, when all sides seem to be optimistic about a political settlement?

[Answer] The IDF is not attacking in Beirut. Israel has proposed ten cease-fires and all have been violated by the terrorists. Our primary duty is to protect the lives of our soldiers, and the IDF is using its clear advantage on land, sea and air to do just that and to persuade the PLO not to open fire. The United States is also aware of the fact that the PLO opens fire, but the Americans argue that at times dissident factions start shooting and violate the cease-fire and that...

[Question] We respond all out of proportion to the PLO violations. This is also one of the American arguments.

We Reject the Proportion Theory

[Answer] True. But you should bear in mind that one bullet can kill a soldier and certainly wound one. To us every soldier is a whole world. I have always rejected the "proportion theory." This is an anti-Jewish approach. Our sages have taught, Why was only one man created? So that we realize that he who saves one life in Israel has saved the whole world. The IDF has the right to use all its advantages in order to protect the lives of its men.

At the same time, while the negotiations are going on, we have decided to make an effort to reduce the conflict to a minimum by using restraint as long as it does not endanger the lives of our soldiers.

There is no doubt that the military pressure has been successful and had led to a political solution. But everything must happen in its own time and in the right proportion.

[Question] Lately something unprecedented has happened in the United States. The government is more pro-Israel than the public and the Congress. This is a dangerous situation and it cannot go on for too long. What does Israel plan to do in order to mend its relations with the United States?

The Battle Over Public Opinion

[Answer] First, it is not a bad thing that the government is pro-Israel. This does not hurt us, it helps us. The friendship the president shows toward Israel is an important asset to us. At the same time, it is clear that in the United States, more so than in any other country with the exception of Israel, public opinion has a great influence on Congress despite the broad authority of the president in foreign affairs. One should not underestimate the criticism of Israel voiced in recent months. The criticism resulted mainly from the one-sided television coverage, intentional or not, of the events of the war. No doubt one of the most urgent tasks following the evacuation of the terrorists from Beirut and the conclusion of the war is restoring Israel's public image before U.S. public opinion and the Congress.

At the same time one should not exaggerate the disagreement between Israel and the United States. Despite the criticism, the embarrassment and the uncertainty among wide circles in the United States, especially in regard to the events in Beirut, the strong foundation of the relations between the two countries has not been affected. There is a basic support for Israel as a free, democratic, pioneering, brave nation. Since we have this basic support, we can with the help of people and resources restore the relations between the two countries to the level we have been accustomed to.

[Question] Israel's former foreign minister has said that the leadership is careless with human life. Have you had the feeling in recent months that the government is sufficiently careful in this regard?

[Answer] I vehemently reject the serious accusation of Knesset Member Abba Eban. One should have expected a former foreign minister to show a minimum of national responsibility and not make unfounded statements that provide ammunition to our enemies and seriously damage our interests. As for your question, I was not at the front and I did not participate in the fighting. But I accept the countless testimonies of soldiers and officers to the effect that the IDF has been extremely careful with human life, including the lives of Lebanese civilians.

One of course can always question the goals of the war. This is a just war, a defensive war, and we in the course of this war we had to go after the objectives we have reached. One of the important questions that had direct bearing on human life was whether or not to enter Beirut.

Despite the fact that for a while there was no hope of attaining a political solution--on the part of the Lebanese and the Americans as well, the government has clung to the political solution and did not instruct the IDF to occupy Beirut. The reason for this has been close adherence to the principle of preserving life.

The Expected treatment of the Palestinians

[Question] All the top American leaders have said that after resolving the crisis in Lebanon they will turn their attention to the Palestinian problem. It seems Israel will come under strong pressures. Is Israel willing at this point to soften its stand on the autonomy question?

[Answer] There is no reason to be unduly concerned about such statements. We are willing to deal vigorously with the Palestinian question. We have always been willing to deal with it. This is why Israel has always sought to hold the autonomy talks. I can disclose that at a certain point the prime minister proposed to the Egyptians and the Americans to hold talks on a daily basis, without stop, except, of course, for Friday, Saturday and Sunday, until we reach an agreement.

The Israeli autonomy plan is clear. It is based on the Camp David accords. In January Israel submitted a detailed proposal to the United States and Egypt. Alexander Haig called it "serious and far reaching." We did not say it was the last word. We want to negotiate. Let the Egyptians come and join us in serious negotiations--which they have failed to do thus far--and we will try to reach an agreement. But there is no point in talking about softening the Israeli position as long as there are no negotiations. This government truly wants to reach an agreement on the autonomy and keep it. If Egypt did not drag this matter we would have been celebrating the third anniversary of the autonomy by now and beginning talks about permanent arrangements for Judea, Samaria and Gaza.

Habib Did a Good Job

[Question] What do you think of the assertion that the military defeat of the PLO strengthens its political position and will be an incentive to deal with the Palestinian problem?

[Answer] I reject the theory that the defeat of the PLO strengthens its political position. It is true that the PLO's defeat has raised the Palestinian question and placed it at the top of the agenda of world affairs. But one should not be concerned about it. One should tackle the problem. The defeat of the PLO should convince the Arabs of Judea and Samaria that the military option has failed and will be of no avail. The paradox is that the organizing of the PLO into a regular army has brought about its defeat.

The Arabs of Judea and Samaria can only choose the road of negotiations. Since 1948, or even since the turn of the century, they have found it difficult to overcome the psychological barrier and accept Israel. The destruction of the PLO military power is an important contribution to the Arabs of Judea and Samaria in terms of accepting the fact that Israel cannot be removed and their only hope lies in negotiations.

If they agree to negotiate, Israel should, and I believe it will, seek reconciliation with the Palestinians in order to create a basis for coexistence. This in effect is the autonomy plan.

[Question] How were you impressed with the personality of Philip Habib in your meetings with him?

[Answer] Mr Habib did a good job. He acted in good faith. We should thank him for his efforts. While in recent weeks there were disagreements between him and us and we had a different assessment of the situation in Beirut at various stages, Mr Habib acted fairly, with good will, reflecting the will of his boss, President Reagan.

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ISRAEL

ARENS DISCUSSES LEBANON, U.S. TIES, OTHER ISSUES

TA170738 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 17 Sep 82 p 5

[Report on interview with Israeli ambassador to the United States Moshe Arens by Washington correspondent Wolf Blitzler; date and place not given]

[Text] Israel's ambassador to the United States, Moshe Arens, is clearly on the front line in dealing with the Reagan administration and its new Middle East peace initiative. Since President Reagan unveiled his blueprint during a nationally-televised address on September 1, Arens has been extremely busy trying to assess the short and long-term impact on the overall U.S.-Israeli relationship. In a Rosh Hashana interview with THE JERUSALEM POST, he tried to put the current crisis into some sort of historical perspective.

"I think the bottom of the relationship has not been fundamentally affected by what is a very strong divergence of views that almost borders on the confrontational in its intensify--the fact that the president has taken a position which he himself has described in his position paper as 'unalterable' and the Israeli government has rejected those positions. At its root, I think the relationship continues to be one of very solid friendship, essentially an alliance. I think that by the very nature of that relationship, it cannot be disturbed by differences of opinion--even if they are heated, even if they are strident--about how our common goals are going to be attained."

Arens has his own explanation for the timing of the Reagan plan.

"Clearly," he said, "they thought they saw what they call here a 'window of opportunity.' And if they saw a window of opportunity, it should have been associated in their minds with the one major event of the past few months, namely, the peace for Galilee operation in Lebanon.

"I think also that as a result of Israel's operation in Lebanon, they perceived themselves to be under strong Arab pressure and therefore felt called upon to demonstrate, at the earliest possible moment, that they were not always yes-sayers to everything that Israel said and everything that Israel did, and that they were ready to take positions that were not consistent with Israel's positions.

Arens said he had discussed the whole subject of a new U.S. peace initiative on several occasions with secretary of state George Shultz, and that it had become clear that the Americans felt a sense of urgency on the matter.

"My position--and the position of Israel--was at least to put first things first, let things fall into place in Lebanon, exert a concerted and common effort in the pursuance of our common goals there; and that coupling events in Lebanon with some new initiatives directed at the autonomy negotiations could exacerbate the problems and maybe prejudice our ability to gain our objectives in Lebanon.

After a few such conversations, Shultz agreed with Arens that they should first work to remove the PLO from Beirut.

Referring to the Palestinian question, the ambassador said he and Shultz had been discussing this matter "during the entire period that the Israeli army stood at the gates of Beirut." The various issues connected with the eventual evacuation of the PLO were discussed and sometimes argued about.

The discussions invariably came back "to what is called here the Palestinian problem" and the need to address this problem urgently in the light of the lessons allegedly learned from the operation in Lebanon. At one stage it had become clear that there was even a possibility that a U.S. initiative might surface even prior to the withdrawal of the PLO from Beirut.

Despite all those conversations, the timing of the Reagan peace plan and its actual form came as quite a shock to Arens, who was then in Israel for U.S. defence secretary Caspar Weinberger's visit. "The form I didn't know," he said. "The form nobody knew until it was actually presented to us."

He complained that the U.S. had not sufficiently informed Israel of the Reagan plan despite the discussions with Shultz. He distinguished between "discussions" and "consultations"; the latter were indispensable in what were essentially relations of an alliance between Israel and the United States.

"We have constant discussions with the secretary--if not on a daily basis, certainly on a weekly basis. But these are not the kind of consultations we are talking about. What we would expect as friends and allies of the United States--and what I think we have every right to expect--is that before launching an initiative, the United States would specifically consult us about the initiative and there would be a meeting either with me here or with the prime minister in Israel where the U.S. representative would put the position paper that was eventually delivered to us on the table and say: 'We are suggesting presenting this list of American positions. What is your opinion about the content and what is your opinion about the timing and what is your opinion about the very presentation?'

"I don't for a minute suggest that we should expect to have a veto on that kind of an initiative although, by the way, there are some contractual commitments which President Ford took upon himself in 1975 where, in essence, there was an American commitment that there would be no American proposals without prior consultations with Israel in order to avoid proposals which are not consistent with Israel's approach.

"I think," said Arens, "we should have expected and could have expected that there would be prior consultations on this specific move and that we would have a chance to comment on it, and maybe then there would be a change either in content or in procedure. There was nothing of the sort. I hadn't the faintest notion--and I must admit that I was shocked while I was in Israel accompanying Secretary Weinberger. I was informed that Ambassador Lewis had gone to see Prime Minister Began at Nahariyya and had presented him with this position paper. In that sense, there was no consultation whatsoever. And by the way, the position paper was presented to King Husayn before it was even presented to us."

He also disclosed that Weinberger himself appeared to have been surprised.

I'm sure that Secretary Weinberger must have been aware that there was a discussion process going on and maybe he was even a party to some of the discussions. But it is my impression that he did not know that on the eve of his arrival in Israel, this position paper was going to be presented to the prime minister."

What is clearly upsetting to Arens is that the administration had deliberately avoided informing Israel of the new strategy.

"In our discussions with administration officials here, you could almost sense a certain glee about the secretive way in which this thing was handled and about the very few people in the administration who knew of it, and about their great success in aborting any leaks of this initiative. So clearly it was a deliberate decision to do this in a very secretive manner and not to have any prior consultation with Israel on the subject."

It was his opinion that the administration had simply concluded that it would be "more effective" to launch the new initiative that way--even without a hard advance commitment from King Husayn to join the talks.

What did he think would happen if Husayn should eventually join the talks? Would Israel reconsider its rejection of the Reagan plan?

"I think the position of the Israeli Government is quite clear and, in my view, quite correct. The president's position paper cannot serve as a basis for negotiations within the framework of the Camp David agreement. And in parallel, the Israeli Government has said that it reinstates its invitation to all parties to sit down and to continue the autonomy negotiations. That will continue to be Israel's position, I'm sure, regardless of King Husayn's final response or lack of response.

"King Husayn is invited at the present time to come to the negotiating table, as President al-Sadat came to Jerusalem in November 1977, without any preconditions for direct negotiations. We don't feel there is any need to guarantee the final outcome of those negotiations before they even start. So if he is ready to come without preconditions for discussions within the framework of Camp David, he will be welcome.

"If what he says is, 'I will negotiate with Israel on one condition, that Israel recognize President Reagan's position paper as the basis for the negotiations, or agree to the points that have been put forward by President Reagan,' then I think the response of the Israeli Government is going to be negative."

Assessing what will now happen the ambassador said: "The only thing that can happen is the resumption of the negotiations within the framework of the Camp David agreements without any additional conditions or new frameworks being added to these agreements. I think, therefore, it behooves all parties--the U.S., Israel, Egypt, Jordan if King Husayn is ready to join the negotiations--to do exactly that: to come and sit together and resume the negotiations which have proceeded some very significant distance. It took a long time, but I don't think it would be correct to say that nothing has been accomplished in all that time."

The differences between Washington and Jerusalem over the Reagan plan have not affected other U.S.-Israeli issues such as military supplies, economic assistance and political support. On this Arens was firm.

He is also convinced that Israel will share fully with the U.S. the military lessons it learned during the fighting in Lebanon, "for the very simple reason that Israel is a member of the democratic community of nations and the United States is the leader of that community of nations.... It may take a little time. It is not easy to summarize, to categorize, to classify, to digest all the information that has come out of this complex operation in Lebanon. But I have no doubt that once this is done, the information will be supplied to the United States."

He disagreed emphatically with a popular notion in the American media that U.S.-Israeli relations had slipped to an all-time low. Admittedly there had been ups and downs over the past 34 years, but looked at from an historical perspective he thought that the curve had been going up pretty continuously.

"If you try to compare U.S.-Israeli relations today, in 1982, with U.S.-Israeli relations in 1952, or in 1962, or even in 1972, I think probably you would state that they were better in '62 than in '52 and better in '72 than in 62 and better in '82 than they were in '72.

"Certainly there is a much bigger appreciation now of Israel's strategic value in the partnership than there was in the past. We started with a relationship that was based almost solely on common values and common traditions and today, clearly, it is common values, common traditions and common interests--a recognition of Israel's ability to contribute to the protection of these interests. That's really a very solid foundation. And I think you will probably not find many countries in the world regarding which you could say there is a more solid foundation existing for their relationship with the United States.

The ambassador even saw a silver lining in the fact that the president of the U.S. and the prime minister of Israel were seeking to influence each other's public opinion.

"I think that in the final analysis, if you ask where all this is going to lead, public opinion will determine and decide--and the side that is more successful in swaying public opinion about the justice of their views will be the side, on this particular issue, which will probably come out on top."

One thing that undermines the Israeli Government's efforts to influence American public opinion, said Arens, is the fact that some labour leaders visiting the U.S. have spoken out in favour of the Reagan plan. He would have liked to see more of these personalities follow Begin's example when he led the opposition: in a debate such as the present they should limit their criticism of the government to their appearances at home and not use the platform offered them in America for that purpose.

He lamented especially the recent statements in the U.S. by Shim'on Peres and Abba Eban, which he described as "deviations from the norms," but praised other labour leaders who refused to join this anti-Israeli government chorus.

Arens conceded that the Reagan administration was making some inroads in influencing a few recognized American Jewish leaders to back away from their traditional support for Israel. Their statements expressing some support for the Reagan plan have received extensive publicity in the media.

But Arens does not believe that the American Jewish leadership has moved away from Israel in any significant manner.

"I had a meeting with the leadership of AIPAC (the American Israel Public Affairs Committee), with the conference of presidents of major American Jewish organizations, with the United Jewish appeal conference in New York, with a number of individuals, and in my mind there is little doubt that on the whole, the American Jewish community, both the organized and the unorganized part of it, will continue to support with considerable enthusiasm the position of the Israeli Government on this issue as well."

He has no doubt, however, that the Reagan administration is actively courting the American Jewish community, and rightly so.

"This is an intelligent administration of people who have a considerable degree of sophistication. They are great friends of Israel, and in many ways, President Reagan may be the greatest friend that Israel has had in the White House in many, many years. But I think I am telling you nothing new if I say that this is an administration that plays hardball. When they want to achieve a certain objective, they go at it very seriously. And so trying to appeal to people in the Jewish community, trying to appeal to people in Israel--that's an obvious part of the tactic and they are doing their best to be successful at it."

Did he believe the stories that the administration would like to topple the Begin government?

"No," he replied "I don't believe that that is consistent with their norms and their values and their mode of behaviour, I think that they probably do believe that if they were to succeed in winning this battle for public opinion in Israel--say, in large measure, among the American Jewish community and other supporters of Israel, then this would have some effect on the position of the Israeli Government."

In countering the U.S. effort, he said, Israel itself has to wage "a very active campaign to explain our positions--and we are in the process of doing that."

By coming out with a specific blueprint, the U.S. and compromised its role as mediator in the negotiations Arens said. That is bound to make another round of talks more difficult to get underway, but "we're hoping that it is not going to abort the negotiations."

CSO: 4400/484

ISRAEL

RAKAH'S TUBI REACTS TO BREZHNEV PEACE PLAN

TAl61405 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1245 GMT 16 Sep 82

[Rakah spokesman announcement]

[Text] Tel Aviv, 16 Sep (ITIM)--The 6-point Brezhnev plan outlining a way to resolve the crisis now affecting the Middle East harmonizes with the just national interests of the Israeli people. This is a constructive plan expressing the desire to put an end to the war in Lebanon, solve justly the Palestinian problem and bring about a comprehensive, just and stable peace between Israel and the Arab world, said Rakah's deputy secretary general, Mk Tawfiq Tubi, in referring to the Brezhnev peace plan, as he outlined it in a reception for the president of the PDRY on Wednesday, 15 September, in Moscow. This plan, which takes into account the fundamental, just interests of all the nations of the region, calls for an Israeli withdrawal from all the territories it captured in June 1967 and for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip alongside the state of Israel.

This plan stipulates that the borders between Israel and its neighbors should be set as permanent unalterable borders. Based on this, the plan calls for the abolition of the state of war and the establishment of peace between Israel and the Arab countries involving mutual respect and sovereignty. It likewise urges the maintenance and observance of sovereignty and territorial integrity together with a commitment to resolve any pending problem by peaceful ways and through negotiations. This plan suggests UN Security Council guarantees, or securities by its permanent members. The Reagan plan, on the other hand, does not solve the basic problems of the conflict, while the Brezhnev plan constitutes a basis for a just and stable peace suitable to the national interests of both parties. Rakah calls on the peace forces in Israel, all those interested in reaching a just and honorable peace to call upon the Israeli cabinet to support the Brezhnev peace plan and to take action toward holding an international conference with the participation of Israel, the PLO, the Arab countries, the Soviet Union, the United States and other countries, to help establish the desired peace.

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SPLIT BETWEEN GOVERNMENT, PEOPLE DISCUSSED

TA161440 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 16 Sep 82 p 9

[Commentary by Mati Golan: "The Reagan Plan: The Government Versus the People"]

[Text] The U.S. secretaries of state and defense are not normally known to live in harmony, which is why there is special interest on those occasions when both express similar views, and all the more so when they make almost the same use of metaphors and turns of phrase when talking about one idea.

Ever since the Reagan plan was rejected by the Israeli Government, George Shultz and Caspar Weinberger had many occasions to talk both about the plan and about its rejection. Naturally, they both warmly defended the plan. Their attitude toward Israel's positions was marked by utmost caution and restraint. Each word they uttered was characterized by the effort invested in it to counter, right from the start, any claim that this is something that is planned to be forced on Israel, the nonacceptance of which is linked to punishment and sanctions. They virtually said that if Israel should want to, they will accept it, if they do not like it, they will not have to accept it.

The motivation for this effort is clear. Prime Minister has succeeded in winning for himself in the eyes of the world the reputation of a man who must be handled gingerly. If one wants to get something from him they should avoid creating the impression that the idea or solution is being forced upon him. He should be left to sense that he has reached the desirable objective on his own--even though this may not be the case.

Yet, there was still another element in Shultz' and Weinberger's statements, and it is far more interesting than the caution to avoid stepping on Begin's toes. Within a few days of each other, the two related experiences they had while visiting Israel. In different times and places they ended their descriptions with the conclusion that the people in Israel no doubt desire peace and abhor war. Their personal impression, they said, was that there is no question that the people in Israel are ready for great sacrifices to obtain their aspiration. This story always followed a comment on the

positions in the Israeli cabinet, not only in regard to the Reagan plan, but also regarding its stand on the settlements, the annexation of Judaea and Samaria and more. One did not have to be specially astute to note the unmistakable and clear differentiation between the government of Israel and the people of Israel. It seems as though the two personalities tried to say: the government of Israel has extremist and uncompromising positions, but this is not the end of the story, because there are also the people there whose positions do not necessarily tow the government line.

If these comments were voiced only once by one high official they could have been dismissed as incidental, devoid of any real significance. But when they are accorded an almost identical expression by two of the leading Washington policymakers, there is no choice but to reach the conclusion that they are the outcome of previous coordination, the distinction between a government and the people not being an uncommon phenomenon in political and diplomatic jargon. The United States made use of this distinction when Allende assumed power in Chile, and before that regarding Fidel Castro's Cuba. The entire Western world talks about the Polish people versus the government in Warsaw in this context. And yet there is a substantial difference when this distinction is drawn in regard to Israel, and it stands out from the examples. In all the other cases the reference is to totalitarian, oppressive regimes--and the term is widely used in that context. Only rarely is a distinction drawn between the people and the government in a country with a democratic system.

At first glance, there is contradiction in terms here. How can one say about a government elected in democratic elections that it does not represent the people? In principle this really cannot be said. That is to say that wherever there are truly democratic elections the elected body represents the people. But there are always exceptions to the rule--on both sides. One cannot say that Adolf Hitler's regime did not represent the wishes of the German people just because it was a fascist and totalitarian regime, nor is it justified to say this about the communist administration that followed the October Revolution, in its first few years. It is hardly true in Castro's case in Cuba, either. So one must beware of generalizations.

One could possibly say the following: a totalitarian government can represent the people in certain cases. After a few years in power it is difficult to distinguish between the representation of the people and the shaping of the people, at which a gap between the people and their rulers takes place automatically. A democratic government, on the other hand, always represents the people--but again, only in principle. In effect, such a government represents the opinion the people had on election day regarding those issues that stood in the forefront that day. It is absolutely impossible to say that the elected body represents its constituents on each and every subject down to the end of its term. Circumstances change, emphasis shifts from one thing to another, new subjects crop up and take prominence. In theory as well as

in practice, a gap could open between the people and the government even in a democratic system. This is true everywhere, and is particularly true in regard to Israel, where subjects and circumstances alter at such an amazing pace.

The rift between the government and the people of Israel could grow also because the split among the Israeli public into doves and hawks never was a dividing line that stood on its own but always a function of the attitude the Arab countries evinced toward topical issues. A dramatic illustration of this was provided in the affair of the peace agreement with Egypt. The traditional position of the Israeli Government was that even as part of a peaceful arrangement there would be no withdrawal to the 1967 border. It was the basis for the founding of the Rafah approaches settlements, with the intention and belief that they would always be under Israeli sovereignty underlying the entire drive. This policy was overturned the moment President al-Sadat stepped on Israeli soil. And even if during that historic visit the hawkish Likud government was in power, this still did not prevent it from giving up all of the Sinai and tearing down the settlements.

The same segment of the public that objected to the return of all of the Sinai supported a total concession after the al-Sadat visit. The conclusion is self-evident: that the majority of the Israeli public adopts hawkish positions when it fails to see the light at the end of the tunnel, but the moment it discerns with the adversary a real readiness to make peace, its extremity fades away together with its intransigence and it is ready to take a big step to shake the hand stretched out to it.

There is no doubt that there is a grain of truth in the argument that Judaea and Samaria are not Sinai, not in terms of the sentimental value attached to them and certainly not with respect to the security risk. But this statement is just as right the other way around. In the Sinai there was no element consisting of 1 million inhabitants who do not want Israeli rule. To a great extent this fact counterbalances--if not more than that--the problem of sentimental value and the security problems.

But even if we accept the fact that there is a fundamental difference, which makes for a difficulty, still it would be a mistake to infer that the current positions upheld by the Israeli public are of a more permanent nature. To date it was much easier to be a hawk than a dove. It was almost called for the simple reason that compromising positions led to nowhere. This state of affairs was not set by us. It was consolidated and implemented in 1974 during the Rabat summit which bestowed exclusive representation of the Palestinian issue to the PLO.

Those who hold extremist positions in Israel had the PLO as an ideal partner, because it was no partner at all. Those who are really and truly not prepared to make any kind of concessions find the situation most convenient when at the opposite end stands an equally extremist element. There is no one to talk to, there is nothing to talk about and the present situation continues unimpededly.

This is why the Begin government encountered no difficulty in gaining the support of the majority of the Israeli public for its positions on Judaea and Samaria. Why have moderate positions when there is no one to talk to? Why refrain from setting up settlements when there is nothing to talk about?

King Husayn, however, is a totally different kettle of fish. The moment he gave his consent to return to the political scene, all of a sudden there is someone to talk to, and apparently there is also something to talk about. The Likud people are also aware of this, hence their nearly-hysterical reaction to the Reagan plan. The only hope the Israeli hawks cherish now is that the Arab countries might pull the chestnuts out of the fire for them. In other words, that in their resolutions and moves they would either express opposition to the Reagan plan or deplete it of any content.

At this point the ball moves to the U.S. court. So far it has only done half the job. It presented to Israel and the regional countries a political plan. If the United States wants to have real results, it must understand that the Israeli public reacts favorably to only one kind of pressure: the light at the end of the tunnel, to that Arab leader who would say he is prepared to conduct negotiations without preconditions or stretch out the hand of peace. That is why the United States must complete the job and use all its influence on the moderate Arab countries to push them onto the tracks of the Reagan plan. As long as the tone is that of the voices that emanated from the Fes summit, there is no chance that the Israeli public will support the U.S. plan.

The hint behind Weinberger's and Shultz' remarks is for the time being more a potential reality than a realistic reality. The potential for a lack of coordination or incompatibility between the wishes of the people and the policy of the government no doubt exists, but the process of it becoming not just theory but also reality depends, in the context of the Reagan plan, on the sincerity of King Husayn's intentions about the solution of the Palestinian problem and on his readiness to implement them.

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LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE IN HERUT ANALYZED

Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 16 Aug 82 p 3

[Article by Dorit Gefen: "War of Succession in Herut; The Tension between the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense Can Only Mislead the Innocent"]

[Text] Coincidence is not always so coincidental. Only a week ago the prime minister "disclosed" to the press that he plans to retire in about 2 years, since, among other things, he had promised his wife he would. One can already hear the echoes of a storm in the Herut party alluding to the war of succession in the ruling party.

Is there any coincidence here? Not exactly. One may assume that Deputy Prime Minister David Levi and other ministers would have not spoken about his early retirement. Moreover, it is doubtful whether any of those who consider themselves successors takes seriously Begin's most recent statement about the date of his retirement. Two years is a long time in Israeli reality and one can hardly anticipate now what will happen then. But none of this contradicts the internal struggle taking place in the Herut movement and the crowding at the top of the party.

The fact that the war in Lebanon has brought Sharon to the limelight--for better or for worse--and has put his colleagues in a dark shadow, does not exactly make them jump for joy, to put it mildly. They watch Sharon's popularity grow (see Likud demonstration at Kings of Israel Square), and they don't like it. Sharon, indeed, has a problem. While among the Likud voters he is "king of Israel," inside his own party there are power groups that intend to block him.

Coalitions are being formed inside Herut, the most obvious being the David Levi, Yitzhaq Shamir, Yoram Meridor trio. One should bear in mind that in the internal election in the Herut for the Tenth Knesset Sharon was able in the first round to get more votes than David Levi. This was a great surprise. It was rectified in the second round, but Levi was hurt, and did not hide his feelings.

But internal struggles in Herut are not relevant at the moment. Anyone who thinks that Sharon may draw personal conclusions from the recent attacks on him in the government or from the harsh words of the prime minister does not know Ariq Sharon. He is well trained in wars of attrition. No one can better home in on a target than him. Did he fail in his efforts to become minister of defense?

Hand in Hand

One should bear in mind how he tried every possible way to get the job after Ezer Weizman left the government. Sharon did not hesitate to criticize Begin's role as minister of defense, when he said that such an important job could not be done one day a week. Begin used to go only on Thursdays to the Minister of Defense in Tel Aviv. Sharon insisted and was successful. He did not get that particular job, but in the new government formed after the 30 June 81 election he became the minister of defense. Even Simha Ehrlich, who made sure Begin did not appoint Sharon minister of defense in the previous government, did not say anything this time.

The recent tension between the prime minister and the minister of defense can only fool the innocent, who think Begin is "led by the nose" by Sharon. In this war they are walking hand in hand, with Sharon doing what Begin wants him to do. The prime minister may not know how many bombs are used during 10 hours of continuous bombing, but he certainly knows the military and political significance of such action. The prime minister also knows about the actual bombing, since he is briefed by his aides. He also listens to the radio like any other citizen. If Begin thought that Sharon were doing things on his own, he would certainly know how to stop him. The truth is that Begin, no less than Sharon, believes that the PLO trapped in Beirut should be pounded at as much as possible, or, if you will, as much as the President of the United States is willing to take. Thus, in telling the IDF to bomb Beirut on Thursday Sharon was doing the will of the prime minister. To think that Sharon became isolated in the government when the telephone from Reagan came, and that Begin's attitude towards him changed, is a mistake.

The defense minister had good reason to mention at the foreign relations and defense committee the showdowns he had had in regard to the settlements and the water towers in Sanai. He was criticized back then by Weizman, and there were those who innocently believed that he was acting on his own. Clearly, he was the one who pushed the government in that direction, but he had the full blessing of Begin. As for settlements, the ones in the West Bank are one of Sharon's strong cards when the real struggle for succession in Herut begins. He will remind his colleagues about the great propaganda project he conducted during the election campaign, when his office became a travel agency for hundreds of thousands of voters to tour the West Bank.

Changing Horses

Of course it is convenient for Begin to direct the criticism toward Sharon, and to plead innocence. It is convenient both internally and externally. But even if Sharon deviates, he will not be forced to resign. Sharon has already made it clear he does not intend to resign. The prime minister stated that he does not plan to change horses as long as the crisis in Lebanon goes on. If one takes into account Sharon's prediction that it will take along time to solve the problem of Lebanon, it becomes clear that Sharon will continue in office despite all those who wish--each for his own reason--to see him leave.

Last week Begin added some fuel to the fire of internal conflicts in his party. Begin knows that when the boys fight he does not lose out. On the contrary. He even benefits from it. As for his retirement in 2 years, one may assume that he will change his mind and accept the decision of his party. It has happened once before, when he decided to postpone his decision of retiring at age 70. As for the promise he has given his spouse, she will certainly forgive him in the interest of the nation and the country. Is there anyone who puts the common good before his own personal good more than Begin?

But one thing is still unclear: Why was not Begin's announcement greeted with great emotion by the masses? Why didn't thousands besiege his home and beg him to reconsider? Is it because the masses also refuse to take him seriously? It couldn't be that they don't care.

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DAVID LEVI'S POWER BASE, VIEWS ANALYZED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 19 Aug 82 p 10

[Article by Prof Shevah Weiss: "David Levi" Symbol and Hope"]

[Text] David Levi is a key figure in Israeli politics and its greatest surprise. He is a poor immigrant boy who has overcome the stereotype of his ethnic group.

David Levi is indeed a "strong man" whose strength rests on the Israeli electorate. It is well known that Sephardic Jews, especially those from North Africa, brought the Likud to power. This was true in May 77, and even more so in June 81.

A study of the voting trends to the Eleventh Knesset has shown that 65 percent of the voters of North African descent supported the Likud. Levi, the leader of this group, is aware of his great popular power, and, in effect, he has the second largest bloc of votes in the government.

While the position of the prime minister is still strong, Levi enjoys a large voting potential, but his power will increase in the post-Begin era, when the Likud will be without an "all-Israeli" leader who transcends ethnic stereotypes.

One of the ways Begin leads his party is by public demonstrations. The Likud is an outdoor, public gathering movement (in the past Mapai was able, especially under Ben-Gurion, to bring tens of thousands to demonstrations and public gatherings). The media keeps emphasizing the ethnic character of the crowds shouting "Begin, Begin," and the adulation of the crowd toward its leader, in Ramleh and Lod, Natanyah and Petah Tiqvah, Jerusalem and the Kings of Israel Square. Sephardic Jews have been recently labelled "square flesh."

The Nationalistic Extremism Myth

David Levi along with a group of Sephardic leaders have begun to react to the insult of the label. TAMI, for example, is trying to get rid of it, as well as ethnic leaders in the Alignment. But Levi is smashing another myth, namely, that Sephardic Jews are extreme nationalists.

In reality, the number of Sephardic Jews in the extreme nationalistic groups today is small. Only a few are members of Gush Emunim, the Tehiyah movement and Rabbi Kahane's group. They are among the leaders of the Labor movement in the Knesset. Of the 13 Knesset members who are not Ashkenazic only three belong to the extreme hawkish camp, two are activists and seven are moderates. Knesset Members 'Aqiv Gal, Rafi Swisa and Rafi Adari are dovish, while Moshe Shahal has begun to show dovish tendencies.

Sephardic Jewry, especially Moroccan Jews, who are the largest Sephardic group in Israel, display a mixture of nationalism and religious romanticism based on historical memories, but is not nationalistic per se. With the Exception of Iraqi Jews, all other Sephardic Jews do not feel a pathological hatred toward the Arabs. They have not given rise to nationalistic leaders and are neither racist nor messianic. The populist, unassuming character of the Likud, its uncomplicated Zionism, have made it the main clearing house for all the protests of the Sephardic Jews against the old establishment, the native born Israeli arrogance, and the patronizing attitude of MAPAI, MAPAM, and later on the Alignment.

David Levi, who takes moderate political stands without any abysmal hatred toward the Arabs, reflects the reality of most members of his ethnic group. I have never heard him refer to the Palestinians fighting in Beirut as "animals who walk on two legs," or "despicable characters." The prime minister's stereotype of the Arabs is fed by his associations to the Lithuanians, the Ukrainians, the Poles and the Germans. David Levi does not have such associations.

Moreover, the recent war in Lebanon is the first Israeli war that has brought to the fore the heterogenous character of Israeli society. In this war, more than ever before, all ethnic groups in Israel took part in the fighting, in the special units, and in the numbers of casualties. Sephardic Jewry has paid the full price of death and bereavement exacted by this war.

The key to peace and prosperity is to a large extent in the hands of Sephardic Jews. If street politics ceases to play a major role among them, and their enchantment with bombastic politics diminishes, if they realize that only the wall of Jericho fell because of noise, the power of the nationalistic elements among them will go down. But if we are destined to live for years to come under the Likud, it would be best for people like David Levi and his moderate friends to lead this government.

As long as the Labor movement does not rid itself of its patronizing attitude, as long as it cannot open up all the tracks of political recruitment, all the way to the top, for all ethnic groups, as long as it does not cultivate authentic ethnic leadership that can sit down as equals among the old Ashkenazic nouveauriche leaders, as long as it is run by selfish cliques, as long as it represents the rich through wealthy members of Knesset, it will not be able to produce men like David Levi.

Israeli politics is now caught between a nation and ethnic groups. He who will recapture the hearts of the ethnic groups will rule the people, and the day an "ethnic person" becomes prime minister we will have become one nation. On this starting line the outstanding figure right now is David Levi.

UNITED STATES SANCTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL DISCUSSED

TA101458 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 10 Sep 82 Weekend Supplement p 3

[Commentary by Erol Guiney: "The United States May Use 'Indirect Sanctions'"]

[Text] "Experience proves that the most effective way of dealing with Prime Minister Begin is that of private talks; these talks enable him to change positions and give him an opportunity to raise compromise proposals instead of being dragged into a public confrontation." This was written recently by Sol Linowitz, the special Middle East ambassador of former President Jimmy Carter, who held many discussions with Menahem Begin.

Hence, while being convinced that without a strong U.S. guideline no real progress toward peace is possible, Linowitz is not sure that the strategy of President Reagan in presenting a plan of his own for a solution in the region will yield the desired results. It may even yield the opposite results than those Reagan seeks to obtain.

And indeed, Reagan's message to Prime Minister Begin and his television speech, prompted Begin to publicly adopt an even stiffer position than could have been expected. Also, the more relative understanding Reagan's ideas gain from part of the Israeli public and Jewish public opinion, the tougher Begin's stand becomes, totally rejecting the U.S. proposals.

Following the debate in the Knesset, the warning to the Americans not to intervene in Israel's domestic affairs, and the emphasis to Reagan that nothing will come out of his plan, it is possible to say that Begin burned the bridges behind him. There is no way for withdrawal, if such a way had existed earlier at all. Reagan's reaction than "this is only an opening move" seems to be wishful thinking.

However, it is not only the deliberations on the basis of Reagan's proposals which seem impossible. The position adopted by Begin and in fact all the Likud leaders on the issue of the future of the territories is such as to draw the comment that it rejects future negotiations with Egypt. It is also possible to say about this firm position that it renders impossible any attempt to incorporate additional representatives into the negotiations. However, just as Reagan's initial reaction sounds to us too optimistic, so does Menahem Begin's claim regarding the future of Reagan's plan.

The more details we hear about the form in which the U.S. proposals were worked out and formulated--how they were discussed at length and approved after numerous considerations in the framework of endless, secret deliberations and under the pressure of the president himself--the more convinced we become that it is absolutely possible that Reagan's plan will not disappear quickly, at any rate not with the speed Begin foresees.

Reagan reveals an unusual degree of stubbornness when plans in which he most heartily believes are at stake, and there is a clear impression that this is such a plan.

The U.S. President was offended by the claims long raised by all kinds of elements and parties that he does not have a Middle Eastern policy. Now he wants to prove that these claims were not justified; on the contrary, he does have a plan for the region and such a plan as never conceived by any of his predecessors in the White House.

In addition, in the course of the telephone conversations he had with Begin in the days of the IDF's siege of west Beirut, Reagan lost quite a bit of the good impression he had about Israel's prime minister. One of his Washington aides quoted Reagan as saying: "This man (Begin) is making it very difficult for us to support the Israelis."

Under the present conditions, what will happen now?

Despite the declaration by Secretary of State Shultz that "it is hard for me to believe that Israel will reject the peace idea," it is a fact that Israel has indeed rejected this idea in the form presented by the United States, which links it to concessions in Judaea and Samaria.

The Americans now learn that to demand [lidrosh] of Menahem Begin to cede Judaea and Samaria is like demanding [lidrosh] of Ronald Reagan to be reserved about capitalism--a comparison drawn by a well-known U.S. magazine.

Therefore, it was possible to assume that the Americans should be happy about the opportunity of advancing elections in Israel to May or June, since after all there is some chance that Begin will be defeated in the elections and will be replaced by one of the alignment's leaders, by one of those who believe that Reagan's proposals constitute a basis for negotiations.

However, the administration leaders are not joyous about such elections in Israel.

First, it is clear to them that an impression that large superpowers are trying to dictate policy to the small state of Israel, on matters which are vital to it, will create a strong reaction of fury and national pride. Begin excels in taking advantage of such feelings, and it is absolutely possible--as he declared in the Knesset--that the Likud will emerge strengthened from the new elections.

Second, it is clear to them that if elections are held in a few months, with the Reagan plan acting as the main issue for argument in the election campaign, the election results will also be affected by various factors that have nothing to do with the Reagan proposals.

The Likud will again confront the alignment with, on the one hand, Menahem Begin's enormous popularity and, on the other, the much lower popularity of Shimon Peres; with, on the one hand, the Likud's unity--imposed by one man--and, on the other, the splits in the Labor Party, in which Yitzhak Rabin has already taken a completely different position on the Reagan plan than that of Shimon Peres and the other alignment leaders.

Therefore, the results may not reflect the genuine positions of the people in Israel regarding the basic problem: should Israel make territorial concessions to Jordan in order to achieve peace and in order to prevent the creation of a binational state.

On the other hand, if there are elections in the near future, it will rapidly emerge that the main problem these days--President Reagan's plan--is much less important than it should have been. And even if it happens that the alignment receives more votes than the Likud, something that does not for the moment appear likely, it will have to ask for the help of the religious parties in order to establish a governmental coalition, and the support of the religious will not be easily gained by the alignment, certainly not with the same ease that it was obtained by the Likud. Therefore, in the end it will emerge that the Likud will sit in the government again, even if public opinion on the issue of "territories against peace" leans toward the alignment position.

The paradox is that new elections in Israel in May or June are too slow and too late, from the U.S. viewpoint:

--Too late, because during an entire year Israel will be paralyzed because of the elections and there will be no movement from Jerusalem regarding the Reagan plan. From this it follows that this U.S. peace plan will lose its impetus, and impetus is an important factor in the success of this Middle Eastern initiative.

--Too slow, because the months before the elections in spring are too short a time for it to be explained to the Israeli public that the country is confronted with world public opinion, and that of the U.S. public and the U.S. administration, without a counterweight of congress or even of the U.S. Jewish community, which is split on the issue of Reagan's new plan.

The Americans are promising that they do not intend to impose direct sanctions on Israel, such as stopping or restricting military or economic aid, sanctions whose effect will rapidly be felt. It is clear to them that such an approach would lead to the opposite results in Israel and would certainly not help the U.S. administration itself on the eve of the intermediate election in the United States this November. It appears, then, that what the administration will try to do is: Use indirect sanctions.

This means: not granting several new Israeli requests, both in the political sphere (in the United Nations, in relations with Third World countries, etc.) and in the economic sphere, and even in the military field.

The Americans will keep the promises they have made, but no more than that. The requests for further military equipment will come up against a "no," or holdups and postponements for the sake of "study."

The administration may even not fight against certain cuts in the budgets for Israel that will be recommended by congress, which has become less pro-Israeli than the administration.

The influence of such indirect sanctions will not be felt quickly by broad sections of the Israeli public, and they will not have a strong influence on formulating Israeli public opinion before the elections. Therefore, the voters may think again that Begin has succeeded in a confrontation with Washington and that the United States is only a "paper tiger" when it is a question of putting pressure on Israel.

The Americans can harm Begin's chances immediately if they set up obstacles to the Begin-Sharon policy in Lebanon, a place where the prime minister has promised to achieve a peace agreement with Lebanon by the end of the year--an objective that he will not obtain easily. Despite no few differences of opinion on the Lebanese question, on this issue the United States and Israel are close to each other and neither of them has an interest in jeopardizing cooperation in Lebanon, despite the dispute over the future of the territories.

CSO: 4400/484

ISRAEL

'MA'ARIV' VIEWS LEBANESE WAR OF ATTRITION

TA141341 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 14 Sep 82 p 5

[Commentary by Shmu'el Segev: "Not a War of Attrition"]

[Text] The war in Lebanon and the ensuing operations of an attritional nature engendered an extraordinary phenomenon: Israel and the Arabs claim, each of them separately, a "devastating victory" and at the same time each side entertains illusions which might prove counterproductive.

Following the evacuation of the Palestinian terrorists from Beirut Prime Minister Menahem Begin hastened to declare that "the land will be quiet for 40 years." In a news conference to sum up the 12th Arab summit conference in Fes, King Hassan of Morocco said: "Israel has in fact lost the war in Lebanon." King Hassan enumerated three reasons for this Israel "loss":

--Military: The IDF did not enter into west Beirut and did not conquer all the Lebanese territory where Syrian soldiers and Palestinian terrorists are still stationed;

--Political: The war in Lebanon proved that the time of the Israeli "lightning wars" has passed;

--Moral: The war underscored the killing and destruction perpetrated by the IDF throughout Lebanon and this adversely affected Israel's image throughout the world.

Of course, this distorted view of the results of the war in Lebanon was aimed at concealing the negligence evinced by the Arab states in the course of the war and to blur the fact that not even one of the confrontation states stepped forward to help the PLO and the Syrian troops. However, as far as Israel is concerned, this distorted Arab view attests to a renewed attempt "to escape from reality" and the consequence might be again avoiding entering direct negotiations and reaching a speedy and comprehensive agreement with Israel.

As far as Israel is concerned, this distorted Arab view does not constitute a "tragedy." Since its establishment, Israel has learned to live with this imaginative Arab world and has wisely and calmly planned its moves with a steadfast reliance on the facts in the field.

However, for the first time, the war in Lebanon has given rise to the fear that Israel has also begun escaping reality and sliding into an imaginary world. Menahem Begin and Ari'el Sharon try to attribute meanings to the peace for Galilee operation which are not anchored in reality. Defense Minister Sharon has even gone one step further and said that the war in Lebanon was "the most brilliant achievement" in Israel's history. Thus, carried on the wings of their imagination, the prime minister and the defense minister dismissed all of Israel's achievements in the past and attributed a still incomplete "victory" to themselves.

Indeed, the war of attrition evolving in al-Biqa' proves that Israel is still far from having achieved its objectives in Lebanon. Bashir al-Jumayyil has been elected president of Lebanon but he has been shunning his undertaking to sign a peace treaty with Israel "before the end of the year" as Menahem Begin promised in public; the Syrian army controls about half of Lebanon's territory; some 10,000 Palestinian terrorists are being sheltered by the Syrian troops in the al-Biqa' and Tripoli areas and are accelerating their deployment with the aim of stepping up their acts of terror against the IDF soldiers in Lebanon and Israeli targets within the boundaries of the "Green Line."

In addition to the 98 cease-fire violations since the July bombardment of the Syrian positions listed by the IDF spokesman this week, the acts of terror in Israel and the territories have been increasing: new terrorist rings are uncovered daily and their weapons and military equipment are confiscated while the Palestinian leadership in the territories hardens its positions toward Israel and continues to regard the PLO as its leader.

Yasir 'Arafat appears to be collecting achievements. After regaining the recognition of the Arab leaders in Fes, he plans to visit Rome this week and have an audience with the Pope and the Italian president. Again, this does not constitute a "tragedy," but this development is far from the rash and unfounded statements made by the prime minister and the defense minister that, as it were, "the PLO has been militarily and politically annihilated."

The latest developments in al-Biqa' call for Israel to return to a balanced and sober policy. It is better to tell the people the truth: the war in Lebanon is not yet over; there is still a long way to go to annihilate Arab terror and evacuate the Syrian forces from Lebanon.

If there had been any doubt about this, the Fes conference confirms it. In spite of the firm demand of the Lebanese Government, the Arab summit conference did not cancel the mandate for the continuing presence of the Syrian army in Lebanon but it compelled the governments in Beirut and Damascus to enter negotiations on the arrangements for a Syrian evacuation "in parallel with the evacuation of the IDF forces from Lebanon." The practical implication of this resolution is that the Syrian army will not be evacuated from al-Biqa' and the Tripoli area unless the IDF forces withdraw from Lebanon. Moreover, the summit conference resolution hints that if Israel and Lebanon reach some

kind of "security arrangements"--as Menahem Begin and Ari'el Sharon demand--President Bashir al-Jumayyil will also have to make "parallel security arrangements" with the Syrian authorities.

This front now demands that Israel seriously and deeply discuss the ways to react to the Syrian and Palestinian violations in al-Biqa'. Israel cannot and must not put up with a new "war of attrition" in Lebanon and it cannot concede the security of its soldiers to the grace of Palestinian terrorists. However, by the same token, a situation should not evolve where Lebanon would become a sort of "Israeli Vietnam."

The sooner Menahem Begin and Ari'el Sharon realize this, the better for the State of Israel and for ensuring a real peace for the Galilee.

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BEIRUT ACTION, DANGERS VIEWED

TA161620 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 16 Sep 82 pp 1, 7

[Commentary by political analyst Erol Guiney: "The Action Was Unavoidable But the Complications Increase"]

[Text] The IDF entry into west Beirut could perhaps have been unavoidable under the circumstances that developed, but undoubtedly it was a sorry development, and one should hope that our soldiers' stay there will be as short as possible.

It could have been an unavoidable development because after the assassination of Bashir al-Jumayyil Israel had a good many reason to fear developments that could have largely negated the positive outcome achieved following the siege of west Beirut.

The Lebanese army, undergoing a process of demoralization, was no longer capable of securing the supervision of that part of the city which had just recently been delivered into its hands. The leftist militias, supported by the remnants of the Palestinian terrorists that were removed from Beirut, number some 2,000 to 3,000 men who are well armed and could have regained control over all of west Beirut.

The Christian "Phalangists" could have tried to avenge the killing of al-Jumayyil by massacring the Palestinians or the Muslim inhabitants of the western part of the city, or hurting the Palestinian refugees in their camps. Any of these developments could have sparked off the civil war in this miserable country.

We see, therefore, that there were reasons aplenty for the IDF to intervene. But in parallel we must be very much alert to the dangers as well. This time we are not fighting foreign forces but primarily against Lebanese who are supported by the PLO men. Thus we are blatantly interfering in Lebanon's domestic affairs.

Experience has taught us that sooner or later the country that interferes to such an extent pays a heavy price for that intervention. It creates a coalition of opposition forces of all shades of views and opinions.

The capture of the western part of the city could even turn out to have the kind of results that are exactly the opposite of what is desirable in regard to the election of Lebanon's next president and in regard to other political developments in the neighboring country.

One could be thankful for the fact that so far our casualty toll has not been too heavy. The "peace for Galilee" operation has already taxed us heavily. If we stay in west Beirut, we could even encounter urban terrorism, which could emerge as a terminal growth spreading slowly but surely.

The capture of the western part of the city could taint with a speck of justification the ridiculous accusation that Israel was behind the assassination of Bashir al-Jumayyil. This charge, raised by the Syrians and Yasir 'Arafat, could conceivably win a measure of world public support, it usually being oblivious to reliable information. This public would believe that it is Israel that is "making profit" from the death of the president-elect, so much so that it drives it toward capturing west Beirut.

Even a man like former President Jimmy Carter's national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski did not rule out the possibility that Israel played a role in al-Jumayyil's murder.

If the hold over west Beirut continues, this will result in additional tension in Jerusalem-Washington relations, which are over strained anyway.

In general, it will further sink us into the Lebanese quagmire.

What typifies the process we have found ourselves in in Lebanon is that each step appears to be logical and unavoidable, but in the final analysis we find ourselves in a very uncomfortable situation, lending justification to the saying that "everyone knows how a war begins, but it is never clear how it will end." Then we stop and ask ourselves: "Actually, how did we get to this place to begin with?"

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AMBASSADOR ARENS SEEN AS MODERATE INFLUENCE IN GOVERNMENT

Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 20 Aug 82 p 4

[Article by Wolf Blitzer: "Arens Becomes 'Moderate;' Israel's Ambassador in Washington, Moshe Arens, Changes His Views, Becoming Less Rigid; As Politician Rather Than Diplomat, He Influences Israeli Policy; Some See His Influence in Israel's Softening Position"]

[Text] Shortly after arriving in Washington last February, Ambassador Moshe Arens angered U.S. officials when he publicly criticized Reagan's policy in the Middle East. Those officials assumed at the time that because of his public statements Arens would find it difficult to form close personal ties with high level American leaders. They argued that the ambassador should be more diplomatic and less brazen in criticizing his host country.

Arens' image as a hardliner added to his problems. As chairman of the Knesset's foreign relations and defense committee he voted, in disregard to his membership in Herut, against the Camp David accords. In the beginning of March Bernard Gwertzman wrote in the NEW YORK TIMES that "Arens fulfills the expectations of those who consider him to hawk who speaks his mind. When one compares his views to those of Prime Minister Menahem Begin, one gets the impression Begin is a moderate." A few days later the popular commentator of ABC's Night Line, Ted Koppel, said that Arens has become known as "strongman." Arens had voted against the Camp David accords and remains skeptical about them.

Now, 6 months later, senior officials in Reagan administration are praising the work of the Israeli ambassador. This change in the American attitude was seen lately when the White House and the State Department found out that Arens had played a decisive role in shaping the Israeli policy during the crisis in West Beirut. American officials consider Arens a "secret weapon" in the struggle to persuade Begin and other Israeli leaders to side with the U.S. in order to attain a political victory in U.S. foreign policy. Israeli flexibility was needed in order to help special U.S. envoy Philip Habib to extricate the PLO from West Beirut peacefully.

A Hardliner, Hence Credible

On 8 August Arens suddenly left Washington and flew to Jerusalem. According to Israeli officials, his assignment was to brief the government on the mood in the American capital. "You cannot put everything in a cable," they said. Arens only started working 6 months ago, too short a time to know Washington. The U.S. is not a foreign country to him. He grew up in Philadelphia, served in the U.S. Army, and studied at MIT. He came back to the U.S. as an ambassador after being away for many years. In time, after several lecture tours, he began to make frequent appearances on American television. He became close with former Secretary of State Alexander Haig and other senior officials, including Undersecretary for Political Affairs Lawrence Eagleburger. Government officials have pointed out it was only by accident that the new secretary of state, George Schultz, had his first official meeting with Arens. Yet, since that meeting the two have been meeting and speaking on the phone regularly.

The Americans have come to realize Arens is not a "right-wing lunatic" (as he was called a few months earlier by an American official). He operates effectively in Washington, since the policy-makers here have come to the conclusion that he has influence in Jerusalem. Arens takes advantage of the fact that he is a politician and not a professional diplomat. As a politician he has more freedom to make decisions. He can suddenly fly to Jerusalem, meet with the prime minister, the minister of defense, the foreign minister and the chief of staff. He can take part in government sessions as an equal. His image as a hardliner lends credibility to his recommendations to Israel to be more flexible. "Former Ambassador Efrayim Evron had also asked Begin to give in," an American official has said. "But now things are different. When Arens speaks, Jerusalem listens."

The Americans believe that Arens latest trip to the U.S. was the turning point in Habib's efforts. They give him credit for the breakthrough. They say that Arens had explained the change in the traditional support of the U.S. for Israel, and the government believed him. It reacted with concessions and removed the obstacles that blocked the negotiations.

This view may be simplistic, considering Arens's personal stand on the use of military force. But the Americans believe that Arens had explained to the Israeli leaders in unequivocal terms what the American reaction to an Israeli assault on the PLO remaining positions in West Beirut might be. He also pointed out the advantages to Israel in reaching an agreement.

Arens may have benefited from Habib's success. Almost all the important doors in Washington are now open to him. He is aware of the fact that he did not cause the U.S. to change its mind all by himself. The road to acquire friends for Israel is still long. It is safe to assume that the American government will now pressure Israel to make broader settlements in Lebanon and solve the Palestinian problem. The general sense is that Arens has started out on the right foot.

AIR FORCE COMMANDER DISCUSSES ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN LEBANON

Tel Aviv BAMAHAHE in Hebrew No 42, 21 Jul 82 pp 10-11, 58

[Article by Yoram Inspector: "Complete Air Superiority"]

[Text] "Complete air superiority was achieved: the Syrian missile deployment in Lebanon was destroyed, and it was impossible to improve on the kill ratio in the air battles. The personnel loss ratio was the smallest we have ever experienced in any war. The results of the attack on the ground targets were impressive. A no less significant achievement was the success in the maintenance of a limited war--confined to the area of Lebanon. It was a modern campaign, exemplary of the campaigns of the eighties, and lessons on the international level will certainly be drawn from it."

This is how the air force commander, Maj Gen David 'Ivri briefly summarized the air force's achievements in the Peace for Galilee war. He made these comments at a press conference of military reporters held on the 34th Air Force Day which was celebrated at air force bases during the past week.

Yes, there is no doubt that this is the air force of the eighties. Photographs taken during combat will also attest to this. To the photographs of the downing of the MiG's, the communications tumult, the clipped voices of the controller and the pilot, a pilot with artistic tendencies added another sound track--avant-garde rock music ("Pink Floyd"). The missiles launched one after the other, and the electric guitars wailing. These go well together. The surrealistic combination. So also is the fact that an awesome reality named war becomes a superficial two-dimensional reality a surrealistic television game also in the manner in which the film strip was suddenly cut off, and we were again returning to the interview room. The military reporters sip from cans of cold orange juice and inquire about the implications, estimates, developments, improvements, and conclusions. The air force commander, in his characteristic style, is quiet, considered, and reserved. The reporters are unsuccessful in wringing from his statements such as "the aircraft subdues the missile"--this is not his style. 'Ivri stresses that "one must not underrate the Syrian pilot" in spite of the fact that the Israeli Air Force downed 92 enemy aircraft (including 6 attack helicopters). The air force commander emphasizes that it is not a better aircraft alone that decides a battle, it is not a better pilot that is

victorious in war. The system is victorious, the method is victorious. The ground crews and the command and control personnel, as well as the one who cooks good food for the air crews, are also victorious. It is the integration of all of them, the maximum input of each one that creates the qualitative gap. There are satisfaction and pride in his words but no intoxication of victory, no complacency. That which characterizes the tone of David 'Ivri's comments on Air Force Day is precisely the modesty, the caution in drawing conclusions, and the concerned look ahead toward the challenges of the future. "Whoever thinks that our success in destroying one of the most concentrated, dangerous, and densest missile deployments in the world means that the surface-to-air missile has lost its significance," says Gen 'Ivri, "is deceiving himself. One destroys such a deployment in certain conditions. This does not mean that one destroys it tomorrow in other conditions. The ground missile deployment has not lost its significance just as the rifle has not lost its significance since World War I. However, there is a change in the specific value of that deployment, in its integration today in air combat. The Syrians consider the missiles as an offensive deployment. This is their concept. The destruction of the missiles has shaken this doctrine to a certain extent. But if we exaggerated the potential danger of missiles after the Yom Kippur War, then now we tend to denigrate their value, and this must not be done. On the contrary, everyone now connected with the air defense field in the world is doing his utmost to restore to the ground missile the same specific value that it had before. Already now, 10 days after the attack, the Syrians are strengthening the missile deployments along their borders. They have brought in equipment from Russia and Libya. The deployment is completely within Syria. There are no missiles in Lebanon, but it consists of several batteries and covers a broad area.

There is a massive tendency to reconstruct the deployment. In the last 3 years, immediately after MiG attacks, some senior "figure" from the Soviet Air Force would always arrive in Syria in order to investigate and draw conclusions, and immediately afterwards the Syrians were reinforced with weapons again. I think that this involves a prestige problem for Soviet equipment. And also today, in wake of the Israeli Air Force's success in Peace for Galilee, the Soviets are demonstrating full intervention."

New Weaponry Is a New Threat

In an interview on Galei Tzahal [IDF Radio], David 'Ivri related that the hours before the attack on the missiles were also for him one of the most tense and difficult stages in Operation Peace for Galilee. "You are facing a crucial battle. You either win or lose all the cards. And here we went for all the cards, and failure would have had a very serious effect. Failure in many cases is above all that of one man, and before the attack on the missiles, it was definitely a moment of peak tension. But in the heat of the attack there was no time to be tense."

[Question] If the Soviets give SA-8's to the Syrians, would this be likely to limit our ability to attack them?

[Answer] "The SA-8, and actually every new weapon, constitutes a new threat. "Tricks" which are good for one are not good for the other. We are undergoing intensive training also for new types of missiles. And the new threat will not necessarily be only the SA-8. We are all "locked in" now on Lebanon and Syria, but there are other places in the Middle East where we have not put the systems to the test of reality, places where they are receiving American and French equipment. We must also consider the American and French reality."

The Syrians have scrambled the MiG-23 for attack and defense missions. The MiG-23 which is designed for attack missions, the Sukhoi-22, and the MiG-21 have participated. "The MiG-21b is a very advanced MiG-21," emphasizes the air force commander. "It is not the same MiG-21 of the Yom Kippur War. It is an aircraft with a more powerful engine, with better missiles, and with better performance." In the dogfights we shot down the MiG-21, the MiG-23, and the Sukhoi.

[Question] A naive question: If the MiG's are after all not such inferior aircraft, how is it that they did not shoot down even one of our planes? What is the secret of the success--to shoot down 86 enemy aircraft and to have all your aircraft return home. How did this happen? Is the Syrian pilot so inferior?

[Answer] "In spite of the fact that the systems and the aircraft are becoming more and more sophisticated, it is always eventually the pilot that is the determining factor in an encounter, in a battle. But this war was a modern one, of the eighties. This is to say that in a modern war the method of operating the system is the primary factor. Our system functioned in such a way that the Syrian pilot's prospect of success was lower at the outset, even before he encountered our aircraft. Their chances were slimmer at the beginning, and this can be attributed to the command and control system, and understandably our training and combat systems. However one must not underestimate the Syrian pilot. I am convinced that there are very good pilots among them."

To Limit the War

[Question] During the attack on the missile deployment the Syrians scrambled tens of aircraft in spite of the fact that they certainly knew what they were up against. How do you analyze their reaction?

[Answer] The reaction per se was logical: "One deployment is destroyed, let's activate another." The response was logical. The system in which it was implemented was not a wise one and was not controlled. I estimate that it took them time to evaluate what was happening in the air battles. On Friday morning they already understood the situation. We had already shot down 60 of their aircraft. Nevertheless, they continued to scramble them. I believe that what happened then was already the result of a psychological pressure of "let's make a last effort to shoot down several Israeli aircraft." And this was already a reaction of impulse and less of consideration. I cannot say for certain that this is what happened. This is a feeling. What is interesting is that when we began to attack on Friday,

4 June, the Syrians did not react despite the fact that we were attacking Beirut, and as a rule in the past when we attacked terrorist targets in the Beirut area, the Syrians would react. In my opinion, the cumulative effect of the last 3 years was a factor here. In the 3 years before the war we became a significant deterrent factor in the air. We had shot down 24 Syrian planes (including 2 Mi-8 helicopters without losing a single aircraft). On Monday they began to intercept us. In the beginning they thought twice. On Monday a MiG-23 was shot down. On Tuesday a few more began to come. Seven were shot down. And with the attack on the missiles there began a massive intercept effort.

[Question] Were the air battles in this war exceptional because of the long-range air-to-air missiles? And if there was such extensive use of the missiles, what remains for the cannon?

[Answer] The missiles definitely have an effect. The more advanced the air-to-air missiles, the higher the percentage of their shootdowns. If in 1967 we had had such a quantity of missiles as we have today, the percentage of shootdowns would, in my opinion, be much higher. This is also true for the War of Attrition because the missiles have more opportunities than the cannon. At the same time, the cannon are definitely effective. There is a part of the firing envelope in which the cannon are more effective. This is simply complementing the missile firing. The weapons system which has been used in the air battles is the same system which has been available to us for the last 3 years.

[Question] Did they fire surface-to-air missiles at our planes from Syria?

[Answer] Yes.

[Question] Did we attack the sources of the firing?

[Answer] What I can tell you is that we made a very great effort to see to it that the war would be limited and remain in the area of Lebanon. This was a very delicate matter. The distance from the Syrian air bases to the battle area in Lebanon is a matter for the weather forecaster. Minutes. From our bases the time is understandably longer so that the Syrians had an advantage in this respect. On the other hand, we did not want to be dragged into a general war with Syria. We kept many planes in the air, throughout the fighting, in order to prevent and foil Syrian sorties from attacking our forces.

The concentration of our aircraft in the air was one of the things that made the air battles difficult. The concentration created problems of identification and a concern about hitting our own aircraft by mistake. The concentration of our aircraft at times bothered us more than the MiG's. Many aircraft circles in the sky, armed and waiting. This was also true for aircraft which were scrambled by our ground forces. The close and massive coordination between the ground forces and the air force in Peace for Galilee created a new dimension of cooperation. The air force destroyed hundreds of vehicles, armored vehicles and tanks, gun positions, and so forth and in this way supported our forces in their advance and prevented grinding ground battles.

"In the Yom Kippur War participation in the ground fighting was not a responsibility of the air force. After the war this responsibility was transferred to us, and a doctrine was developed which was tested for the first time in the Litani operation, an operation from which it was difficult to learn lessons. The first significant test of the doctrine of coordination with the ground forces has now been conducted in Peace for Galilee. In terms of support to the ground forces this has been one of the largest operations ever, both in effectiveness and in size. There were instances in which they did not launch an attack as long as the aircraft had not come to soften up targets. This was the most concrete expression of need for the air force and for fruitful coordination. This is not easy. It is an area in which there are very many conflicts and problems. There are very many forces with many requirements. Each one is worried by something else. One is concerned about Sagger's, another about tanks, and a third about RPG's, and you must provide each of them with a different solution. This is a most complex system in every respect, both in coordination and in the cooperation itself. It is not as simple as it sounds, to drop several bombs and to go home. However, in sum, we are satisfied with the cooperation, and most of the ground units are also satisfied with our collaboration. Despite the fact that there are always here and there those who did not receive support because of objective conditions, it is impossible to attach four aircraft to every soldier. In a total war in several areas this would be much more difficult--so much support would not be able to be given, and this is one of the things which we will have to be deployed for and to plan for in the future--but it can definitely be concluded that the new support system has been exploited beautifully."

In the support to the ground forces attack aircraft were, of course, not the only ones to participate. Assault helicopters also took part. This was their first taste of combat in Israel, and actually in the world ("They were used in Vietnam but only against guerrilla forces and not against a significant opposition force as was the case here," Gen 'Ivri). They carried out many blocking operations and supported the ground forces in the destruction of tanks, APC's, firing on artillery positions and snipers, and so forth.

Ground Support Test

Assault-transport helicopters also supported the ground forces with great dedication. The Bells and the Uas'urs [nickname for the Sikorsky CH-53 helicopter] transported forces to the battle areas and evacuated more than 1000 wounded in hundreds of flights to the hospitals in Israel. About 90 percent of the wounded were evacuated by air by the helicopters and the Hercules and received treatment by the air force air medical team.

The aircraft also transported supplies: many tons of ammunition, food, and recreational materials were brought to the front lines by the helicopters. "The war of the helicopters," says the air force commander, "was extremely dangerous this time. They flew over an area where it was difficult to determine the location of the concealed danger. At times, an area at the front was already mopped up but in the rear of the front line there were still terrorists who fired at the helicopters."

Last but not least in the system of support for the ground forces were the anti-aircraft forces. The anti-aircraft elements, by the very nature of their mission, were deployed with the regular and reserve units to defend against aircraft in the northern part of Israel such as defending emergency depot units, airfields, control units, and so forth and deployed units which moved with the forces in the area. However, the uniqueness of the anti-aircraft fighting in the Peace for Galilee war is that while the invaders had MiG's and assault helicopters, the anti-aircraft troops carried out many ground-to-ground missions and fired directly toward the terrorist and Syrian forces on the ground. In many cases they were at the head of the attack force, and this was evident in the number of wounded: over 40 of the wounded were anti-aircraft personnel.

There was, of course, another new test of the operational functioning of the new air force bases in the Negev--Ramon and 'Uvda.

"Ramon and 'Uvda were one of the most complex logistical projects with which the air force ever had to cope. It was only at the end of April that they were declared operational. In June when we were required to go to war, the bases functioned very well. All of the personnel there, the logistics and maintenance personnel in Ramon and 'Uvda, definitely deserve congratulations."

[Question] One of the more painful phenomena in the Peace for Galilee war was the casualties among the civilian population in Lebanon. What measures did the air force headquarters take in order to prevent civilian casualties to the extent possible?

[Answer] "In recent years in attacks on the terrorists, one more than one occasion we gave up on targets where we knew with certainty that there were terrorists in order not to cause casualties among the civilian population. In war the problem takes on, of course, another dimension. There are ground forces who are depending on you. And you have a dilemma: You must choose between two terrible alternatives as to your action if a battalion enters Tyre and finds itself in a difficult situation. What is preferable? To extricate the battalion and to take the risk of civilian casualties or to leave the battalion which will break its head against the PRG's and the Saggars just for the sake of not causing civilian casualties. Of course, in such a case the war gives preference to our forces, and this is really a difficult decision. In every case in which we had to attack targets where a civilian population was involved, we tried to carry out selective bombing. Not once did we drop bombs randomly. Instead we tried to hit only the terrorist target with maximum accuracy, and we are capable of hitting with maximum accuracy. Evidence for this, for example, can be found in the attack on the stadium in Beirut in which no Lebanese civilians were hurt. But there is a problem. The ground force does not see the area so well, buildings block his view, and the pilot also does not have a complete picture. He sees everything subjectively. It is difficult to create an understanding between the two, and at times in the area there are mistakes. There were aircraft that had not identified targets with certainty and they returned with their ammunition. It can be said that we did the maximum to support our forces and strike the target with a minimum of civilian casualties."

In contrast to the dilemmas and limitations caused by the Lebanese civilians caught up in the war, the Peace for Galilee war had a very significant advantage for the air force, says Gen David 'Ivri. "Since it was not a general war, we were able to operate on a completely qualitative basis. Every aircraft carried out the mission for which it was best suited. The F-16, the F-15, and the Kfir passed the test with good performance, and there is no doubt that the lessons we will draw from Operation Peace for Galilee will influence the continuing development of the Lavi. We do not now have a list of lessons which we can apply one by one. There are residues which slowly begin to take form and begin to influence the thinking. This changes concepts and directions. Perhaps one should think, for example, about "more precision than the number of bombs and other matters of this kind. There was no full quantitative exploitation in Peace for Galilee. The operation did indeed permit us to show every aircraft in its best mode. And such was also the case with the Phantoms and the Skyhawks."

When one speaks about full qualitative exploitation, it is impossible not to conclude with the classic question: the pilot of today and the pilot of the past. Is there a qualitative gap between them? In an interview on IDF Radio, Gen 'Ivri responded to this question as follows:

"This was the first war for many young men who had not fought since Yom Kippur other than on current security missions. What we discovered, what we feel is that the preparation and training given to the personnel are very good. There was outstanding operational discipline, and this perhaps was one of the reasons why we had such few casualties because if you follow the doctrine, that is to say perform with operational discipline, if everyone knows what he is doing and does it as it should be done, there are less casualties. Naturally, the requirements on the Israeli pilot are continually increasing. War is becoming more and more complex, and for the pilot of the F-15, the F-16 or the Kfir, it is insufficient to be courageous and composed as perhaps was sufficient for the pilots of the Mustang and the Spitfire. There is much more weight attached today to the element of skill and professionalism and the element of knowledge and learning than in the past. This is required by the technology and the sophisticated systems which are introduced from time to time. We, the veterans, joke that if we were now trying to pass a flight course, we would not finish it. There is something of the truth in this. The requirements increase, and at the same time the results are also better."

5830

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WEST BANK ARAB VIEWS CONSIDERED IN LIGHT OF LEBANON WAR

Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT 30 Jul 82 Weekend Magazine pp 5-6, 7

[Article by Tzvi Zinger: "The Arabs in the Territories: After the Shock"]

[Text] The first reaction was shock. Nabulus, Ramallah, East Jerusalem and Hebron looked like abandoned towns. Gaza was quiet, sedated. You could cut the tension with a knife. Desperation lurked in every corner. In East Jerusalem, on Salah al-Din Street, most of the shops were empty. Many stores--which on normal days are crowded with shoppers--were locked with heavy iron gates. Even those that were open were desolate. Bands of youth gathered at the entrances to some of the shops, small transistor radios in hand--listening, turning from one station to another. Silent.

The market mob, which usually characterizes the old walled city, had completely disappeared. The few store owners who opened for business during the first days of the war found themselves without clients. Almost no tourists ventured into the market. Israelis, too, made themselves very scarce in the Old City and the few who did not were very aware of the glares cast in their direction from every corner or entranceway, hostile looks that could not be misunderstood. "It reminded me," said one resident of the Jewish Quarter who makes his way daily through the streets of the marketplace, "of the first few days following the Six-Day War. I know those looks well. I felt them in Gaza after it was conquered. They are the kind of stares that tickle your back for a long time, even after you're well on your way. In Gaza, following the Six-Day War, those looks make me carry my gun whenever I left the jurisdiction of the quarter and look carefully over my shoulder every few seconds."

There were Israelis who encountered more "active" reactions. "I don't sell to Israelis," said some of the shopkeepers in market places throughout Judea and Samaria. There were those who had the iron grating literally slammed in their faces when they approached. "We're closed now," they were told.

There are also stories of Israelis who were sold rotten fruit and vegetables or those who suddenly found themselves surrounded by dozens of youth, staring at them with hatred--without uttering a single word. I myself--a few weeks after the war broke out--encountered situations where a group of kids fired cap guns at me. One of them, in Gaza, ran alongside our car, "shooting" and shouting: "'Arafat is great, 'Arafat is great." In East Jerusalem, next to

the City of David excavations, one could see the surrealistic picture of mounted police, religious demonstrators and about 10 children "spraying" them with cap gun "fire."

The depressed atmosphere had its tangible counterparts. At least during the first 2 weeks after the war began, the residents of the occupied territories were almost completely paralyzed. It was hard to believe that for 2 months prior to that the West Bank and East Jerusalem had been stormy, with dozens of violent demonstrations during which rocks and incendiary bombs were thrown and Palestinian flags were raised. The period following the decision to establish a civilian administration had been the most restless period since the Six-Day War.

Even Bir-Zayt University, which had become a "rightwing symbol" for Palestinian nationalism on the West Bank--since the heads of the National Steering Committee were deposed--was calm and quiet. "The students were absolutely in shock," said Professor Salim Tamari, senior lecturer of Middle East history at Bir-Zayt University. "They were frustrated, confused and helpless. They listened to the various radio stations and could not believe their ears. They were shocked by the scope of the military operation, by the photographs of destruction and death shown on television and most of all--by the Arab response. In their darkest dreams they had never believed that the Arab nations would be so divided and splintered, instead of uniting on the Palestinian issue."

The first shot fired in the occupied territories was in Nabulus, 4 days after fighting broke out in Lebanon. An IDF patrol was making its way through the streets of the city when suddenly it was surrounded by dozens of students from al-Najah University who had apparently prepared a well-planned ambush. Dozens of rocks were thrown at the soldiers in the patrol car and on other Israeli vehicles in the area. Some of the students used new weapons--efficient and frighteningly dangerous--steel balls that had been studded with nails and teeth and were fired from sling shots. The area quickly became a battleground and the patrol, reinforced with additional troops, scattered the insurgents with rubber bullets, tear gas and shots fired in the air.

One day later, north of Gaza, an Israeli driver working for a contracting firm was wounded after his vehicle was bombarded with rocks. He lost control of the vehicle and turned over on the shoulder. A military ambulance took him to a hospital in Ashkelon. Two days prior to that, other Israeli vehicles had been stoned along the Gaza Strip, among them military cars. There were also incidents where residents of the refugee camps tried to block the entrance to the camps. But here again, this was the exception. The majority closed themselves in their homes and most workers even avoided going to their jobs in Israel.

Insurgence on the Temple Mount

After the first days of shock--a week to 10 days after the outbreak--a slow awakening took place. Manifestos from the Communist Party and Palestinian nationalist groups were published calling for a strike against the economy and trade by Jerusalem and the occupied territories. "No workers for Israel,"

read one of the circulars. And there was, therefore, an appreciable decline in the number of workers from the Gaza Strip going to work in Israel. Youth suspected of being disruptive elements were arrested by security forces. In East Jerusalem, too, youths who walked among the shops calling for a trade strike were arrested. Students from Bir-Zayt University distributed leaflets on the Temple Mount, leaflets calling for a strike and for a "civil revolt," but were usually met with apathy or avoidance.

In Gaza, they started burning tires. The familiar picture returned. Twice, hand grenades were thrown at IDF patrols--but large army and border security forces squelched these attempted uprisings with a strong hand. In Nabulus, another demonstration of students from al-Najah University welled up. This time, a border security patrol was attacked. The patrol commander tried to create a distance between the patrol and the dozens of youth trying to surround them by firing in the air, but to no avail. The bombardment of rocks became heavier and he tried again, this time aiming at the demonstrator's legs. One of the youths was wounded in the hip and later died in the hospital.

In East Jerusalem, the daily police registers were again filled with accounts of familiar disturbances, of rocks hurled over the walls, on the Shu'fat Road and in Wadi (Juz)--although with a relatively low frequency. East Jerusalem was, however, the only locality to engage in a full trade strike when the first strike was declared to show sympathy with the Palestinians in Lebanon. The strike lasted only one Saturday. But compared with Ramallah, Nabulus and other towns, it was a full strike.

In Nabulus, two 19-year old youths were killed and in other towns on the West Bank, 11 were wounded during the protest strike which was declared by the "Organization of Nationalist Groups," an offshoot of the National Steering Committee. At the Sug in Nabulus, dozens of youths attacked and wounded an IDF soldier in the head. Border police and IDF soldiers had to use their weapons in order to force the demonstrators to retreat. In Ramallah, youths burned tires in the center of town, fired rockets and shouted slogans against the Israeli attack in Lebanon. Only gas bombs and shots fired at the demonstrators' legs broke it up. In one of the villages in the Ramallah area, explosives were thrown at a group of workers--by some miracle no one was injured in the explosion. In the village of Bayt Sira, three were wounded when fired upon by people from the "Village Association"--after they tried to prevent workers from going to their jobs. Two weeks earlier, an Arab youth from the Communist Party was killed in another incident with the "Village Association." It was in Kfar Bayt Khalil in the Hebron district, when workers were attacked while putting up electrical lines for their village--by hundreds of demonstrating youths.

Thus, gradually, the atmosphere became hotter. The peak of these incidents was the murder of Ya'akov Kur--a Jerusalem man strolling through the market in Bethlehem with four of his children--two weeks ago. It was actually the second murder in the occupied territories (both in the Bethlehem area) since fighting had erupted in Lebanon. Previously, there had been the brutal, multiple knife wound killing of David Rosenfeld, the manager of the Herod Palace dig site. The tactics of his killers pointed to a band of guerrillas.

This time, the murder was carried out with real weapons. An unidentified man armed with a pistol, followed Ya'akov Kur through the heart of the marketplace and shot a single bullet into his head from behind. Kur tried to pull out his gun, but was too late. His murderers have not yet been apprehended.

Two weeks ago Friday, there was another incident of insurgence by hundreds of demonstrating youths--the worst since the bloody attack by Alan Harry Goodman on the Temple Mount. It was during the Friday prayer on the last day of Ramadan, with around 50,000 Muslims participating. I witnessed the event. The waves of hatred, the clenched fists, the calls of "In blood and in spirit we're behind you 'Arafat" and the waving of Palestinian flags were enough to freeze one's blood. In wave after wave, hundreds of youths stormed through the square with murder in their eyes, toward the police check point on the Temple Mount. The air was filled with stones. The shots fired in the air did not deter the youths. Only after permission was given to shoot gas bombs into the crowd did the demonstration break up.

The incidents on that day were preceded by a demand from Shaykh Akr'am al-Szabri who glorified the "bravery of our Palestinian brothers in Lebanon." The war in Lebanon," he said, "is a war between Muslims and aggressors. You as Muslims must embrace your religion not just in words, but with actions as well, to resolve the problem of Palestine. This week, young Palestinians fell. You must pray for their souls. You must organize so that what is transpiring now will never happen to us again..."

These words had their effect. Slowly, the feeling surged through the crowd of worshippers. Groups of young people shouted "Allah is great." Palestinian flags began to appear and within minutes the Temple Mount turned into a volcano of emotions.

The war in Lebanon and the war between Iraq and Iran became the wave on which supporters of Khomeyini's revolution would ride--from the territories and East Jerusalem--a way to ramrod their views through the back door. The single appearance of a Khomeyini publication, which was repressed on that same Friday on the Temple Mount, exposed the "Iranian connection," headed by an organization of "Young Muslims." On the front page of the publication and on subsequent pages appeared pictures of the Ayatollah accompanied by blatant appeals to support his revolution. In color on the front page, appeared the headline "Beirut--the Fire and the Torch" with a background of burning fires and the picture of an armed guerrilla holding his fingers up in a "V" to symbolize victory. Within the publication there was a poem for the Ayatollah and the "Islambuli hero" President al-Sadat's assassin.

Beirut, of the articles said, "will not be Sharon's passport to the West Bank. Beirut will be the torch that lights the way to resistance." Elsewhere it was written: "Our children in Lebanon are bathing in their own blood. Their cries rise over the rubble of their homes, over the dead bodies and over the beds of the wounded. And the Arab Kaisers play in the ashes--like the Cypriot jackasses on Western shores. They bath in wine while Lebanon burns and is being turned into a graveyard of tanks and a field of hand grenades and bullets."

A Knife in the Palestinians' Back

Has an earthquake hit the territories, one as forceful as that precipitated by the Six-Day War? Have the residents of the territories recovered yet from the shock? Is this serious injury to the PLO's military base likely to bring about any real change in the approach of the residents in the territories to the "Palestinian problem?"

An interim analysis of the situation--derived from conversations with official sources, experts and Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip--shows that everything is still fluid and much is contingent on the Israeli's actions. The Arabs in the territories--and also the public figures known as "territorial leaders"--are still confused and bewildered for the most part. Until all the dust of battle settles over Beirut, it appears that this dilemma will continue.

During the first days of the war, when pictures were being drawn of the total destruction of the PLO military forces, the Arab leadership in the territories and in East Jerusalem was completely paralyzed. Maurice Zilka, the mayor of Jerusalem's advisor on Arab affairs, said that they had spoken with dozens of respected public figures and common citizens alike, and that the "overall feeling was that even the most nationalistic and radical groups had their tails between their legs and were digging holes in the ground. This could even be felt in the way they spoke, which was not like yesterday or the day before yesterday. The distress and the prevailing seriousness were easily perceived. Not a smile was to be seen on anyone's lips."

At that time, even the radical mayors of the West Bank were quiet. Dozens of requests for interviews and comments were received at the time by the deposed mayor Bassam Shak'a, his colleague Karim Kalaf and other political figures known to be close to the PLO. But all these requests--among them from foreign journalists--were cursorily refused. The civil administration saw the explanation for this in the fact that at the time the terrorist radio in Beirut had stopped broadcasting and the Arab leaders in Israel had lost all contact with the PLO leadership. "PLO supporters in the territories simply lost their "bearings." They had no one to tell them what to say and when," explained one expert.

But even from the first days of the war--and nothing has changed in this regard to date--most of the anger, even among conservatives on East Jerusalem newspapers, was directed at the Arab nations who "deserted" and "fought only with words." "In the wake of the war came the curses--real curses!--against the Arab countries which were so utterly disappointing," said Maurice Zilka. "Everyone, leaders and simple folk alike, had the same reaction."

An editorial published in AL QUDS--a relatively conservative newspaper closely tied to the Hashemite administration--harshly attacked the "Arab people from the Persian Gulf to the Ocean, who took an apathetic stand on the situation in Lebanon. Have their feelings changed? Have they broken off their ties with their Arab brothers?" asked the writer of the column. "Have the Palestinians become unwanted relatives, to the point where they should be destroyed? The

Arab silence is a knife stab in the Palestinians' back and the Palestinian people will never forget it. Today it is a wound in the body of the Palestinian people--tomorrow it will be a gaping wound in the body of the Arab people."

This anger toward the Arab nations, who deserted in battle, still exists. But the conclusions are different. This was well expressed by intellectuals and public figures in the territories. Ziyad Abu Ziyad, editorial coordinator of the East Jerusalem newspaper AL-FAJR and a graduate of Damascus University, says that the reaction of the Arab nations forced the PLO to continue their armed battle to the end--and not retreat from West Beirut. "If Yasir 'Arafat gives up on the military front and turns the PLO into a political organization, he would be giving up all the gains made by the Palestinian people since 1965. The PLO was not born out of political activity. It is true that their actions were criticized, but without the armed struggle, the PLO would have achieved nothing. Therefore, anyone who asks the PLO to surrender militarily and leave Beirut is asking for 'Arafat to commit suicide. If I were in West Beirut, I would see no other choice but to fight until death."

Muhammad (Huss), editor of the Gaza weekly AL-SHURUQ (Dawn) has a different opinion: "The Palestinian people have suffered more at the hands of Arab peoples than they have suffered under Israel. It is not coincidence that in the entire Arab world there was not a single demonstration of solidarity with the Palestinians--while in Israel the "Peace Now" party did demonstrate. That means there is hope that in Israel there is a large public that we can speak with. Not everyone is a military ruler. Not everyone sees the barrel of an Uzi as the solution to the problem."

And the mayor of Bethlehem, Ilyas Forayj, openly admits: "The silence of the Arab world caused many among us to rethink the slogans being used in Arab nations and by the rejectionist front. These slogans proved to be empty and meaningless. Once again we saw that war is not the solution. The Palestinians must recognize the right of Israel to survive."

9811

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GAZAN ATTITUDE TOWARD AUTHORITIES DISCUSSED

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 30 Jul 82 p 18

[Article by Dani Tzadkoni: "There Are Still a Lot More Guns in Gaza"]

[Text] Due to the war in Lebanon, municipal issues in Gaza have been relegated to the back burner. During the upheavals in Lebanon, the long-time mayor of the city, Rashad al-Shawa, was ousted. Under "normal" conditions this would have been a major political issue. One might note at this juncture that the city of Gaza was, and still is, the largest Arab (that is to say Palestinian) city in the State of Israel. Even if the problem of the terrorists in the Lebanese capital is resolved to everyone's satisfaction, Gaza will continue to be a problem. I went down to Gaza at the beginning of the week to look into these municipal issues. One of the city's most central figures, whom I approached to confirm information I had been given indicating that he had been offered the position of mayor, said: "Who can think about the municipality in times like these? Even if I was interested in being mayor, I would be ashamed at this point in time to do anything about it." This is not to say that nothing is going on in Gaza relative to the mayorship, but rather that activities are being conducted under a low profile. The system is such that supporters of various figures mention the names of the candidate they support and supporters of rival candidates, who are interested in dirtying the other candidates' names, come back and claim that the others are candidates of the Israeli administration. The names that were mentioned last week as those being considered for the position were: Musa Abu-Shaban, currently head of the mukhtars in Gaza, son of a well-known family in town which became involved with al-Shawa and therefore tended to be absent from meetings of the town council; and city engineer 'Agil Matar. Others were mentioned as well, such as the lawyer Ibrahim Abu-Sita who heads the office of the "Gaza Strip Refugee Congress." According to one Arab source in town, Abu-Sita--who has thus far avoided participation in the government--was warned that if he agreed to accept the position, he should be aware that "there are still a lot of guns left in Gaza." The head of the Bar Association in the Gaza Strip, Fayiz Rahma, denied that the position was offered to him and said that in a conversation with government representatives on the issue, he raised the old demand of leftist groups in the city who want the mayor to be chosen through democratic elections.

Since 1945 there have been no mayorial elections in Gaza. All mayors since that time were appointed either by the British, the Egyptians or the Israelis. It is doubtful that the Sharon forces in the territories will conduct elections in Gaza, because it would then be likely that a "leftist" mayor would be chosen, or even an outright PLO supporter. In studying the problem, I could not turn to the "civil administration" in Gaza, which is actually a hard-nosed military institution alienated from its surroundings and from the Israeli press, unlike the "military governments" that preceded it.

Even al-Shawa claimed that he could not recognize the "civil administration" because it was just a cover for the military government. In all fairness, however, it should be said that the "civil administration" itself does not bother to disguise itself as civilian. The only change in the Israeli administration in the Gaza Strip that has occurred since Sharon was appointed "civilian head" is a return to the model that was in force when Sharon was southern regional commander, and Brigadier General Pundak was Governor of the Gaza Strip and another officer--David Minon, the brigadier general now responsible for Israeli aid to Lebanon--ruled over what was called "the unit" and dealt with problems of security in a stepped-up war against terrorism.

In order to find out what was "happening" in Gaza, I went to Fayiz Rahma's office, the man who heads the Bar Association in the Gaza Strip. With him was a young female reporter from a well-known American newspaper published in New York. After a short time, Dr Haydar 'Abd al-Shafi arrived, a former member of the National Guidance Committee in the territories who is considered the leader of the PLO supporters in Gaza. Former Minister of Foreign Affairs Moshe Dayan (may he rest in peace) met with al-Shafi at the time and they engaged in a long discussion that stimulated a lot of rumors. Al-Shafi believes that the Israelis are convincing themselves that the war in Lebanon will be of some benefit. I suggested that he strengthen the position of those who oppose this view in Israel by declaring that he supports the right of the Jews to a state of their own in the land of Israel. I suggested this based on a previous conversation we had had, during which al-Shafi said he recognized this right and recommended that the Israelis recognize the right of the Palestinians to a country of their own in the land of Israel. The question of borders between the two countries, he said, would be resolved in peace negotiations between the two peoples. Then the doctor started presenting me with conditions. I explained that on essential issues, there would be no conditions. Two ministers in the government, Yariv and Shem-Tov, already expressed positions on the subject but no response from figures of equal status on the Palestinian side had been forthcoming.

The American reporter expressed her opinion that 'Arafat's declarations on the subject should suffice. I pointed out that what Uri Avneri and others say is not relevant. On this subject only explicit statements "straight from the horse's mouth" to the world count. On the subject of the Palestinians, 'Arafat is not the only voice. He will be seen as an enemy as long as the PLO exists. This holds true even for those people who recognize the right of the Palestinians to self-determination. As far as the threat to destroy Israel, al-Shafi said that "it's just words."

It would be hard to call Abu-Rahma, who defended hundreds of terrorists before the military court in Gaza, a "traitor." Maybe that is why he is prepared to declare that "the establishment of a Palestinian State in the territories, with East Jerusalem (part of a united Jerusalem) as its capital," would end the conflict in the Middle East--if the Palestinians would recognize the State of Israel and withdraw their historic claims to the land. It would mean real peace and justice for both peoples.

Obviously, we talked about the attacks on civilians in Lebanon. I told those present that I oppose harming civilians, but I added that unfortunately, I did not hear the Palestinians criticizing the attacks on our civilians in Qiriyat Shemona. The conversation was interesting and provoking, because in a fair debate you move with your opponent toward some point of mutual agreement, which sometimes opposes accepted views. Dr Shafi, for example, who in his day was one of the leaders of the opponents to al-Sadat's initiative, said that the al-Sadat initiative was originally meant to solve the problem of the Palestinian people. The goal of the initiative was not just the return of the Sinai. When I commented, "If that's the case, why didn't you support it?" he did not answer. When Fayiz Abu-Rahma asked me if I didn't think that Israel had exaggerated a little in the actions taken in Lebanon and attacks on civilians, I told him that no war was good. It was the Arabs who had chosen war in their struggle for the land of Israel and they were suffering the consequences. I told him that the Arabs were always shouting "The Law of Muhammad by the Sword." Now, those among my people who believe that the sword is the only way are growing in number. But that shouldn't stop you, I told them. That's why you should declare that you recognize the right of the Jews to a Jewish State with secure borders in the land of Israel! What can you lose? I asked Dr al-Shafi, who claims that the PLO is the Palestinian people but if the PLO is destroyed the Palestinian people will not die, that question. Really, he said, if we did make that kind of declaration, we could only gain from it. A true dialogue with the Palestinians in the territories may pave the road to peace between us and them, but since people like Dayan, Alon, Peres and Weitzman are no longer in the government, the government avoids the responsibility of this dialogue, which is not comfortable for them--just as those Palestinians who call for a radical solution to the Zionist problem would not be comfortable with that same dialogue.

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'MA'ARIV' DISCUSSES SOLVING ARAB REFUGEE PROBLEM

TA101011 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 10 Sep 82 p 15

[Commentary by Shmu'el Schnitzer: "A Bad Plan"]

[Text] In President Reagan's speech in which he presented his new ideas for establishing peace in the Middle East, he stressed the fact that the war in Lebanon and the evacuation of the Palestinians from Beirut (to use his words) dramatically made real the homelessness of the Palestinian people. "The Palestinians," he said, "feel that their problem is more than a problem of refugee, and I agree with them."

And so, the new U.S. plan stresses finding a realistic expression to what was defined in Camp David as "the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people." But on the way to the proposed solution--self rule of the Palestinians in Judaea, Samaria and Gaza through a connection to Jordan--the president apparently forgot the fact that if the Palestinian business is more than a problem of self rule: outside the borders of Judaea, Samaria and Gaza there is living today 2 1/2 million (and some say more than 3 million) Palestinians in the status of refugees and foreign workers. Where do they come in in the solution proposed by the president?

Surprisingly enough, there is no mention of this problem in Reagan's speech. Apart from this one mention of the Palestinians in Lebanon, not one word was said about the problem of finding a homeland for 3 million people who see themselves as exiles from their homeland. About this, apparently, the president has nothing to say. All the elements which he consulted before forming his plan--the administration officials we involved in the situation in the Middle East from the historical point, congressmen, personalities from the private sector, as well as his own secretary of state and all the aides helping him--forget to tell the president that in order to solve all aspects of the Palestinian problem, a living area should be found for hundreds of thousands, or even millions, of people, somewhere in the Middle East; and the patchwork done by the president's advisors in order to form a solution for the problem simply does not answer this question.

Was this out of forgetfulness or neglect? Or maybe through an intention not all together innocent?

There is one secret hope in the hearts of those proposing independence, or almost independence, for the Arabs of Judaea, Samaria and Gaza: that the minute this political act is completed the following miracles will happen:

--All the refugee camps which are situated today west of the Jordan will, overnight, turn into permanent housing and all those living in them will acquire the status of permanent residents in their countries.

--All the Palestinians who are dispersed today in the Arab world, in Jordan, in Lebanon, in Kuwait, in Syria, in Iraq, in Egypt, in Libya, in the Persian Gulf Emirates, in Qatar, in Oman and in any other place, will all of a sudden decide they like it where they live and that they have no more need or desire to return to Palestine.

--All the host countries, which until now saw the Palestinians as a problem to be borne until times are better, will publicly announce that the Palestinians are welcome to see themselves as part of the family in their temporary dwellings and to take part in the local economies.

--And that all that the Palestinians in those countries said about their different identity, and about their desire to go back to their previous settlements and to their stolen homes in Palestine, will be null and void, not firm and not abiding.

This wishful thinking, totally disconnected from any reality, can be heard in any place where there exists a readiness to "solve the Palestinian problem" in Judaea, Samaria and Gaza, and to ignore its existence in any other place in the Arab world. "They will not want to come back," say the Americans, the Sheli people, and no few of the alignment leaders. "At most they will ask for compensation for their property. All that they want is for their rights to be recognized. But when they face the choice between the good positions they now hold or the crowding in the little area of the autonomy, or that of the Jordanian province, or even that of the Palestinian state, they will prefer to stay in their place of exile."

The problem is that no one ever tried to check this theory in reality; and no one ever did a survey among the Palestinian diaspora to see if this is how they will really act.

But everybody is busy guessing; everyone sees their own dreams as long as they can calm those who express the worry that even if we give up Judaea and Samaria, we will still be faced with a problem no less difficult from the one we are facing today.

I do not accept the guessing. And I think that whoever treats the problem seriously, refusing to sweep its most significant aspect under the rug, should face the question of how the Reagan plan, or any other plan, solves the problem of the Arab refugees.

One thing should be clear: whoever thinks that by great investments and the use of modern technologies the population now existing in Judaea, Samaria and Gaza--about 1.2 million people--plus another 1 or 2 million who will come back from exile, can be kept there, deals with science fiction and not with realistic forecasts.

Even today the population density in Judaea, Samaria and Gaza is greater than that of Israel within the green line, and the local sources of work are poor and few. Even today the greater part of the local work force is employed in Israel, in Jordan and in the rich Arab countries. Even today these regions are a large dormitory for those employed elsewhere. There are no natural resources, no energy sources; and hence no industry of real substance. Even if resources are found for establishing science-based industry (and the recent economic trouble occupying some of the rich oil countries raises many doubts about the possibility of finding investors), many years will pass before the proper professional forces are trained, until the equipment is bought and operated, and until the markets for the products are established. And all the other limitations of poor water sources, a backward transportation system and maybe also subjection to the needs and interests of the Jordanian kingdom will still exist.

The basic fact should not be forgotten: the area discussed, after the border alteration promised by President Reagan in his speech, will be no larger than 5,000 square km. There is in Europe a developed and successful country with a smaller area: Luxembourg (2,596 sq. km). It has heavy industry that much bigger countries can envy. Rich mines of iron ore feed this industry. But the number of its citizens is not more than 350,000, that is to say, less than the number of people in the Gaza Strip today.

Even today the population density in Judaea, Samaria and Gaza is greater than that of Switzerland, Austria, France, Italy and many other industrial countries. And we should believe that it is possible to add on to it more than twice the number and still ensure enough food, a roof and a reasonable standard of living to all?

The idea is simply not a serious one. Very, very not serious. [as printed]

What then is the thing that President Reagan is recommending so strongly? A solution to one-third of the Palestinian problem while cruelly ignoring the other two-thirds?

The difficult situation of the Palestinians in Lebanon, whose camps were destroyed in the war and who urgently need shelter before the winter arrives, was used by him as a pretty rhetorical argument to illustrate the urgency in solving the problem. But what is the actual help his proposal will bring to the three or four hundred thousand Palestinians in Lebanon? Will they be able, after establishing the government in Judaea and Samaria, to go there and settle? Will they be able to find housing and work there?

The president and his advisors, apparently, did not give much thought to this question, and if they did, they are hiding something when they talk about the solution. But we cannot allow ourselves to ignore the meaning of their silence.

We must take into consideration the possibility that what we have here is only the first stage in a multistage plan that will develop, more or less, according to the following scenario:

First the right of the Arabs in Judaea and Samaria for self-determination, with a link to the Jordanian Hashemite Kingdom, will be recognized, as recommended by the president. Then what is known today will be "discovered," that in an area of 5,000 sq. km the multitudes of Palestinian refugees wishing to return from the camps in the neighboring areas cannot be absorbed. The Palestinian problem then will not disappear after signing the agreement according to the Reagan plan; it will change its appearance and will most probably become more acute. The host Arab countries will invite the refugees to pack their bags and go "home."

This of course will be mocking the poor, since such a "home" will not exist. But very soon the mocking will become very dangerous, when they will decide that there is someone responsible for the fact that the Palestinians have no room in their own national home-- someone who pushed them away from where they and their fathers before them lived.

And who do you think will be blamed? Against whom will all the demonstrations, the protests and the demands be directed? To whom will the United Nations organization give the responsibility for absorbing the refugees, whom will the European Community denounce?

Very simple: we will be guilty and a correction to the situation will be demanded of us. We will have to prove our readiness to establish true peace in the Middle East by opening our gates to all those refugees who have nowhere else to go. We will be the target of pressures, denouncement and sanctions if we come and claim that we have already paid the price and have already given what was the most dear to us, that we have already made all the possible sacrifices.

A man can stand on any point of the Israeli political spectrum, the physical reality will not change. He can believe, like the writer of these lines, that Eretz Yisra'el is one and that it belongs to the Jews; he can believe in an autonomy a la Begin, in a self rule under the aegis of Jordan, in a Palestinian state that will exist alongside the State of Israel in its former borders--he will still have to admit the fact that the area in which 1.2 million Arab inhabitants of Judaea, Samaria and Gaza are now sitting in will not be able to absorb all the Palestinian diaspora that will want to realize its right to return to Palestine.

Therefore, the Reagan plan, with all its temptation, with all its sweet and well known formulations, with all the words of calm and friendship it is showering on us, is basically the plan of an administration which is not ready

(or is unable) to see the problem in its entirety and to give an answer to all its aspects. The Palestinian problem is the problem of a big diaspora, and the presumption that it can be solved in a territory of 5,000 sq. km, which in itself is poor, barren and over-populated, is an illusion--or a deception.

There is one place in the Middle East in which a problem of this magnitude can be solved, and that is the Hashemite kingdom of Jordan. Only there, in its 90,000 sq. km, which today holds 3 million people, can the thousands or even millions be absorbed with the right investment and with daring planning. Only there is there now a Palestinian majority, with family ties to the Palestinian diaspora all over the area. Only there, then, can it be expected that the existing population will not reject those coming to join it and will not limit their steps.

Because the pronouncement of this truth annoys Klayn, and because another truth in relation to the Palestinian problem does not exist, the U.S. administration released a plan that like its predecessors is a miscarriage.

And no artificial respiration, no showy severity, no artificial determination, will put life into it and turn it into something that can be carried out and turned into reality.

CSO: 4400/484

ISRAEL

OPENING OF BETHLEHEM UNIVERSITY POSTPONED

TA140919 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 14 Sep 82 p 2

[Report by David Richardson]

[Text] The military government in Judaea and Samaria yesterday postponed the opening of Bethlehem University's academic year, against a background of mounting tension between the authorities and the three local universities--Bethlehem, al-Najah and Bi'r Zayt.

An ad hoc committee representing some 100 foreign passport holders employed at the three universities has written to foreign consulates and legations in Israel asking for their intervention in the dispute. The academics object to signing a formal statement committing them to refrain from any direct or indirect support of the PLO.

Stressing that their presence in the area is only academic the lecturers charged that the "loose and ambiguous wording" of the statement "would appear to impose unacceptable limits on our rights of expression."

Among the foreign passport holders affected by the new order are at least 30 Americans, 10 Britons, 11 Jordanians, 2 Irishmen and a Pole.

West Bank University sources said yesterday that another order requiring students who do not reside in the West Bank to carry a permit would affect about half of the local student population, which is estimated at over 7,000 this year. The students concerned reside either in east Jerusalem or in the Gaza Strip.

University legal advisers have held meetings with officials in the civil administration in an attempt to work out some form of compromise on both issues.

During a meeting yesterday, administration officials renewed the requirement for a yearly academic license, in accordance with a recently published military government order. University officials claim that the license issue was not raised last year.

Bethlehem University is now scheduled to open on September 21, al-Najah in Nabulus will open on October 9, and Bi'r Zayt, which is under a closure order until October 8, plans to re-open on October 11.

BRIEFS

RESTRICTIONS COMPLAINT--Bethlehem Mayor Ilyas Frayj says that the civilian administration does not allow him to carry out development plans for the city and to buy new cleaning vehicles for the municipality. Frayj told our correspondent Pinhas 'Inbari that because of the civilian administration's stand the construction works in the new wholesale market were stopped, as well as water and road plans. In his opinion, the administration's stand arises from its policy of not allowing funds from Arab sources to enter the territories. The civilian administration completely denied Frayj's remarks. [Text] [TA170731 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0700 GMT 17 Sep 82]

FOOD STOPPAGE--Gaza, 15 Sep (ITIM)--Despite the fact that the UNRWA cancelled 203,000 food portions intended for the population of the refugees camps in the Gaza District, no agitation is felt in the camps. In the past the agency's people distributed food portions to 240,000 refugees from the Gaza District, but following the peace for Galilee operation higher priority was given to the refugees for the war in Lebanon, and the food portions in Gaza, Judaea and Samaria, Jordan and Syria were drastically cut. Today the agency supplies 37,000 food portions to the Gaza District. They are divided in the following way: 18,000 portions to hard cases, 12,000 portions to pregnant women or nursing mothers and 5,000 portions to children in trouble. These children receive lunch in the UNRWA facilities. Sources close to the administration in Gaza said lately that those food portions were mostly passed by the refugees to merchants who waited near the distribution points. This way the whole thing has turned into profiteering in flour, sugar and oil, more than human aid to the refugees. This is how the administration men explain the quiet in the Gaza District after stopping the distribution of 203,000 food portions to the refugees. [Text] [TA151834 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1815 GMT 15 Sep 82]

CHINESE SCIENTIFIC MEETING--Two Israeli scientists, Prof Gerald (Tauber), of Tel Aviv University, and Dr Tzvi (Poran), of the Hebrew University, took part in the international physicists' conference held at the end of August this year in Shanghai, in the People's Republic of China. Only after Yuval Ne'eman organized international pressure and after the conference's participants threatened to leave, were the Israelis allowed to enter China on their passports. [Avraham Peleg] [Excerpt] [TA161319 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 16 Sep 82 p 7]

JUDAEA, SAMARIA WATER PLANTS--Ramallah, 14 Sep (ITIM)--A senior officer in the civilian administration today told the ITIM correspondent in Judaea and Samaria that the water plants owned by Arab municipal authorities in the territories are their private property and they cannot be confiscated, as is also true of other private property, and be transferred to the Meqorot water company. It should be noted that most water plants in Judaea and Samaria are run by the municipalities, the village councils and other municipal authorities. These plants supply about 80 percent of the population's water needs and they will not be handed over to Meqorot. The civilian administration will hand over to Meqorot those plants that supply water to 20 percent of the local population and which had been transferred from Jordanian rule prior to the 6-day war to the military government. This move is to avoid duplication in the management of the water and to make it more effective. Meqorot will handle only a few of these plants as well as the water plants of the new Jewish settlements in the area. [Text] [TA141657 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1630 GMT 14 Sep 82]

CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATION--The Defense Ministry spokesman announces: 1. There is no intention of eliminating the civil administration, and reports to that effect are groundless. 2. No committee has been established to deal with this matter. 3. Within the framework of the regular examinations conducted by the comptroller of the defense establishment and the follow-up to implementation of decisions made by the defense minister in every area connected with defense, the comptroller's staff is looking into, among other topics, the subject of the civil administration in Judaea and Samaria. 4. The staff is now in the midst of its work. 5. When it will conclude this, it will refer its report, as usual, to the minister of defense. 6. The reference is to regular, ongoing examination and is unconnected with the fact that there is no intention of eliminating the civil administration, because the latter has proved itself. [Text] [TA151647 Jerusalem Government Press Office in English 14 Sep 82]

ILLEGAL HOUSES DESTROYED--The IDF destroyed 40 houses in Judaea and Samaria last month. The houses were built illegally on state lands. Our settlements affairs correspondent Shalom Oren reports that the civilian administration asked the Jewish settlements for volunteers to supervise the building in the area. The administration promised to give the volunteers a supervising license issued by the administration. Our correspondent goes on to report the phenomenon of Arabs deserting fields and vineyards in areas close to Jewish settlements. These areas are being sold to Jews. [Text] [TA151416 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1400 GMT 15 Sep 82]

ISRAELI ARABS VOLUNTEERING--Dozens of Arab youths from the Galilee--including Muslims, Christians and Bedouins--have recently asked to be allowed to volunteer for IDF service. Their requests increased during the peace for Galilee operation, and some of them have already received an answer. On the other hand, in the village of Kawkab Abu-al-Hij in the lower Galilee, anti-Israeli graffiti was painted on walls and Palestinian flags were hoisted. Last week, two Sakhnin village youths were arrested on suspicion of having painted similar graffiti, and before that inhabitants of 'Arraba were also apprehended for committing a similar deed. An AP correspondent reports that two Galilee Christian villages have recently received a donation of 250,000 DM from friendship associations and church bodies in West Europe. Government sources have said that they are not sure the source of the money comes from organizations sympathetic to Israel. [Text] [TA101731 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1700 GMT 10 Sep 82]

INTERVIEWS BANNED--The IDF apparently prefers to rely on Lebanese Radio reports about matters involving the eastern sector, even if the reports by the neighbouring radio are exaggerated, imprecise and anger senior commanders in the eastern sector. Otherwise, the ban imposed lately by the IDF spokesman on interviews with soldiers and officers by the Israeli media is hard to understand. The ban might be connected to the latest events in the area, arising from the decrease in alert and discipline among the IDF soldiers, but it might have been for different reasons. No one bothered to inform the correspondents--who are allowed to move around the area by a temporary or permanent IDF permit--about this ban. "Do not heat up the sector," a brigadier general, a commander in the eastern sector, told us. But to be interviewed, even anonymously, he was not allowed. His colleague, who wanted to react to the radio reports from Beirut and to tell the truth to the people of Zion, could not speak, even though his words would not have gotten through the military censorship anyway. [Text] [TA131027 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 13 Sep 82 p 2]

CHIEF COMMUNICATIONS, ELECTRONICS OFFICER--Brig Gen Mordekhay Bar-Dagan was appointed chief communications and electronics officer. This is reported by the IDF spokesman. He was appointed to this position in place of Brig Gen Tzvi 'Amid who ends his active service in the IDF. Following his appointment Mordekhay Bar-Dagan was promoted from the rank of colonel to the rank of brigadier general. [Text] [TA141949 Tel Aviv IDF Radio in Hebrew 0747 GMT 14 Sep 82 TA]

EXPORTS DOWN--In the first 8 months of the year, that is until the end of August, net exports of goods amounted to \$3.21 billion, or a drop of 6 percent compared to the same period last year. The Central Bureau of Statistics explains this as being primarily affected by the drop in the export of polished diamonds which, in the first 8 months of this year, went down by 20 percent compared to the same period last year. The agricultural exports also dropped by 7 percent, and here it should be noted that the export of citrus fruit this year went down by 20 percent compared to last year, probably because of the low price. On the other hand, industrial exports, excluding diamonds, were stable. [Text] [TA131623 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0800 GMT 13 Sep 82 TA]

IMMIGRATION STATISTICS--About 13,000 new immigrants came to Israel in the year 5742 [1981-1982], the same as last year. A spokesman of the Central Bureau of Statistics reported that the number of those coming as new immigrants has dropped, and the number of those registering as potential immigrants has increased. [Text] [Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1200 GMT 13 Sep 82]

CSO: 4400/484

GOVERNMENT'S ECONOMIC POLICIES CRITICIZED

Amman AL-UFUQ in Arabic No 19, 11-17 Aug pp 12-13

[Article by Fahd al-Fanik: "Economic Laws Are Not Invalidated by Administrative Decrees and Spurious Laws; Productive, not Superficial Solutions to Economic Issues Are Required"]

[Text] Officials sometimes think they can nullify or obstruct some economic laws by means of administrative decrees or precipitate legislation. However, the outcome [of such action] is often exactly the opposite of what is required.

For example, the government has been trying to improve conditions for the working class. It thinks that the way to do that is to set a minimum wage. But if this minimum wage is not economical, that is, if it is higher than that which would have been set by conditions of supply and demand in the marketplace, the practical outcome of the government's action will be that unemployment among workers and especially unskilled or inexperienced workers, will grow. It is assumed that these are the workers who stand to benefit from the minimum wage. Consequently, they do not even get that minimum wage, nor do they get the lower wage they would have earned had it not been for the minimum wage policy.

The government has been trying to protect tenants from the tyranny of landlords. It has decreed, therefore, that a lease may continue in effect with the same conditions despite the fact that the period of time stipulated in the lease has expired. The government has also decreed that the monthly or annual rent is not to be increased regardless of inflation and the continued decline in the real buying power of money.

The result is that a sharp rise in rent ensues because landlords take precautions by anticipating what rent increases would be in the coming 5 or 10 years and ask for that amount since they are not entitled to reconsider the amount of rent that is to be paid after the term of a lease expires. Thus, new tenants suffer and are forced to pay exaggerated sums of money in rent because these sums include what landlords expect rent will be in the future. Thus we now have two kinds of rental property: old rental property where the amount paid in rent is trivial, and new rental property where the amount paid in rent is exorbitant. In some cases the difference between the two is 20 times. This is unfair to new tenants who now constitute a majority of all people who rent their homes.

On the other hand, under these circumstances people who have been tenants in a

On the other hand, under these circumstances people who have been tenants in a building for a long time do not vacate a rented building even if they do not have an urgent need for the premises. They neither build nor buy their own home even if they can afford to do so because they wish to hold on to benefits that are unnecessary. These benefits were granted to them by the laws, notwithstanding the intentions and objectives of legislators. The result is that the housing shortage gets worse, and the state is forced to assume the responsibility for building and financing the construction of housing at an actual cost that is much higher than what it would cost to build most houses that are built by the people themselves.

The government has been trying to protect the consumer from fuel price increases since 1973. For several years it has assumed the cost of price differences. The result is that energy consumption has risen at a rate higher than that of any country in the world during that period. The quantity and value of imported oil have also risen several times. Unprofitable economic industries and activities have been established, but these depend on realizing false profits, and these make up part of the country's losses in energy price differences.

The government decides to subsidize bread for the benefit of people on limited incomes. As a result, the farmer who produces the grain is forced out of business, and grain cultivation dies. Then the government realizes what is happening and decides to pay a high price to buy local wheat. Brokers benefit and treasury losses rise, and the result is that clean and healthy bread cannot be found even by those who can pay the real price. Bread subsidy is distributed equally to rich and poor even though an individual's share of this subsidy is not more than 40 piasters a month. No one gains weight, staves off his hunger or raises his standard of living on this small subsidy.

Finally, inexpensive bread is used as fodder for animals, and it is in poultry farms because it is cheaper than usual fodder. Next, subsidized bread will be used as fertilizer as long as the state foots the bill. It would thus disappear from the market; shortages would set in; and people would stand in long lines for hours to buy bread, as is the case in Egypt.

The government tried to encourage investment and to increase returns on investments so it decided to exempt [from taxes] profits made on stock and on trading in stock. The result has been that acquiring stock has actually become more attractive, and stock prices have risen on the stock exchange. The return for a person who purchases stock at the going rate remains the same, and the government's sacrifices in the form of income tax exemptions have been turned into capital profits for people who own stock. Savings and investments have remained unaffected.

We can go on citing scores of factual or theoretical examples which indicate that the government's intervention in the market place by giving orders and by artificially affecting supply and demand may in many cases bring about poor results which are the opposite of what the government had in mind by intervening.

We are not saying that the objectives aimed at by the government in its decrees and legislation are not socially sound. Nor are we saying that the government must not take measures that would raise the standard of the working class; ensure a fair wage for workers; achieve a balance between landlords and tenants; ensure housing at a reasonable rent that is consistent with income standards; provide

energy to keep the wheel of production rolling; help people on limited incomes cope with the cost of living, especially in basic things; or encourage investment and saving, etc. We are, however, claiming that these objectives cannot be achieved by administrative decisions, precipitate legislation or arbitrary orders. This is because economic laws cannot be obstructed by decrees. The objectives that are hoped for nationally can only be achieved by a long and arduous road, that of supporting, encouraging production and making the needs of production available.

Workers' wages can be increased by increasing their productivity, their experience and their skills. This comes about by means of appropriate vocational training and free and sound union organization. New tenants can be protected by ensuring financial and architectural support for professional and cooperative housing and achieving balance between actual demand and supply. The energy shortage can be confronted by raising the price of oil perhaps even higher than its actual cost so that consumers would have an incentive for conserving energy. Thus, positive, not negative price differences are created, and these would be used to develop alternative sources of energy. Bread production can be encouraged by subsidizing the farmer who produces the wheat and not the consumer in the city. Investment is not encouraged by exempting speculators from paying taxes on the profits they make, but rather by providing clear incentives for savers and investors.

And so on.

8592

CSO: 4404/660

PREPARATIONS TO RECEIVE PLO DISCUSSED

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 133, 28 Aug 82 pp 18-20

[Interview with Senate Chairman Bahjat al-Talhuni by Huda al-Murr: "In the Course of an Exclusive Interview about the People's Army and Other Questions Bahjat al-Talhuni Tells AL-MAJALLAH, 'The Alternative Palestinian Homeland in Jordan Is a Fiction Created by Israel; Israel Failed in Lebanon, and Those Who Cooperated with Israel Will Fail;' " in Amman]

[Text] In his exclusive interview with AL-MAJALLAH Mr Bahjat al-Talhuni, chairman of the senate in Jordan, said that he considered the plan for "an alternative homeland" for Palestinians [nothing more than] an "Israeli heresy." Mr al-Talhuni said that anyone who would work for that would be seen as a traitor to the cause. The interview with al-Talhuni touched upon the withdrawal of Palestinians from Lebanon to some Arab countries and the fact that some Arab countries had reservations about receiving Palestinian guerillas. The interview with the chairman of the Jordanian senate dealt with the measures that Amman had undertaken and according to which it had established the Jordanian People's Army. AL-MAJALLAH's interview with Mr Bahjat al-Talhuni follows.

[Question] What are your expectations regarding the outcome of the war that is being fought in Beirut?

[Answer] The ongoing war in Beirut is merely an indication of the brutality and barbarism of Israel whose incursions have been unknown to humanity since the age of the Tatars. When we see on the small [television] screen [scenes of] killing and destruction, and especially the raids that Israel carried out from the air and the sea during which it would drop almost 180 bombs and rockets in the course of one night, we are seeing examples of Zionist savagery and barbarism. Naturally, the Lebanese and the Palestinian people have had much to endure. I believe that it is the duty of the Arab nation to be steadfast and to stand alongside the Palestinian and Lebanese people and to support them as much as it can. The Arab nation should offer them every aid to ward off the barbaric invasion that is being supported by American power. Israel has specific objectives it wants to achieve with this savage invasion of Lebanon.

[Question] In your opinion what are Israel's objectives?

[Answer] If we wanted to evaluate the objectives Israel had set [for itself]--and the United States did take part in planning these objectives--we would say

that Israel had failed. Israel thought that it was going to wage a blitzkrieg that would not last more than a few hours or days. But the war was prolonged, and it is now in its third month, especially since it is being fought on land that is not stable. Therefore, I believe that Israel's war has failed, and Israel [itself] has fallen into something for which it had not made proper calculations.

[Question] Don't you believe that what Israel has in mind is different from what we have in mind, and that Israel is prolonging the war deliberately to make it easy to partition Lebanon in the future?

[Answer] I personally don't believe this. Ever since the Creation Lebanon has lived as a complete unit with its Muslim and Christian sects. Despite the fact that one of Lebanon's factions is cooperating with Israel, Lebanon will remain intact with its nature, its unity and its borders. Therefore Israel and those who are cooperating with it are doomed to fail, and Lebanon will emerge from the battle intact and victorious.

[Question] Don't you think that some Arab countries have been remiss with Lebanon in its war with Israel, even to the point that they were not able to convene an Arab summit meeting?

[Answer] If Israel knew for sure that there was Arab solidarity and Arab unity, it would not have attacked Lebanon. Israel is the beneficiary of Anwar al-Sadat's operation and of the action he took, breaking away from the Arab nation and unilaterally accepting the Camp David accords. That was when the split and fragmentation between the Arab countries set in. Israel used this fragmentation to its advantage, and it began dealing with each country separately, taking those countries up one after the other. If Israel were to succeed in its aggressive plan against Lebanon, another Arab country will follow. As an Arab citizen and official I therefore say that there can be no life for the Arab nation without solidarity. The Arab nations can live only if they are completely united. If we had had solidarity and understanding, neither Israel nor the United States, which is supporting it, could have carried out such a barbaric attack against the children, the old people and the women of Lebanon.

Summit Conferences

[Question] While the Lebanese and Palestinian people are being slaughtered in Lebanon, some people are wondering about a summit conference that would issue a firm and decisive decision which would be carried out immediately.

[Answer] At the present time summit conferences have lost their value. The first one to call for a summit conference was the late President Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir. He called for a summit conference in 1964 to prevent Israel from diverting the tributaries of the Jordan River and placing the Arab nation face to face with that problem. At that time--in 1964--the summit was convened, matters were dealt with openly, and the summit was able to overcome this problem. Although Jordan at that time did not have diplomatic relations with Egypt and with some Arab countries, King Husayn did respond to the call for the meeting, forgetting all differences and personal matters. He placed national and Arab interests above all other considerations. Today, if Arab leaders were to forget their differences and rise to the level of their national responsibility, we would be able to overcome

Israel which wants to evict us from our land and expand at our expense and at the expense of our culture, our history and our land. [Arab leaders should set aside their differences] particularly since no Arab is the enemy of another Arab, but it is rather Israel that is the enemy of the entire Arab nation.

[Question] What are the steps that must now be taken?

[Answer] There must be a call for an Arab summit conference. The call for a summit is to be preceded by messengers who would explain the reality of the Arab nation, the meaning of that reality and the future of the Arab nation. We've hit rock bottom. It is then [that is, after all these explanations are made] that summit conference resolutions can take on not only Israel but also those who support it. When we break political and economic relations with an Arab country that has departed from our ranks, we must also break all relations with the countries that help our enemy. We now have the greatest need for a summit conference that would indicate our reality. If we were to go back to our authentic Arab history and if we were to read some of the heroic feats in that history, we would find that in the past if a woman were to exclaim, "Help!" soldiers would have formed armies, and she would have been told, "We obey your command." Now, [however], hundreds are being killed and thousands are being evicted from their homes and no one is reacting. Therefore, we have to spurn hostilities and act as one in undertaking constructive action.

[Question] Why doesn't Jordan extend a cooperative hand to its neighbors and forget all past differences?

[Answer] The reason for some of the problems that exist between some Arab countries is suspicion. Suspicion turned to doubt; the doubt turned to certainty; and this certainty was conveyed by advocates of evil who turned the bad news into material for publication. I can affirm that Jordan harbors no hostility to any Arab country. Jordan has nothing but affection for every Arab country. Our relations with countries remain firm and good even when political relations with them are broken. Countries mean people, and in our book governments come and go but people stay. This is especially so since the forgiveness of our king is exemplary. He has pardoned many people. He pardoned those who conspired against him, and he pardoned those who bore arms against him. As far as the Arab countries are concerned, Husayn harbors nothing but affection for them. I know this from experience because I have been by his side since 1953.

Ten Years Ago

[Question] In the 1973 war the Arabs forgot all [their] differences and were able to regain part of the occupied land. Why don't we forget all the differences we have now and open two fronts in Jordan and Syria to relieve the pressure from Beirut?

[Answer] In 1973 the situation then involved Syria and Egypt, and the Arab countries supported them. The Arab climate then was much better than the present climate or the present situation. Therefore, the Arab nation assumed one position and realized political and military victories. We liberated al-Qunaytirah, and we crossed the Suez Canal. Arab blood that was shed on the soil of the Golan documented the glorious Arab feats that were carried out. I believe that the Arab

nation is still the same, but the fragmentation that has fallen upon the Arab homeland now has been unprecedented in the history of our nation.

[Question] And what is the reason for the fragmentation that has so destroyed the Arab nation?

[Answer] The reason is clear. Some Arab countries evaluate the patriotism of other countries. Some countries also put other countries into categories, and they argue back and forth about special slogans. This is what made us come to this. The situation was better in the past because we thought we had one enemy and we were all working together to overcome that enemy. Today, however, I am accused by my brother who now fights me with a policy of terror or control instead of correcting me when I make a mistake or accepting my advice when he makes a mistake. In our religion, this is not permissible. God Almighty spoke to our Lord Muhammad, may God bless him and grant him salvation and told him, "Remember that you are only to confer with people and not to control them." Therefore, one country may not control another. Every country has its independence, its sovereignty and its leader.

[Question] It is being said that Arab mediation efforts are being made to bring Jordan's and Syria's points of view closer together. How far have these efforts gone?

[Answer] I have no knowledge of that, but I would like to say that every political action taken by my country is predicated upon an Arab premise and a national course. My country looks upon all Arab countries as parts of a united nation. The reason is that every country by itself is weak, no matter how strong it is. Our strength lies in our solidarity. This is Jordan's view and particularly King Husayn's view. I am saying this from knowledge and experience. I've discussed this point repeatedly with the leaders and opinion leaders in Syria. Jordan's heart remains open. We may disagree on some opinions and positions, but as far as national positions are concerned, like [our position on] the question of Palestine, we cannot disagree on those. We consider the question of Palestine the question of the Arab nation or rather our question in particular because we and our Palestinian brothers are blood brothers, and we have lived together ever since the disaster.

[Question] After Lebanon, do you expect an Israeli attack on Jordan?

[Answer] Israel is a treacherous and a deceitful country. Its intentions and its attacks cannot be known in advance. For the sake of truth and history, [let me say that] Jordan with its army, its king and the unity of its people will be able with God's help to respond to the schemes of anyone who wishes it evil, whether it is Israel or anyone else.

[Question] There has been much talk in western circles about the establishment of "an alternative homeland" in Jordan despite the fact that the Resistance has strongly rejected [that notion]. Is there any coordination between you and the Palestinians to foil this idea?

[Answer] I met with many Palestinian opinion leaders, and I listened to what they had to say. We talked with each other, and they and I think that contemplating

anything called an alternative would be treason. Palestine is the homeland of Palestinians, and Palestinian soil is their soil. This too is Jordan's policy. Therefore, the alternative homeland is tantamount to a myth created by Israel. A Palestinian cannot replace his home in Palestine with another one elsewhere. This is what opinion leaders among our Palestinian brothers and in Jordan as well think. We must not forget that Jordan is not a country without a people. Jordan is an ancient country, and its ancient character goes far back into history. Jordan is the Arab kingdom of the Nabateans whose capital was the city of Petra, built in 2300 B.C. Jordan used to embrace the leaders of Islamic conquests such as Abu 'Ubaydah al-Jarrah, Sharhabil ibn Hasanah, Ja'far ibn Abu Talib and others. The people of Jordan then have an ancient civilization. They derive their culture and their principles from the great Arab Revolution. Whoever made up the statement about "an alternative homeland" is a foreigner, an Israeli like Sharon, Shamir and Begin. Those foreigners to Palestine were thrown out of Poland, the Ukraine and East and West Europe. They are the ones who have no home in Palestine. To put it briefly they are the ones who are outsiders in our land, Palestine.

A Confederation

[Question] There has been much talk also about a confederation between Jordan and a part of Palestine. How accurate is this?

[Answer] In the past King Husayn had proposed a plan for a united Arab kingdom, but this plan was put away and forgotten after Arab leaders made fun of it. Palestinians too did not think too much of it. It was then that King Husayn abandoned the idea altogether. The plan had meant the establishment of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza; its capital would be Jerusalem and it would be tied in a confederation with the East Bank. But since Arabs and Palestinians did not accept this plan, Husayn gave it up.

[Question] Is there a possibility that this plan might surface now since the Resistance has reached this dead end?

[Answer] This depends on the Palestinians. Jordan's policy regarding Palestine stems from two principles: Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territory, and especially Jerusalem, and the Palestinian people practicing their full national rights including their right to determine their destiny and establish a state on Palestinian soil.

[Question] There is some discrepancy between European and American views. Can one rely on this breach [in the attitudes of western countries] and gain some support for the question?

[Answer] I would not depend on Europe or on the United States. I would rather concentrate on Arab solidarity, Arab unity and Arab understanding. I am hoping that Egypt's present efforts to alter its political course under the leadership of President Husni Mubarak and join the Arab march would achieve Arab solidarity so that Arab solidarity can yield benefits for Palestine and Lebanon and be instrumental in bringing about an end to the war between Iraq and Iran. The fact that we are so fragmented, with the fires [of war] ravaging the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples and also ravaging the borders of Iraq, and the fact that

...surround the Arabian Gulf make it imperative that we overlook all Arab disputes. Arab leaders will have to shake each other's hands so we can remove all differences and ensure the future of the Arab nation.

[Question] How would you explain this timing coincidence between the attack on Lebanon and Iran's attack on Iraq?

[Answer] Iraq's position has been honorable, especially since it accepted all mediation [efforts], starting with the non-alignment committee, including Islamic mediation and ending with the UN representative. President Saddam Husayn's agreement to withdraw his troops to the international borders was met by an Iranian intransigence that resembles Israel's. All this took place to weaken Iraq and accordingly the Arabs, especially since Iraq's Arab positions are known. Our position of supporting Iraq stems from a principle: whenever we called upon Iraq, Iraq had always answered our call. Iraq was fighting in the hills of Janin, Tulkrum and 'Ajlun, and Iraq was losing its people. Therefore I am saying that the fact that Khomeyni has accepted none of the mediations for peace and the fact that he has not accepted the words of the Koran, "Make peace among your brothers" [al-Hujurat: 10], signifies that [his purpose] is to weaken the Arab front, especially after we discovered that Israel was supplying Khomeyni with weapons. This was established after an airplane was shot down over Russian territory. Therefore I am saying that none of the slogans Khomeyni is proclaiming for the liberation of Jerusalem has any substance.

The People's Army

[Question] Let us come back to Jordan. There has been much talk about the creation of a Jordanian people's army. Can you give us a brief overview of this army?

[Answer] The people's army is still being formed. You can find out details about that army from the specialized agencies after the implementation stage is begun.

[Question] What is meant by the people's army? Is it restricted to Jordanians, and can any Jordanian citizen join this army?

[Answer] So far nothing of that nature has been done; however, the king wishes to establish the people's army. In the future there will be committees that will execute the laws. When preparations for this royal wish are complete, we will announce all the details.

[Question] Don't you think that the fact that some countries had reservations about receiving the Palestinians meant that they took part indirectly in liquidating the cause?

[Answer] No. No. The Palestinian cause will not die no matter how much time passes. President Husni Mubarak told the United States that he would welcome the Palestinians provided that their cause is settled. Also all the Arab countries said they would welcome them until they would return to Palestine. Palestinians do not accept any Arab country as an alternative to their homeland. I am making these statements from experience. In 1976 al-Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil and his son Amin, the member of parliament, came to me along with the Phalangist representative Louis Abu Sharaf asking us to gather all the Palestinians in one

area. My reply was that each Arab country had to shoulder the responsibility for those Palestinians who were on its territory until their question is settled. [I told them], "Let us work together so we can help the Palestinians return to their homeland. No Arab country should get rid of the Palestinians who live in that country by dumping them into another Arab country. This would mean that they are washing their hands off their cause, and this may not happen at all." Al-Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil, however, was not impressed by what I said. Then, in jest, I told him and the Phalangist delegation that was accompanying him, "Leave the Palestinians in 'Ayn al-Hulwah under the cedars until their question is settled."

[Question] Is there hope that Palestine will be regained after what happened in Lebanon?

[Answer] Abu 'Ammar has approved all UN resolutions pertaining to Palestine without exception. He has thus placed Israel in an internationally embarrassing position. It is this that made Israel turn things upside down. Israel wants neither UN resolutions nor Security Council resolutions. Of all these resolutions Israel accepted only the one that created it. Let me go back to what I said at the outset of this interview: we have to establish solidarity, and we have to work together to restore the dignity of the Arab nation.

8592

CSO: 4404/661

ARAB MILITARY ACTION IN LEBANON URGED

Amman AL-UFUQ in Arabic No 19, 11-17 Aug 82 pp 2-3

[Article by Tariq Masariwah: "Let Us Fight!"]

[Text] All this redundant, emotional and rancorous talk about "the Israeli invasion of Lebanon," "the Israeli-Palestinian war in Lebanon," "the Zionist expansion in the north," or "slaughtering the Palestinian Resistance in Beirut and placing its remains in the context of a formula of Arab impotence" is [just that]: redundant, emotional and rancorous. At best such talk constitutes a political diagnosis of a state of war between Arabs and Israelis that we want to confine to Lebanon, to Beirut and to West Beirut in particular. This is based on the consideration that the outcome of this war will affect the Palestinian or the Lebanese people. [These statements are being made] in the worst case of national desertion practiced by Arab regimes in their contemporary history and in the largest operation of deception about a principal and decisive battle in the Arab-Zionist struggle.

On Diagnosing Events:

--Not everything that is happening in Lebanon now has to do with the Palestinian-Israeli war. What is happening is rather an Arab-Israeli war that Arabs have deliberately failed to enter so they can hang its outcome, which is known in advance, on the Palestinians.

--What is happening in Lebanon now is not a crisis that Israel has used to its advantage; it is rather the beginning of an integrated Israeli plan to arrange conditions of the Arab region, which has lost its clout and its stature. Israel wants to force the Arab area to recognize its usurpation of all of Palestine and the Golan. It wants to force the Arab region to deal with it on a normal basis as is the case between any neighboring countries in this vast world.

Many people may not know that Cairo Airport, and not only the bridges over the Jordan River, has become a passageway to Ben Gurion Airport and that thousands go through Cairo Airport without their passports being stamped. Many people do not know that Lebanon will become another bigger and greater passageway. Many people do not know that Lebanese passengers coming to Lebanon and departing from it now land at Ben Gurion Airport and are then carried by (IJAD) buses to Sidon, Tyre and Nabatiyyah. Lebanese passengers leave Lebanon from this airport on their way

to Europe, Africa and the world. The Israeli objective now is to do business in the region and to do so by force if that is the means by which business is to be done. If the countries of the region do not watch out, they will find themselves with nothing more than "an autonomy" such as that which was set up and is being set up by the racist regime in South Africa.

Let us pause at this point in our diagnosis of events in Lebanon. This diagnosis alone will not be enough if we want to write with a sense of responsibility and if we want the job of journalism to be more committed.

Let us stop at this diagnosis and ask, "What is the solution?"

How can we correct our failure to fight an Arab-Israeli war in Lebanon? What are the means by which this war can be fought?

We are not among those people who would exploit a gory reality to engage in political name-calling. We are saying, however, "Syria's position in this battle is a decisive one that cannot be covered up by making accusations or effecting a news blackout. Syria is the geographical, human and political stepping stone the Arabs can use to enter the battle in Lebanon. Despite everything, the Damascus regime is still capable of turning this fact into a glorious [feat for] Arabs comparable to that of Palestinians. Syria is still capable of changing many considerations.

First, Syria can reconsider its relations with Jordan and Iraq and turn them from a state of conflict to one of harmony, coordination and joint action.

We know that Hafiz al-Asad picked up the telephone one day and called Husayn to threaten him that the Syrian army would march on Jordan.

Notwithstanding the emotional wound that this unfortunate telephone call effected, there is nothing to keep Hafiz al-Asad from making another call that would be appropriate to the crucial events that are taking place in Lebanon and commensurate with King Husayn's national gallantry.

There is nothing to keep Hafiz al-Asad from becoming fully convinced that his allies, the ayatollahs in Tehran, will not be able to subdue Baghdad to reach Beirut or Jerusalem. If this can take place, it will definitely take place at the expense of subduing Damascus as well. That is, if the ayatollahs are sincere about their revolution and if the slogans of al-Ba'th are still relevant.

The hostilities regimes harbor for each other have become burdensome. Why do they continue carrying this burden? If lasting hostility or lasting friendship cannot survive in politics, why then do we not observe the laws of politics in our political practices?

If we are in agreement that Damascus is the geographical, human and political stepping stone Arabs can use to enter the battle in Lebanon, and if we are in agreement that the present role of Damascus is to build a Syrian-Iraqi-Jordanian-Palestinian-Lebanese position by turning the state of conflict into one of coordination and joint action, then what is required now--right now--is action that would turn this position into a fighting force. This can be done by:

1. Mobilizing the military power of Syria, Iraq and Jordan into positions of military steadfastness.

2. Sending tens of thousands of special troops to Lebanon to turn the Jewish occupation [of that country] into a military crisis with the cooperation of Palestinian and Lebanese forces. We can gain access to the Israeli soldiers with this force, and we can overcome the superiority that their weapons afford them by drawing them into a fight in a manner and at a place and time that we determine.

By itself Syria cannot become North Vietnam, and Jordan by itself cannot [fight this aggression]. However, setting up a strong resistance position that extends from Basrah to Latakia and al-'Aqabah will be tantamount to a real North Vietnam. Israel is an illusion created by Arab weakness. It is a myth that has grown over the ruins and remains of [Arab] unity.

Let us now talk about the battle. If Arab regimes continue to play the game that sectarian kings in Andalusia played, they alone will be the victims. The people of this region are capable of withstanding the Zionist attack just as they withstood the attacks of Tatars and Christians. They are capable of pulling themselves [out of this condition] even if that takes a while.

The withdrawal of Palestinians from Lebanon will not solve the problem of the Israeli invasion. The withdrawal of Palestinians will not mean that Israel will withdraw from Lebanon. Lebanon has now become the scene of conflict. Why shouldn't we turn it into a real scene of conflict? Why don't we turn the battle into an Arab-Israeli battle? Why don't we send thousands of Arab fighters into Lebanon and make this invasion the last Zionist invasion?

If Begin and Sharon are able to achieve their objectives in Lebanon, what is to keep them tomorrow from trying to achieve their objectives in Syria and then in Jordan and north Saudi Arabia?

Let us make Lebanon their graveyard. Let us light a candle that would give hope to millions of Arabs who are wallowing in the darkness of despair.

Let us fight.

8592

CSO: 4404/660

TV COVERAGE OF LEBANON CRISIS CRITICIZED

Reporters' Motives Questioned

Kuwait AL-TALI'AH in Arabic No 755, 11 Aug 82 p 39

[Text] It seems that officials who monitor television programs, those who receive the video tapes on the Israeli invasion and the herosim of the joint forces as well as those who prepare news and commentaries need someone to divest them of the fears they have about mistakes they may make. It seems that the emotional state of these people is quite pathetic and that their hands shake when they cut off parts of a tape or when they delete a news item. They do not know what news and pictures must be announced and broadcast and what must be deleted or left out.

They need to be told what Kuwait's reporting position on the Israeli invasion is: is it with the invasion or against it? More than likely, they need to be told and assured that Kuwait's official position, as we heard it in His Highness's address during the last 10 days of Ramadan, is one that condemns this invasion and considers it a step in a larger plan of aggression. Kuwait's official position supports the extraordinary resistance of the Palestinian and Lebanese people. [Broadcast officials] also need to be told that it is Kuwait's official position that the United States is the power behind the aggression. [They need to be told] that they are not to fear for their jobs and they are not to fear the Kuwaiti people when they show tapes that portray the resistance in Beirut and affirm the extraordinary heroic feats of the joint forces. They need not entertain any fears when they broadcast the U.S. statements that reveal the depth of U.S. collusion and participation in the invasion of Lebanon.

We make these statements as we watch the curious conduct of a television service whose government and people support the Palestinian Resistance and the Lebanese National Movement even as that television service seems to be operating in another world.

Last Wednesday evening, on 4 August 1982, it was my good fortune to watch a tape that was shown on the 8:30 Qatar television news. The tape contained live scenes of groups of fighters from the joint forces in Beirut who were brandishing their weapons and singing patriotic songs. At 9 o'clock I switched to Kuwaiti television, and to my surprise the same tape was being shown. However, the censor had cut off these scenes!

On Thursday, 5 August 1982, Kuwaiti television showed a tape of wounded Israeli soldiers who were crowded together in the corridors of a building. But as soon as the camera moved to a large hall filled with wounded enemy soldiers, the tape was cut, and the announcer's smiling face appeared [on the screen] to finish [reading] the news bulletin.

When we shift [our attention] to those who edit the news, we would find that Kuwait's television made the announcement about the U.S. veto of the Soviet plan that called for suspending all weapons shipments to Israel, the aggressor, and disarming those insane people in the news summary that was broadcast at the end of last Friday's broadcast. Kuwaiti television dropped another important news story that was broadcast by radio and television stations in the Arabian Gulf. That news item was about a statement from the U.S. State Department. The statement was formulated in the form of a warning to the PLO and to all Arab countries collectively which appeared to be set to convene a summit meeting soon.

The warning said, "If a prompt diplomatic solution to the problem of Palestinian fighters is not found, there will be a real military danger."

Alluding to the summit meeting, the statement added that this fact must be taken into account when an attempt is being made to reach a diplomatic solution by peaceful means.

A warning of such significance, coming immediately after the U.S. veto and after the call for an Arab summit, is very significant. Dropping a report about this warning from the news bulletin is even more so.

These observations make it incumbent upon us to ask the Ministry of Information a question: Has there been a decision to impose a news blackout on the fighting of the Palestinian and Lebanese people who are fighting America's instrument of invasion? Has there been a decision to attract attention to Israel's tanks as these tanks shell Beirut? Has there been a decision to direct attention to U.S. plans, to U.S. actions and to the U.S. lies that are articulated by Habib? Has there been a decision not to expose the truth about the U.S. position?

Ministry's Response

Kuwait AL-TALI'AH in Arabic No 757, 25 Aug 82 p 11

[Article by Hamad Yusuf al-Rumi, assistant undersecretary (of information) for artistic affairs]

Text | The Editor-in-Chief of AL-TALI'AH Magazine:

Dear Sir:

In issue number 755 of AL-TALI'AH Magazine, which came out on 11 August 1982, you published an article entitled, "On Whose Behalf Is This Television Station Operating?" You stated in that article that "officials who monitor television programs and people who prepare news and commentary need to be divested of the fears they have about mistakes they may make. They do not know what news and pictures must be announced and broadcast and what must be deleted or left out."

You also stated that those people needed to be told what Kuwait's reporting position was on the Israeli invasion. They needed to be told whether Kuwait supported the invasion or was against it. There were other such questions. You also cited examples regarding the fact that television broadcasts of some Gulf countries showed some scenes that Kuwait's television did not show. You also stated that some important news stories were deleted from the news summary, and you made other observations and critical remarks as well.

In response to what was stated in the article, we wish to clarify at the outset that those who prepare the news and commentaries and officials who monitor television programs are fully aware of the tasks they have to do. They are highly competent individuals and they have gained experience over the years from their work in the media and in news in particular. As far as television news is concerned, it is known that news agencies are the source of news, and a dispatch from one agency will differ from a dispatch that comes from another agency. The shots in the dispatch, the subjects of the pictures and how extensive and comprehensive the coverage is will vary. Hence one video-taped news dispatch will differ from another. If the pictures [that accompany] a news story are different from others [that accompany the same story on another broadcast, the reason for this difference is due in most cases to the source of the news. The forementioned Gulf state receives its television news from (FIS News Agency) to which Kuwaiti television has recently subscribed.

With regard to deleting some of the news from the news summary, [I would like to say] that all the news does not necessarily have to be included in the summary or in the complete news bulletin. In either case--[that is, the news summary or the complete news bulletin]--news stories must be chosen with regard to the limited time period for each broadcast. Selection of the news should take into account what is important and what is new without prolonging, belaboring or repeating a presentation.

We thank you for your interest and your observations, and we wish to assure you that all media agencies function within the framework of the state's public policy, and neither they nor government agencies can depart or deviate from this policy.

We ask that you print this reply in the same place and in the first issue of the magazine you publish after receiving this letter.

Please accept] our regards.

Hamad Yusuf al-Rumi

The assistant undersecretary for artistic affairs

Ministry's Reply Criticized

Kuwait AL-TALI'AH in Arabic No 757, 25 Aug 82 p 11

[Editorial]

[Text] We received this explanation from the Ministry of Information about the article we published last week under the title, "On Whose Behalf Is this Television Station Operating?" We took issue with [Kuwaiti] television on several matters regarding the fact that some scenes on video tapes had not been shown, and interest in certain news stories had not been made evident.

There was nothing new in the explanation regarding the multiplicity of news sources and agency tapes. However, our observations were focused on one tape that was sent by one agency. It was what was done with that tape that was the object of our criticism.

Our observations were also focused on a serious news story in the context of the U.S.-Zionist invasion of Lebanon that should have been included in the bulletin.

We differ with the Ministry of Information about the importance of such a news story. The ministry's assertion that those who prepare the news and commentaries are competent, experienced and well aware of what their duties are is not the issue here. The problem is not one of competence, experience and sheer know-how. The problem is where does all this lead to, and in whose interest [is this being done]?

Naturally, the ministry can get an answer to that question from the opinions of television viewers which are published in newspapers.

We hope to have television [programs] that meet the needs of viewers. When viewers indicate their dissatisfaction with declining standards and when they protest, that means that something is wrong somewhere there.

The truth is that we are bewildered by the ministry's assertion in its response that all the agencies of the media function within the framework of the state's public policy and cannot deviate from it. This means that it is the state's public policy that is responsible for the fact that television broadcasts have stayed away from the most serious question facing Arabs: the question of the Arab-Zionist struggle. The state's public policy is also responsible for this series of serials about which the least that can be said is that they are intellectually and artistically offensive. There are many of these serials and other matters as well, filling up broadcasting hours.

8592

CSO: 4404/653

DEVELOPMENT PLAN CONTINUES DESPITE ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES

London AL-ZAHAF AL-AKHDAR in English 27 Aug 82 p 10

[Text]

AS LIBYA celebrates the thirteenth anniversary of the September Revolution, the Jamahiriya can congratulate itself on the fact that the US-Saudi attempts to sabotage Libya's development plans have failed to obstruct the momentum of the present 1981-1985 Transformation Plan, the details of which were agreed by the General People's Congress last year.

The 1981-85 Transformation Plan is of crucial importance for the development of Libya, because once it is implemented Libya will escape for ever the dangers which the kind of actions initiated by the Saudis at America's behest over the past year or more have caused.

Although Libya's oil liftings are not as high as they once were, this fact is mitigated to a great extent by last year's confirmation that Libya's oil resources are in fact far higher than were originally thought.

Total Libyan oil reserves were stated in March, 1981 to be in excess of 90 billion barrels, a figure that astounded and confounded Libya's American and Saudi adversaries. Furthermore new oil basins, such as that around Ghadames near the Algerian border could provide Libya with more oil, in addition to the extra liftings, amounting theoretically to an extra ten billion barrels, which the use of secondary and tertiary methods of extraction could provide.

More resources, less dependence

What enables Libya to ride out economic sabotage actions with such blatant political intentions like the Saudi-engineered oil glut, is the fact that Libya is not only on course for more oil, thereby increasing its weight within OPEC, but is also set to reduce its dependence upon oil for Libya's export revenues.

This is one of the primary aims of the present Transformation Plan, which intends to reduce Libya's dependence on oil sector revenues from the 64.3 per cent at which it stood in 1981 before the Plan's adoption, to 46.3 per cent by 1985. Moreover a larger and larger proportion of those oil sector revenues will be coming from newly developed petroleum-related industries and not just from the sale of oil.

The end result will be that even if, as now seems possible, the Saudis make another attempt to force an OPEC agreement for lower oil prices (the present base rate for Saudi light crude is \$34 per barrel) such politically-motivated tactics of economic destabilisation will have a constantly reducing impact on the Libyan economy. Thus when the Leader, Muammar Qadhafi spoke last year about the Libyan people's ability to live without oil, as they had done in the past, he may well have had an eye on the future as on the past.

For Libya's development plans hinge on a range of major industrial projects which are designed to broaden the base of the Libyan economy by creating whole new industries.

increasing home self-sufficiency as well as boosting exports, which will all have the combined effect of ending once and for all Libya's dependence on the oil industry.

The Saudi-implemented, US-inspired campaign against Libyan oil can thus be seen in its proper perspective. The campaign which began last year and the repetition which the Saudis may now try to implement were and are probably the last chances for Libya's opponents to prevent the country from becoming a major industrial power in the Arab world.

By creating an oil glut, the Saudis and Americans hoped to force cutbacks in Libyan development spending of an order which would sabotage Libya's efforts to develop major revenue-earning alternatives to the export of oil. But it must be added that the US and Saudi governments are not the only people worried about Libyan development plans.

Refining crisis

Libyan petrochemical complexes like that at Ras Lanuf threaten the developed world's control of the refining of Arab oil, as do the refineries of other Arab countries. Over the past year and a half there has been a marked worsening of the circumstances of western oil refineries, which are finding that business is becoming scarcer thanks to the oil exporters' development of indigenous refining capacities.

Coupled with all the petrochemical spin-offs from which Arab countries can benefit if they develop their own plant, it is clear that despite present difficulties, OPEC's power is actually set to grow in the longer term.

This is what the Americans fear most. The Saudis also fear such competitive industrialisation probably because they are aware of their own inability to efficiently compete in the petrochemicals refining field. This inability is due entirely to the ingrained corruption and inefficiency of a Saudi society which cannot modernise itself without a new political direction.

Libya has not been slow to appreciate the economic benefits of the development of petrochemicals industries, as the Ras Lanuf complex proves. Petrochemicals were scheduled to receive some \$2,195 million in development funds over the 1981-85 period in the draft Transformation Plan, while petroleum products are to receive \$838 million.

But still the Libyan Jamahiriya has avoided putting all its eggs in one basket. \$58 million is to go towards the expansion of Libya's non-oil related chemical industries and a massive \$2.7 billion — 32 per cent of total manufacturing allocations — on metallurgy, much of it towards the Misurata iron and steel complexes.

Coupled with Libyan plans to increase allocations towards the home production of passenger cars and the continued home assembly of trucks and buses, it is clear that Libya stands to become a major producer of capital industrial goods by 1985.

Other projects under consideration include plans to produce household consumer appliances, aluminium cables, water and electricity meters and fluorescent lamps — all this in a country which twenty years ago had neither industry nor the skilled manpower for industrial development.

In addition to all these plans, Libya intends to actually reduce its agricultural workforce while at the same time increasing agricultural production to levels which will guarantee food self-sufficiency covering a range of products. All this is the kind of development the Saudis and Americans would dearly like to frustrate.

The oil glut

When the oil glut began last year it was suggested that the reasons were not political, but that the glut was rather an economic 'inevitability'. But a few people can seriously believe that the initial Saudi calls on industrialised countries to reduce their oil consumption, at a time when Saudi production was reaching record levels, were not inspired by the Saudi desire to do the American administration's bidding.

The Saudi call for conservation was anyway unnecessary. Major industrial countries had already cut back their oil consumption, Japan cutting it by no less than 10 per cent in the first three months of 1981. Furthermore the Americans in particular were, and still are launching a drive to exploit the oil resources of lesser oil producers which can be politically trusted by the US not to oppose US policies.

Saudi inconsistency

The inconsistency of Saudi statements and both Saudi and American actions, all proved that the oil glut was no mere inevitability, neither was it the product of chance — the international oil industry is not nearly as nervously responsive to changing international economic cir-

cumstances as the Saudis would have the world believe.

Thus the massive dumping of cut-rate oil by the Saudis during 1981 had one clear purpose: to effect an immediate and irreversible drop in oil prices. The Saudis could feel confident that with their massive financial reserves in foreign banks, they would not suffer any shortfalls in finances for development.

Indeed, a former US ambassador to Saudi Arabia, has estimated that the entire Saudi development plan could be

financed with the export of just three million barrels of oil a day — less than half the present Saudi production levels.

The political purpose behind the creation of the oil glut was perfectly obvious to Libya, as it was to other radical oil-exporting states. Although Libya was the target, it was other countries — Nigeria in particular — which were to suffer the effect of what Muammar Qadhafi called in March, 1982 Saudi Arabia's 'reckless policies'.

The Leader was only expressing what all aware observers knew to be the case when he told the General People's Congress

on March 4th that Saudi Arabia had been 'acting on American orders in raising oil production to cause a glut'. The purpose of Saudi policies, Qadhafi said, was to maintain the 'defence of American protection'.

The immediate cause of Muammar Qadhafi's condemnation had been the revelation that the Saudis had indeed been carrying out dumping on the international spot market, just as they later tried to do after OPEC agreements enforced a certain discipline on Saudi behaviour.

Recovery of stability

Serious though the oil glut has been for many oil exporters, the Saudis and Americans have not succeeded in their aim of overturning Libya's development plans. The more immediate aim of somehow influencing a reduction in Libyan material support for the Palestine Liberation Organisation also manifestly failed to be achieved.

The fact that Libya's responsible Secretariats have said that the goals of the 1981-85 Transformation Plan are still intended to be met, is proof of the failure of the Saudi-US campaign of international economic stabilisation.

Stabilisation of the oil market

The recovery of the oil market's stability has no doubt come as bad news for the Saudis, who have privately said that they would have liked to see the present \$34 per barrel benchmark for Saudi light drop to \$25 per barrel and stay there. Recent statements by both UAE and Venezuelan oil officials have attested to the fact that the Saudis have no hope of seeing the price drop to that level and that indeed the spring and summer of this year has seen a marked stabilisation of the oil market. Certainly Libya is having no trouble exporting its agreed OPEC quota.

It is within this whole context of past failure and the challenge of Libyan economic development that the Saudis and Americans are persisting with their attempts to upset the present stability of the oil market. Whatever happens, Libya will certainly survive any new shocks and the rest of the world will have no difficulty apportioning the blame for such shocks to the Saudis and their American backers.

KING'S MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

LD202112 Rabat Domestic Service in Arabic 2000 GMT 20 Sep 82

[Text] Following the abominable massacre of the innocent and unarmed Palestinians in Beirut, King Hassan II, may God preserve him, yesterday sent a cable to U.S. President Reagan. The following is the text of the cable:

His Excellency President Ronald Reagan of the United States, Washington:

Mr President and great friend, I am fully aware of your feelings, as a head of a family and as man responsible for war and peace in the world, over the events in Lebanon. It is for this reason that I will refrain from making any comment. However, I cannot but say that the United States has a responsibility toward events in the Lebanese arena, as is evident from the following:

The Palestinians, who until recently could sacrifice their lives while they had their arms, in defense of their unarmed wives, children and relatives who remained behind, have left their families in Lebanon, entrusting them to your government, although nothing to this effect was specifically mentioned in the agreements signed by the parties to the conflict.

In short, these men have placed their trust in you. I believe, as my knowledge of your affirms, that the agonizing feelings you now entertain have become unbearable. You have been misled by those who claim to be your allies. Hence, we expect you to deal with the situation.

Both politically and morally, the United States must save itself from this stigma by resorting to all means necessary, including a military presence in Lebanon--an honest and effective presence defending the weak and the unarmed.

What is taking place in Lebanon is completely different from war. Simply and brutally, what is taking place in Lebanon is a massacre. It has been said in the Bible: Thou shalt not kill.

Mr President and great friend: These are sad moments which every head of state must face as he shoulders his responsibilities. I am confident that you will face up to them with a spirit of full courage, determination and wisdom. Your friend who is sending you these words stands by you and prays to God to guide you to the right course; the course of justice and fairness.

Mr President and great friend, please accept my most true cordial feelings and high esteem.

Written at the Royal Palace at Ifrane on 19 September 1982.

[Signed] Hassan II, King of Morocco.

CSO: 4500/304

RESULTS OF FES SUMMIT SUPPORTED

PM201211 Casablanca LE MATIN in French 15 Sep 82 p 1

[Ahmed Alaoui editorial: "A United Front, a Common Charter"]

[Excerpts] The 12th Fes Arab summit is certainly the richest of all those held and will continue to be an example in the Arab League's history since its formation.

During that frank examination the Arab leaders were at last able to criticize themselves openly and make the necessary analysis: Why has Israel always won military victories?

It was noted, therefore, that for the time being the Zionist state has unbelievable equipment and might in the military sphere. That gives it free rein for all kinds of arrogance, challenges, invasions and heinous crimes, especially since it is backed by the United States. Even the friends of the Arabs, those who support their demands on the Palestinian problem, oppose the destruction of the Zionist state.

It was by taking account of those objective facts that the Fes summit was able to define a valid strategy and tactics. The struggle which has hitherto been military will be transferred to the political plane. The objectives to be attained were defined by the summit in a charter which received the whole Arab community's approval.

That charter poses the Palestinian problem in political terms with realism and responsibility, and that is why the summit was deemed united and positive. In addition it binds the whole Arab community with the exception--and it is a fortunate one--of the Tripoli adventurer, who excluded himself and is thus acting as the Zionist state's objective ally.

Another important decision was the formation of a committee for the implementation of the Fes charter decisions, which will keep track of the approaches and monitor the measures to be taken in keeping with the tactics and strategy defined. This is also the first time that the Arab nation has formed such a body comprising Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, the PLO, Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

Finally, the fact that the Fes summit made it possible to end splits and divisions may be a decisive factor. As we stressed, there is no longer any rejection front or moderation front: There is only one united Arab front showing solidarity with the valiant Palestinian people and the PLO, their sole legitimate representative.

CSO: 4500/304

PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

PDRY, BULGARIAN LEADERS MEET

GF180854 Aden Domestic Service in Arabic 1230 GMT 17 Sep 82

[Text] Brother 'Ali Nasir Mhammad, chairman of the PDRY Supreme People's Council Presidium and chairman of the Council of Ministers, arrived in Sofia yesterday on a friendly visit to Bulgaria at the invitation by Todor Zhivkov, secretary general of the Bulgarian Communist Party [BCP] Central Committee and chairman of the Bulgarian Presidium. Brother 'Ali Nasir Muhammad was received upon arrival at Sofia airport by the chairman of the Bulgarian Council of Ministers and a number of members of the BCP Politburo and Central Committee.

This morning, Brother 'Ali Nasir Muhammad met with Comrade Todor Zhivkov at the headquarters of the BCP Central Committee. They discussed the tasks of the BCP and the YSP and the Bulgarian and PDRY governments. The two leaders exchanged views on the most important current issues of the international revolutionary movement and the current international situation, particularly the situation in the Middle East in light of the Israeli aggression against Lebanon.

Comrade Zhivkov briefed the Yemeni guest on the activities of the Bulgarian communists and all workers in Bulgaria for the implementation of the decisions of the 12th BCP Congress in order to establish the developed socialist society in Bulgaria. Comrade Zhivkov also briefed him on the active and consistent foreign policy of the Bulgarian Party and Government which is oriented for establishing good neighborly relations and cooperation among the people of the Balkans, for rendering the Balkan region free of nuclear weapons, and for bolstering peace and security in Europe and the world.

Comrade Zhivkov once again expressed the struggling solidarity of the BCP and the Bulgarian Government and people entirely with the just struggle of the Yemeni people and the rest of the Arab peoples against the plots of imperialism, Zionism and reactionism in order to solve the conflict in the Middle East justly, permanently and comprehensively in terms of the complete withdrawal of Israel from all Arab territories occupied in 1967 and for restoring the legitimate rights of the Palestinian Arab people including their right to self-determination and the establishment of their independent national state on Palestinian territory under the leadership of the PLO.

Brother 'Ali Nasir Muhammad spoke of the struggle of the Yemeni people in the PDRY under the leadership of the YSP for bolstering the political and economic independence of the country and within the framework of the implementation of

the decisions of the extraordinary conference of the YSP and the efforts exerted by the PDRY in order to abort the designs of imperialism, Zionism and reactionism in the Middle East and the Red Sea region and in order to bolster world peace.

Brother 'Ali Nasir Muhammad highly appraised the successes of the Bulgarian people in advanced socialist edification--successes which have been achieved under the leadership of the BCP. He also highly appraised the active foreign policy of the BCP and the People's Republic of Bulgaria. Brother 'Ali Nasir Muhammad further appraised the active solidarity and support of the BCP and the People's Republic of Bulgaria for the just cause of the Arab peoples and the struggle of the people of the national liberation movement struggling against imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, Zionism, racial discrimination and [word indistinct].

During the talks, Comrade Todor Zhivkov, praised the consistent and constructive stand of the YSP and the PDRY in the struggle for a comprehensive solution to the Middle East crisis and in order to change the Indian Ocean region into a peaceful and secure one. He also praised their role in bolstering the unified Arab action to enhance the unity of the steadfastness and confrontation front.

Both leaders regretted and denounced the source of tension and danger of war in different parts of the world--this source which is illustrated by the current hostile U.S. military policy and the U.S. allies in the NATO which is aimed at upsetting the balance of military power through the arms race and the production of devastating weapons.

Comrades Todor Zhivkov and 'Ali Nasir Muhammad affirmed that this course contradicts the peaceful and constructive policy adopted by the Soviet Union, and all socialist bloc countries.

This policy also contradicts the efforts made by many peaceful and democratic countries which struggle to prevent an arms race and ensure effective measures for disarmament, peacekeeping, detente and auspicious cooperation for everyone.

Exchanging several views, both leaders denounced the barbaric attack that was unleashed by Israel and which was conspicuously backed by the United States against sovereign Lebanon. They also denounced the ferocious crimes of annihilation carried out by the Israeli aggressors against the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples, and re-expressed their firm solidarity and support for the just struggle of the PLO, the Lebanese national and progressive forces, Syria and the rest of the Arab countries which struggle against the designs of the Israeli aggressor which are aimed at annihilating the Palestinian resistance movement and its vanguard, the PLO, and imposing the Camp David transaction by force. They affirmed that the situation in the Middle East resulting from the continuous Israeli aggression against Lebanon requires the bolstering and enhancement of Arab unity in order to struggle against the Israeli expansion and the U.S. designs aimed at dominating in the Middle East. In that regard, they assessed all positive proposals made by the Fes summit.

Both leaders pointed out that all attempts aimed at the enervation of the alliance of the Arab liberation movement with the Soviet Union and all the countries of the socialist bloc and which are directed against the interests of the Arab peoples harm their struggle against imperialism and Zionism. They affirmed that any new unilateral transactions or any secret activities will raise tension in the Middle East and will deepen aggression and conflict.

Both leaders pointed out that the real solution to the conflict in the Middle East can be achieved within the framework of an international conference on the Middle East which the Soviet Union had called for in terms of the principles which Comrade Leonid Brezhnev proposed in his speech on 15 September.

Both leaders reviewed the implementation of agreements signed between both parties and governments, and with satisfaction they expressed that the ways of cooperation between the BCP Communist Party and the YSP and the cooperation between the PDRY and Bulgaria are steadily progressing. Both leaders affirmed that the BCP and the YSP will work together for future dynamic development and for bolstering the multilateral relations between the two countries, and the two parties on the basis of the principles and goals of the theory of scientific socialism and international proletarianism and for the sake of both people and peace and security in the world.

The meeting of comrades 'Ali Nasir Muhammad and Todor Zhivkov was attended by [name indistinct] secretary of the BCP Central Committee.

Earlier, Brother 'Ali Nasir Muhammad and the delegation accompanying him left the Soviet capital yesterday afternoon ending a 3-day state visit to the Soviet Union. He was seen off at Moscow airport by [name indistinct], member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and a number of Soviet officials. A joint statement was issued in Aden and Moscow yesterday regarding the visit.

CSO: 4400/491

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

BRIEFS

PDRY CHAIRMAN MEETS HABASH--Brother 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, secretary general of YSP Central Committee, chairman of the PDRY Supreme People's Council Presidium and chairman of the Council of Ministers, met with PFLP Secretary General George Habash at his residence in Sofia on 16 September. During the meeting several issues in light of the recent events on the Lebanese, Palestinian and Arab arenas were discussed. [Excerpt] [GF181802 Aden Domestic Service in Arabic 1630 GMT 18 Sep 82]

CSO: 4400/491

SUDAN, EEC SIGN GRANT AGREEMENTS

Khartoum SUNA in English 31 Aug 82 pp 2, 3

[Text] Khartoum, Aug. 31, SUNA--Two agreements were signed here yesterday between the European Economic Community (EEC) and the Sudan.

According to the agreements the EEC will grant the Sudan 25.8 million European units of account (around 28 million dollars) of which 9.8 million units for the consolidation of Uwayl Rice Project in the Southern Region, 16 million units value of urea fertilizer for the al-Jazirah Scheme in the context of the second rehabilitation phase of the irrigated agriculture sector.

The agreements were signed by Finance and Economic Minister, Ibrahim Mun'im Mansur for the Sudan and the EEC Commissioner General for Development Mr. Edger Pisani.

It is note worthy that the EEC had earlier financed the first phase of Uwayl Rice Project in 1979 against a grant of 4.4 million European units of account, SUNA learned.

Pisani told a press conference here yesterday that the developing countries receive more than 50% of the total international aid funds offered by the EEC and that Africa receives the biggest share of these aids in the context of the Lome convention between the EEC and the countries of the Pacific, Caribbean and African community.

Answering a question on the possibility of raising aid for rehabilitating irrigated agriculture projects, he said, the EEC could not give more funds for the rehabilitation programme of the irrigated agriculture because the volume of consolidating this programme was limited.

He said the Sudan could make an ideal benefit of the EEC aids by giving enough consideration to the human factor during implementation.

The agreements signed yesterday between the EEC and the Sudan to provide 80,000 tons of urea fertilizers for the Gezira Scheme represents 60% of Sudan's programmed aid according to the second Lome convention of 1981-86 in addition to 11 million dollars contributed by the EEC to the quick relief programme of rehabilitating the agricultural sector, he added.

The EEC aid to the Sudan amounted to 210 million dollars of which 15 millions were in the form of soft loan for the projects of Babanusa railway line and Juba airport, he further added.

Mr. Pisani also explained that the EEC aid to the Sudan represents 12% of the total aid offered to it by the European countries which amounts to more than 55% of the foreign assistance to the Sudan.

He said that the African countries' concern over petroleum production helped to destroy its agricultural progress and expressed readiness of the EEC to offer the Sudan any assistance for stepping-up petroleum production.

Mr. Pisani added that the EEC offered food relief aids to Lebanon and would offer 50 million European units of account for its rehabilitation.

CSO: 4500/302

NEXT DEVELOPMENT PHASE IN EASTERN REGION DISCUSSED

Khartoum AL-AYYAM in Arabic 25 Jul 82 p 7

[Text] As in other regions, the regional government of the Eastern Region has during the preceding phase accomplished the major tasks involved in setting up the government. It has spared no effort in coping with the issues of the people within its capabilities and the time allowed during the transition period. With the selection by the masses of their governor, Hamid 'Ali Shash, and his selection of his aides, the same people who took part in carrying out the tasks of the preceding phase, except for one minor change involving one ministry, housing, and the Red Sea Province, a new phase begins with new steps, broader than earlier ones, along the road of effort and giving and further accomplishments which we must optimistically view as achieving more aspirations of the masses in areas of development and services, aspirations which the Eastern Region government in the preceding phase began in earnest to accomplish what could be done in that period of time, however short. It is definitely striving today to complete its tasks, particularly since the team is the same and the plans are the same. Yes, it is the same team and everything is in the same place from which the launch began in that phase.

The Masses Also

The masses are also the same that took part in drafting their recommendations, starting with the consultative conference in October 1980 in the assignment phase and moving on to the regional conference of the Sudanese Socialist Union last January, and then, they agreed on the same leadership through the joint meeting to elect the governor of the region in mid-June. Yes, it is the same implementation through its vessels in the masses who clearly expressed on every occasion what accomplishments they wanted under the aegis of the regional government in the areas of development and services. They expressed their concerns and unhappiness in recommendations and resolutions which they submitted on every occasion to the appropriate agencies which had the authority to act and follow up within our political organization, the Sudanese Socialist Union. Then, the regional government today is also the same government with all its members except, as we mentioned earlier, for a minor change. A government so structured does not need to rehear or to try to find out things because it is like a doctor who has been following the condition of his patient, whose condition he had supervised from the beginning.

In the Ministry of Services

The Ministry of Public Services is one of the biggest ministries and the one in closest contact with the problems of the people in education, health, social care, religious affairs, youth and sports. It thereby becomes the ministry that faces a glut of problems and is burdened with coping with problems of work and performance, with all the negative and positive characteristics, and to remedy shortcomings in all these areas.

The truth is that the region is experiencing a great upsurge in which the number of elementary schools, according to the latest figure, has reached 678 with 102 intermediate schools and 27 secondary schools, besides a large number of technical, agricultural and business schools. However a person in this region goes beyond that and seeks an expansion in all phases of education and looks forward to the day when he can see the establishment of the University of Kassala or Port Sudan, a university which we, the people of the East, have been promised since the regional government was still an unborn fetus in the womb.

It is also true that my people in the East are also experiencing another upsurge in the field of health services. They now have 16 hospitals in the region and more than 100 clinics, 169 first aid stations and 90 preliminary health care units as well as four schools for midwives. However, they also seek more health care through the expansion of the base of these services for those to whom it is not yet available, and they are not few, so that can be possible to eliminate malnutrition and anemia and to cope with tuberculosis of various types and Port Sudan fevers about which statements and even doctors' reports vary. Attention must be paid to social care and religious affairs, besides the care and athletics the young people get.

Regarding Housing

The Ministry of Housing is in turn the focus of the hopes of the many who have no shelter and who hope to get a piece of land to shelter their families to bring them together to cope with the ups and downs of life and the insane rise in rents. There are those who do not desire more than their nests or their huts and, in the best of circumstances mud houses or even vendor's boxes. These are our people in Sinkat, al-Fa'w, al-Gadar'f, al-Hawatah al-Nahal, Jubayt, Sawakin and even in Kassala and some in Port Sudan as well, besides the other cities of our region which there is not space to list. There are also those who are thinking of deluxe housing and each naturally has his own issue and these are two different issues which should not be mixed. Then all of these people are placing their hopes on the ministry to overcome what some cities of the region are now experiencing in the way of lack of water and a severe shortage of electric power (in spite of all the digging and maintenance of wells and dams that is expected).

Concerning Finance and Economy

The problems of supply also urgently occupy a large share of the concern of citizens, a legitimate urgency because supply involves flour, sugar, petroleum

byproducts and everything needed for a person's daily existence for his meals. Although we knew in advance that the authority in these matters had been given to the committees of the areas' assemblies, it is the Ministry of Finance and Economy that continued to be the planner and overseer, and it has the responsibility of monitoring the status of commodities, providing them, and drafting just distribution policies and ways to guide the consumer. The citizen of the Eastern Region hopes, under the aegis of the new phase and with the efforts of persons working in the Ministry of Finance and Economy, led by its young minister, that he will also enter a new phase in which these commodities will be available. He also expects his economy to be strengthened by ideal exploitation of industrial projects, an increase in the number of big plants and companies operating in the Eastern Region, there already being many, and the direction of revenues toward the desired local development and services which will have the impact of easing things for all citizens, bolstering what is already there, focusing on what is underway and establishing what is needed in line with priorities.

Ministry of Agriculture

This area also has its needs despite capable efforts which we will not recount. Besides the attention it is giving to major agricultural projects, it is working to combat plant epidemics and to exploit the fisheries in our territorial waters, which constitute huge national resources of marine life. It is working in providing more services for animal resources which total about 700,000 camels, about 1.5 million sheep and another million cattle, all of which are awaiting better services in protection from disease and provision of pastures suitable for them with the objective of making better investments.

In affairs of the region and its management, efforts must be redoubled this time. Local popular rule, despite reports by some about its negative elements and about those who governed at one time and jailed because of their ignorance, is the basic keystone of regional government and devoting attention to it and caring for it will provide a firm foundation for the principle of handing power over to the masses, the goal of the May Revolution. A person in the East expects tangible support from the Ministry of Regional Affairs for the police as the basic agency in the security of a citizen, in addition to the support that should be given to the information media in the region. We should recognize that the information media is no longer a sort of pasttime and luxury or superficial glitter, which unfortunately is the prevailing belief on the part of many of us. Rather, they have become one of the most powerful weapons used today for purposes of war and peace alike, a weapon that might be more significant than nuclear weapons themselves. This becomes evident if we examine this with a long range and profound view. Then this ministry has a role which it must play in the field of encouraging tourism in the region and we are still waiting. Then there are the firefighting units the importance of which machinery we are all aware. Despite this, we recall hearing bitter complaints from an official of a firefighting unit in the southern part of the region, which narrowed down to shortcomings in their capabilities which barely amounted to zero in comparison with their responsibilities in fighting fires in the cities and villages where the broad base of housing is straw huts.

The people of the East have aspirations that the Ministry of Regional Affairs will play its role in them in this phase because they are legitimate aspirations of people who have placed their trust in their leadership.

BRIEFS

ELECTRIC BAKERY--Juba: Vice-President Joseph Lagu received yesterday businessman Amin 'Akashah who expressed desire to build an electric bakery in Juba at the cost of \$150,000, SUNA learned. The bakery's daily capacity is 240 bags of flour and is expected to meet the demand in Juba. Lagu approved the project which would be completed during the coming two months. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA in English 1 Sep 82 p 7]

SUDAN-NORWAY COOPERATION--Khartoum, Sept. 1st, (SUNA)--Vice-President Joseph Lagu yesterday received at his office here the Honorary Consul of the Kingdom of Norway here Mr Taha al-Sayvid al-Rubi. The meeting discussed means of implementing a project for electricity generation from water resources in al-Fulah and Kinyeti Falls, Eastern Equatoria Province, Southern Region. In a press statement after the meeting, al-Rubi said that the arrangements for implementation of the \$25-million project are nearing completion, adding that the African Development Bank would provide the necessary financing of the project, while the Norway government will supply the constructional materials. On the other hand, Lagu also discussed with his guest the Norway contribution to the building of hospitals in Malakal, Juba and Torit besides the possibility of providing mobile hospitals throughout the Region and the building of a medical training centre in Juba. Al-Rubi told Lagu that all the materials needed for the building of the proposed hospitals had been delivered at Mombasa Port, Kenya, and that arrangements are underway for their transportation to Juba where a number of Norwegian experts are already there to supervise implementation of those hospitals. The meeting also touched on a project for the establishment of a River Transport Company in Juba to facilitate delivery of supply commodities between Juba and Kosti river ports. Al-Rubi further stated that Norway would extend assistance to the Southern Region, during the upcoming four years, to the value of 200 million Norwegian Kroner for development projects in the Region. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA in English 1 Sep 82 pp 1, 2]

RIVER IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM--Khartoum, Aug. 31, (SUNA)--Chevron Oil Company of Sudan lastweek began a navigation improvement programme on the White Nile River. Beginning at Kosti, Chevron will install navigational aid markers (Nav-Aids) southward to lake No and then in the Bahr-al-Ghazal to the Bentiu area. In addition, Chevron will place marker buoys at locations where rocks in the River Channel are a hazard to barge traffic. The Nav-Aids are an internationally recognized shape marker and are mounted on steel piling

driven into the River bed. The Nav-Aids have a reflective coating that will enable boats to easily see them at night. By marking the main River channel with these Nav-Aids, Chevron will provide a well defined course for boat and barge traffic to follow. These Nav-Aids will reduce the possibility of vessels running aground and will enable boat captains to determine their exact position on the White Nile during the night as well as at day time. Once the Nav-Aids and buoys are installed, Chevron will make new river charts for the Kosti to Bentiu segment of the White Nile River. These charts will show the location of not only the Nav-Aids and buoys but also the existing mileage markers and topographical features such as rocks, hills, and villages. Chevron will give a reproducible set of these charts to the River Transport Corporation so that all river traffic can make use of them. Chevron anticipates completion of the Nav-Aid marker installation by the middle of September. The drawing and marking of the new river charts will take about two months to complete. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA in English 31 Aug 82 pp 5, 6]

SUDANESE-ROMANIAN COOPERATION--Khartoum, Aug. 30, (SUNA)--A delegation of Romanian experts is due here early next September for talks with the officials of the Energy and Mining Ministry, in the context of a Protocol signed between the Sudan and Romania, SUNA learnt. Within that protocol, an Energy Storage project in Port Sudan and Hayya is being undertaken by the Romanian Company "Rom-PETROLEUM" in collaboration with the Petroleum Public Corporation, to the value of \$16,380,187 as foreign component and LS. 3,409,494 as local component. The project which started on October last year is due to be completed by October 1983. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA in English 30 Aug 82 p 2]

NCR BOARD REFORMED--Khartoum, Aug. 29, (SUNA)--President Ja'far Muhammad Numayri yesterday issued a Republican Decree re-forming the Board of Directors of the National Council for Research (NCR), SUNA learned. Set up under the presidency of the NCR Chairman, the Board's membership will include the following: 1-Region Governors or their deputies. 2-Education and Guidance Minister. 3-Finance and Economic Planning Minister. 4-Energy and Mining Minister. 5-The Minister of Health. 6-The Minister of Agriculture and Irrigation. 7-The Minister of Industry. 8-The Agriculture and Irrigation State Minister. 9-The Directors of Khartoum Polytechnic. 10-Chairman of the Research specialized councils. 11-Chairwoman of the Sudan Women Association. 12-Chairman of Sudan Chamber of Commerce. 13-Chairman of the Sudanese Industries Association. 14-Chairman of the Sudan Federation of Workers Trade Unions. 15-Chairman of the Professionals Union. 16-Chairman of the Tenant's Union. 17-Chairman of the Employer's Union. 18-A Representative of the Regular Forces. 19-Dr. Yusuf Badri. 20-The NCR Secretary-General as member and rapporteur. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA in English 29 Aug 82 p 2]

KHARTOUM PROVINCE WATER--Due measures have been taken to strengthen the water network of Khartoum Province, announced Energy and Mining Minister Sharif Al-Tuhami. He said that new wells would be drilled in the different parts of the capital and added that a plan had been laid down to extend water pipes, from Khartoum North to Omdurman to increase water supplies of that city. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA in English No 4226, 23 Aug 82 p 5]

INTEGRATION--Khartoum, Aug. 23 (SUNA)--Some 15 food industries workers will receive training in the Trade Unionist Studies Institute, Cairo, within the Sudanese-Egyptian integration, SUNA learnt. The three-week course will begin September 21. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA in English No 4226, 23 Aug 82 p 3]

MILITARY ECONOMIC CORPORATION--Khartoum, Aug 24 (SUNA)--President Numayri yesterday chaired a lengthy meeting of Military Economic Corporation Board that looked into reports forwarded by the board chairmen of the corporation's different branches on performance and its impediments. Regular meetings would be held to lay down working plans and to further cooperation between the different branches of Corporation. Branches of the Corporation are: the Military Industrial Corporation, the Military Agricultural Corporation, the Military Commercial Corporation, the Military Corporation for Transport, the Military Corporation for Housing and Construction, the Military Corporation for Services and the Military Corporation for Insurance and Banking. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA in English No 4227, 24 Aug 82 pp 2,3]

TAX REVENUE--The actual revenue resulting from levied taxes up to last June has reached L.S. 141,341,028, i.e. an increase of L.S. 24 million over that of last year, an official source at the Department of Taxation told SUNA yesterday. The taxes paid by Sudanese nationals working abroad, in hard currency, reached an equivalent of L.S. 7,074,382 up to the end of last July, the source added. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA in English No 4228, 25 Aug 82 p 7]

SUDANESE-IRAQI COMMERCIAL EXCHANGE AGREEMENT--Khartoum, Aug 25 (SUNA)--Sudan and Iraq yesterday signed a commercial exchange agreement to the value of \$20 million, equally divided between the two countries. Sudan will export cotton, oil, seeds, legumes, sorghum, gum arabic, cattle, oil cake and fruits to Iraq. Sudan's imports from Iraq will include drugs, electric equipment, chemicals, bicycles and schools equipment. The volume of commercial exchange between the two countries, according to this agreement, exceeds what had been agreed upon in 1979 by \$6 million. The agreement was signed during the closing

session of the Sudanese-Iraqi Joint Committee. The Sudanese side presented proposals as regards the Iraqi request for providing that country with manpower and the training of Iraqi cotton classification experts and food industries cadres in Sudan. The Sudanese side also explained its views as regards exchanges of experts and instructors in the fields of agricultural development, animal health and industry. The Joint Committee began sessions August 20. The forthcoming meeting is expected to be held in Baghdad in late 1983. [Text]
[Khartoum SUNA in English No 4228, 25 Aug 82 p 5]

NUMAYRI RATIFIES AGREEMENTS--Khartoum, Aug 25 (SUNA)--President Numayri has ratified a grant agreement between the Netherlands and the Sudan signed here last April. According to the agreement, the government of the Netherlands will provide the Sudan with 51 million Dutch guilders to be earmarked for the construction of Al-Ubayyid-Al-Dubaybah, Omcurman-Dunqulah and Nyala-Al-El Fashir highways. The President also ratified a protocol for technical cooperation in the field of water-resources between Sudan and Nigeria. The protocol, signed last April, will enable Nigeria to benefit from the Sudanese experience in irrigation as well as training opportunities for Nigerian engineers. The protocol also includes exchange of visits between the two countries' officials in order to strengthen bilateral relations in that connection, SUNA learnt. [Text]
[Khartoum SUNA in English No 4228, 25 Aug 82 p 2]

NILE WATERS COMMITTEE MEETING--Khartoum, Aug 27 (SUNA)--A meeting of the Technical Committee for the study of the future of the Equatorial Lakes project has commenced in Cairo, Egypt, during the period Aug. 23-26, SUNA learned. The committee consented to extend the duration of the project to five years, with the aim of promoting the hydrological studies and specifying the proposed storage and control systems in the Upper Nile areas. It's worth noting that the Irrigation Ministers in Sudan and Egypt, had earlier this month, paid a visit to the Nile Basin States in East Africa where they reached an agreement with the Water Resources Ministers therein for extending the duration of the said project. The committee's membership includes the Sudan, Egypt, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, Zaire and Ethiopia, SUNA adds. [Text]
[Khartoum SUNA in English No 4230, 27 Aug 82 pp 1, 2]

POPULATION CENSUS--Khartoum, Aug 27 (SUNA)--Internal Affairs State Minister Mohammad 'Uthman Abu-Saq yesterday morning reviewed with the officials of the Culture and Information Dept and those of the Department of Statistics here the role the mass media should play in the context of the national campaign for the Third Population Census. The meeting set up two committees to work out and coordinate an overall information campaign for national enlightenment. [Text]
[Khartoum SUNA in English No 6230, 27 Aug 82 p 3]

INDUSTRIAL PROJECTS FINANCING--The Central Region Government, the Industrial Bank and the Sudanese Savings Bank have agreed to implement seven industrial projects in the Region through joint finance, official sources have told SUNA. [Text]
[Khartoum SUNA in English 4231, 28 Aug 82 p 3]

TRANSPORT COMPANY PROFIT--Al-Jazirah Transport Company has made a profit of Ls 160,000 during the past fiscal year ending on December said Finance Minister of the Central Region Abdallah Imam. The success was the result of the measures taken lately to organize and promote the company's functioning. [Text]
[Khartoum SUNA in English No 4229, 26 Aug 82 p 10]

CENTRAL REGION-EMIRATES COMPANY--The Regional Government has allocated Ls 500,000 to meet the first part of its share in the Central Region-Emirates Company, SUNA-learnt. The capital of the company reaches Ls 6 million out of which an Ls 2 million will be paid by the Regional Government and Ls 4 million by the Sudan-Emirates Company. The company will launch its activities by implementing two vital projects: oil tankers and a poultry farm, said the Regional Minister of Finance and Board Chairman of the Company Abdallah Imam. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA in English No 4229, 26 Aug 82 p 10]

FOREIGN EXCHANGE NEW ORDER--Khartoum, Aug 26 (SUNA)--Finance and Economic Planning Minister Ibrahim Mun'im Mansur yesterday issued a new order abrogating his previous one that has fixed the maximum price of foreign exchange, SUNA learnt. The new order obliges every exchange office to announce daily the price of foreign exchange. The canceled order had fixed 115 Pts. as a maximum selling price and 113 Pts. as a maximum buying price for a U.S. dollar. A press statement by the Ministry of Finance affirmed that the Bank of Sudan would continue following up the exchange market with the view of assessing the experiment and then taking the appropriate measures if necessary. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA in English No 4229, 26 Aug 82 pp 4, 5]

SOUTH-NORTH UNITY STRESSED--Juba, Aug 26 (SUNA)--Deputy First Secretary of the SSU Preparatory Central Committee Zayn-al-'Abidin Muhammad 'Abd-al-Qadir has stressed the importance of unity between the South and the North adding that the self-rule applied in the South was the basis on which the regional government system was built in the regions of the north. Abdel Gadir, addressing here yesterday secretaries and representatives of popular and sectoral organizations of Jonglai, Western and Eastern Equatorial Provinces, praised the daring steps taken by the May Revolution for solving the problem of the South and restoring peace there after the civil war. He said the meeting was intended to reorganize the political organization and prepare for the SSU national congress. He also called upon the participants to exert efforts to overcome problems. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA in English No 4229, 26 Aug 82 pp 3,4]

CSO: 4500/293

BRIEFS

THALA LIME FACTORY--Last Wednesday a deal was signed relating to the completion of the Thala lime factory. A program has already been adopted: the excavation works will begin in November 1982; the civil engineers will conduct a survey in April 1983. The entire project will most likely take shape 29 months from the date of signature. Initially, two deposits, considered important, were discovered: one at Mezzouna (Sidi Bouzid); the other at Thala (Kasserine). After on-site seismic and geological studies and extensive in vitro, [portion within slantlines, underlined] analyses, it turned out that the Mezzouna deposit has many parasitic elements. Consequently, it was abandoned leaving only the Thala [deposit] which contains raw material of a much higher quality. It was undoubtedly for reasons of economic profitability that a "pause" was marked, which lasted more than 4 years. In fact, according to the economic study undertaken jointly by the Ministry of Equipment and the Ministry of National Economy, it would require, at the very least, 15 years of full-scale production to amortize the completion costs which no other developer but the state would accept because the total investment amounts to 22,795,000 dinars. The project is as big as the risks are great: under normal conditions, the goods cannot be moved at less than 32 dinars a ton (the current price of lime being 28 dinars). Two major advantages nevertheless restore the balance: the first is that this unit will make up for the country's deficit in natural hydraulic lime for at least the entire period of the sixth plan. Hardly a negligible quantity. The second is that the lime factory is really the first industrial project in Thala, and the second or third, at the very most, in the entire region of Kasserine--a fact which will surely make this project a center from which the whole region will benefit in the medium and long term. When completed, this plant will allow the creation of 130 jobs in the initial phase. [Text] [Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 23 Aug 82 p 2]

OPPOSITION PARTY MEETING--The Tunisian Movement of Popular Unity (MUP) held a plenary meeting of its Political Bureau in Paris during which it decided to open [its doors] to other Tunisian political movements in order to establish a front among the forces which do not enjoy a legal existence in the country. The MUP is the only Tunisian movement which holds its central meetings outside of Tunisia, because Ahmed Ben Salah, its Secretary General, is outside the country. [Text] [London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic No 251, 13 Sep 82 p 13]

END OF

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